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When humans use the mental states (e.g., beliefs, intentions) and the emotional 
states of others to predict or explain another person's behaviour, they have 
demonstrated their theory of mind understanding. Theory of mind is "one of the 
quintessential abilities that makes us human" (Baron-Cohen, 2000, p. 3). Emotion 
understanding has been considered by some to be an aspect of theory of mind 
understanding. There are several theories proposed to explain the development of 
theory of mind, from changes in representational abilities (Pemer, 1991), to having an 
innate domain specific module (Fodor, 1992; Leslie, 1994), to social linguistic 
influences (Nelson et al., 2003). One facet of theory of mind understanding, 
understanding false belief, has been consistently found to develop at around 3 or 4 
years of age (e.g., Wimmer & Pemer, 1983). Another cognitive ability that develops 
at the approximately the same time is that of autobiographical memory. 
Autobiographical memory has been defined as "memory for information and events 
pertaining to the self' (Howe & Courage, 1993, p. 306). There are also several 
theories explaining the onset of autobiographical memory. Two similar theories by 
Pemer (1991) and Welch-Ross (1995) proposed that until a child possesses dual 
representational abilities (or theory of mind), they cannot form autobiographical 
memories. Nelson (1993) and Fivush (2001) have both proposed that autobiographical 
memory is developed through shared narratives with more experienced others (e.g., 
parents). There are several factors that have been found to contribute to theory of 
mind, emotion understanding, and autobiographical memory. Language abilities have 
been related to all three cognitive abilities (e.g., Slade & Ruffman, 2005; Dunn & 
Cutting, 1999; Harley & Reese, 1999). Factors such as maternal talk, gender of the 
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child, and the number of siblings the child has, have all been related to at least two of 
these abilities. In the current study, I addressed the relation between theory of mind 
understanding, emotion understanding, and autobiographical memory in three studies. 
The first study investigated the relations between language, theory of mind, emotion 
understanding, and mother-child talk about past events in 61 children at three 6-
month intervals from 42- to 54- months of age. The second study also investigated 
these factors and the children's pretence in 59 children at 48- months of age. In the 
second study, the mother's theory of mind and emotion understanding were also 
measured. In the third study, I investigated the relations between theory of mind, 
emotion understanding and early memory recall in 73 adults, with an average age of 
20 years. One key finding was that, despite theoretical predictions, there was no clear 
relation between theory of mind understanding and autobiographical memory in either 
children or adults. Results showed that theory of mind and emotion understanding are 
related but distinct abilities. The number of siblings, or the gender of the participants 
were not strongly related to theory of mind, autobiographical memory, or emotion 
understanding. Language abilities and maternal talk were the strongest factors related 
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Autobiographical Memory- Definition and Explanation 
1 
Autobiographical memory has been defined as "memory for information and 
events pertaining to the self' (Howe and Courage, 1993, p. 306). It is more than 
memory for the past, however. Fivush (200 1) distinguished between episodic and 
autobiographical memory. Both types of memories involve representations of a past 
event, but only in autobiographical memories is the representation of the past event 
understood as happening to me (italics in original). Most of the research has focused 
on verbally accessible, definite, one-time events (Reese, 2002a). Previous research 
has consistently found that the average age of an adults' first memory (the onset of 
autobiographical memory) is between three and four years of age (MacDonald, 
Uesiliana & Hayne, 2000; Mullen, 1994). 
The development of autobiographical memories does not occur until three or 
four years of age (Sheingold & Tenney, 1982). Sheingold and Tenney (1982) 
investigated the ages at which recall for a salient event occurred. They questioned 
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children from the ages of 4 to 12 and college students on a set of questions about the 
birth of a sibling. Sheingold and Tenney (1982) found that not until the child was at 
least 3 years old at the time of the birth, did they recall any details about their 
siblings' birth, and that if the participant was 4 at the time of their siblings' birth they 
could recall a considerable amount. The age of onset of autobiographical memory at 
three to four years has been consistently determined using both free and directed 
recall with adults (Pillemer & White, 1989). 
Autobiographical memory has been linked to a phenomenon called childhood 
amnesia. Childhood amnesia is the adult's inability to recall memories for their early 
childhood. So the offset of childhood amnesia occurs when autobiographical memory 
develops. Wetzler and Sweeney (1986) investigated the existence of the phenomenon 
of childhood amnesia by looking at how autobiographical memories were distributed 
across a lifespan. Using data from Rubin (1982, cited in Wetzler & Sweeney, 1986) 
they found that the distribution of autobiographical memories for later childhood and 
adulthood could be described using a power function that fitted forgetting as a 
function of time. However, the distribution of memories before the age of five was 
lower than would have been predicted using this power function. Wetzler and 
Sweeney (1982) suggested that childhood amnesia is characterised by the lack of 
early memories that cannot be explained due to forgetting over time. 
The inability of adults to remember events that took place before this period 
(childhood amnesia) is not due to the child having poor memory ability. There is clear 
evidence that even infants have long-term memory. Meltzoff (1995) used deferred 
imitation to assess both memory and cognition in infants who were as young as 14 
months old. He found that after a 2- month delay the infants could imitate the actions 
previously seen performed with four novel objects. Meltzoff extended the delay and 
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showed that the infants could reproduce the behaviours they had witnessed 4 months 
earlier. He concluded that the infants had "long -term recall of events, even those that 
have not been practised" (p. 512) 
Long- term memory in young children was also evidenced by Fivush, Gray 
and Fromhoff(1987) who interviewed children between the ages of29 and 35 months 
on events that had either happened in the previous three months or more than 3 
months ago. They found that all the children were able to recall information about an 
event that had occurred more than six months before. Moreover, the two year old 
children were capable of providing a reasonably coherent narrative about the 
distinctive one-time events. 
Children's memory for a one- off event has also been found to last over 
several years. Pillemer, Picariello and Pruett (1994) used a fire alarm in a preschool to 
measure the children's recall 2 weeks after the event and then 7 years later. They 
found that two weeks after the event the 4 Yz year olds more accurately recalled their 
location at the time of the alarm than did the 3 Yz year olds, and more 4 Yz year olds 
reported the cause of the alarm. Pillemer et al. brought the same students back to the 
preschool 7 years later for free and prompted recall of the event. They found that the 
children who were 3 Yz year olds at the time of the event either had no memory of the 
event or the recall was fragmentary, whereas one third of the older children who had 
been 4 Yz years at the time had coherent narratives, and 86% recalled their location at 
the time the fire alarm went off (Pillemer et al., 1994). 
Theories of Autobiographical Memory 
So how do we explain the paradox that adults appear to remember very little 
from their childhoods, yet there is evidence that children below the age of 3 or 4 have 
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long- term memories? Many theories have been proposed to explain this phenomenon 
of childhood amnesia, some of which are cognitive, social or neurological. In the 
following section I review social and cognitive explanations for autobiographical 
memory onset. I begin with Freud because he made childhood amnesia an important 
theoretical concern. 
Freud's Blockade Model. One of the first theories to explain childhood 
amnesia was proposed by Freud (1905/1953, cited in Pillemer & White, 1989). Freud 
noticed in his clinical population a dearth of memories for the experiences that took 
place before the ages of 6 to 8 years. Freud (1905/1953) proposed that this was due to 
the sexual and aggressive nature of early memories; therefore these memories were 
repressed or blocked from being recalled as an adult (cited in Pillemer & White, 
1989). Freud (1916- 1917/ 1963, cited in Pillemer & White, 1989) also proposed a 
second model to explain childhood amnesia called the selective reconstruction model. 
Childhood amnesia, according to this model, is due to an immature memory system 
which fails to convert the child's fragmented memories into a form that can be 
recalled later by the adult (Freud, 1916- 1917/1963, cited in Pillemer & White, 1989). 
The research discussed earlier has already discredited Freud's theories. There us 
ample evidence that children under the age of 6 have impressive memory abilities. 
Socially Induced Changes Theory. Both Schactel (1947) and Neisser (1962, 
1967) posited that childhood amnesia is caused by mismatch of the mental structures 
at encoding and retrieval. Due to social changes that take place during childhood, the 
mental structures used to encode memories change. As an adult, the cues that they use 
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to attempt to retrieve early memories are not successful, because they are not the cues 
that were used to encode the memories (cited in Pillemer & White, 1989). 
Dual Memory Systems. Whereas Schactel and Neisser mention only one 
memory system which changes over time, Pillemer and White (1989) proposed that 
there are two memory systems. The first memory system is available from birth and 
continues throughout the lifespan. The primary memory system consists mainly of 
locations, feelings and people. This early memory system is not accessible verbally, 
but can be addressed using situational and affective cues. The second memory system, 
called the socially accessible system, does not develop until the later preschool years. 
It is not until this system develops that a child can encode and store long-term 
autobiographical memories. Memories in this second system can be intentionally 
retrieved and only enter this second system with purposeful mental processing. The 
main precursor of the socially accessible system is the development of language, but 
the socially accessible memory system is also improved with other cognitive 
developments that occur at the same time such as the development of causal- temporal 
sequencing (Pillemer & White, 1989) 
Cognitive- Motivational Account. Conway and Pleydell- Pearce (2000) 
proposed that childhood amnesia is mainly due to the difference in goals and goal 
structures for infants and adults. They claim that autobiographical memories are 
encoded and retrieved with reference to the goals of the individual at the time. Infants 
have vastly different goals to adults and it is the mismatch between these goals used to 
encode the memories and the goals used at recall, that make early memories 
inaccessible to adults (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). They note that possessing a 
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concept of the self is an important aspect of autobiographical memory development, 
for infants would not have a fully developed self-system with which goals would be 
linked. However, they state that more than a sense of self is needed for the emergence 
of autobiographical memories. Instead, they argue that changes in goals and goal 
structures, along with neuro-physiological development of the frontal lobes, are a 
requirement (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). They also discount the influence of 
linguistic experience on the basis that "memories are records of progress in attaining 
personal goals, and we have no choice but to form them no matter what our linguistic 
experience" (Conway & Pleydell- Pearce, 2000, p. 279). This cognitive- motivational 
theory is difficult to experimentally validate. One problem would be ascertaining what 
the motivations or goals of the individual are, especially if the individual is unaware 
of his/her goals. The goals may be subconscious. 
Self Recognition Theory. Howe and Courage (1993) proposed that the 
phenomenon of childhood amnesia disappears as the child develops a sense of self. It 
is the sense of self that is the core factor in the development of autobiographical 
memory (Howe & Courage, 1993). Children develop a sense of self at around 18 to 24 
months; therefore any event that occurs before then will not be coded as 
autobiographical memory but will instead become part of the child's general 
experience (Howe & Courage, 1993). 
It is this sense of self which is first seen using a mirror self recognition task 
(Lewis & Brooks- Gunn, 1979) at between 18 and 24 months of age. This is shown by 
self-directed pointing or mirror self-recognition where a dot of rouge is surreptitiously 
put on the child's nose under the guise of wiping the child's nose. The child is 
positioned in front of a mirror and if he or she points to his/her nose then they are 
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attributed with a cognitive sense of self or self-recognition. The development of self-
recognition has been said to be due to maturational not experiential or social factors, 
although what maturational factors contribute is not certain (Howe & Courage, 1997). 
But evidence has shown that mother's education, social economic status, and other 
social factors do not affect the rate of acquisition of self recognition (Lewis & 
Brooks- Gunn, 1979). Children with developmental or maturational difficulties do not 
show mirror self recognition until they are of a maturational age of at least 18 months, 
regardless of their chronological age (Howe & Courage, 1997). Talk about the self 
does not become apparent until after mirror self recognition. Children start to reliably 
use the terms "I" and "you" at around 22 to 24 months of age (Fenson, et al., 1994, 
cited in Howe, 2000) so the concept of self is in place long before it can be verbalized 
(this is similar to other concept development e.g., the concept that dogs, cats, giraffes 
and lions are all animals) (Howe, 2000). 
Not until there is a sense of "me" can a person encode memories that will 
become autobiographical in the sense they are a memory of something that has 
happened to "me". In other words, what is needed is a personal frame of reference 
with which to code the memories. This personal frame of reference serves to organize 
and structure memories (Howe, 2003). The lower boundary of autobiographical 
memories according to Howe, Courage and Edison (2003) is around 2 years. Howe 
and Courage (1993) do not exclude factors such as language or neurological 
development on the emergence of autobiographical memory, but they argue that 
developing a sense of self is the most fundamental factor. 
Howe and Courage (1993), unlike others such as Pillemer and White (1989), 
assume that there is only one memory system. The development of this memory 
system, although it appears to be discontinuous, is in fact continuous. Its 
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discontinuous appearance is due to the cognitive changes that affect memory 
performance. Cognitive changes are themselves continuous, but it may not be until 
they reach a critical mass that they make any apparent differences to memory 
performance. Cognitive changes, or as Howe and Courage regard as changes in 
memory 'software', include factors such as language, meta-memory, and sense of self. 
These cognitive changes affect the way that memory is encoded. Once the children 
have an organising concept, they can then encode the memories using this concept. 
The concept is dynamic, using the concept during encoding leads to changes in the 
concept. For example, as more memories are encoded about the self the definition of 
the self also changes. The development of the self concept provides a bottom limit, or 
the earliest possible age that an event can be encoded in autobiographical memory. As 
the definition of self becomes more complex and detailed, the probability of a 
memory becoming autobiographical increases (Howe & Courage, 1997). According to 
Howe, "The self serves to provide a new organiser and the regulator of experience and 
the foundation of autobiographical memory" (Howe, 2003, p. 64). 
Howe and Courage (1997) added further to the proposed theory by explaining 
the nature of the language input on autobiographical memory. Howe and Courage 
(1997) proposed that language, instead of adding to the development of 
autobiographical memory, is simply an outlet through which autobiographical 
memory can be expressed. Language also aids in the preservation and reconstruction 
of autobiographical memory. 
How do they explain the large variability in the number of autobiographical 
memories that increase over time? Howe and Courage not only propose that the vast 
differences are due to differences in the onset of self recognition, but they also 
propose that changes in the storage capabilities contribute to these individual 
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differences. The storage capacity of long term memories continues to increase as the 
children go through their preschool and school years. This increase has also been 
attributed to changes in memory software (e.g., changes in the use of memory 
strategies). They also posit that the sense of self develops more features as the 
children get older. Features of the self could include physical attributes, skills, and 
aspects of their personalities. The increase in the number of features leads to a higher 
possibility that the features will become encoded as part of an event. Howe and 
Courage also disagree with a number of theories that posit that language is a major 
factor in the development of autobiographical memories. Howe (2000) disagrees with 
the interpretation made by others for the correlation found between language and 
personal memory recall. It has been interpreted by others that increasing language 
abilities leads to increasing memory abilities. Instead, Howe proposed that memory 
recall does not change with age, just the ability to verbalize the memory changes. So 
the correlation is simply due to language providing better narrative abilities not better 
memory abilities. 
According to Howe and Courage, the development of a sense of self is not due 
to social factors but is instead due to maturational factors. So social and experiential 
factors are not what underlie the development of autobiographical memories, but 
these factors may influence the content of early memories (Howe & Courage, 1997). 
This would mean that differences found cross culturally would be due to differences 
in the development of a sense of self. That is, cross- cultural "differences in the onset 
of autobiographical memory in atypical populations should be directly related to 
delays in the establishment of the cognitive self and not chronological age" (Howe & 
Courage, 1997, p. 516). 
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Povinelli (1995) articulated a similar position to that of Howe and Courage 
(1993, 1997); however, he proposed that it was not until children have a 'proper self 
concept that autobiographical memories are possible. In order to have a proper self the 
children must be able to hold more than one representation of the self; it is not until 
the child can hold a representation of a past self and an immediate self that the child 
can develop autobiographical memories. Povinelli (1995) argues that the development 
of a 'proper self has a large "impact on the child's conception of self as an entity with 
a personal history" (p. 165). 
Theory of Mind Explanation. Pemer (2000b) suggests that an important factor 
in the development of autobiographical memories and the offset of childhood amnesia 
is the development of the awareness that direct knowledge is only obtained from 
informational access. In other words, it is not until the child understands that 
experience leads to knowing that they can form autobiographical memories. Pemer 
posits that the failure of adults to recall their early memories is because the memories 
were not encoded as personally experienced. It is with the development of theory of 
mind and the "understanding that one's knowledge about the past comes through 
direct experience" (Pemer, 2000b, p. 306) that improvements are seen in 
autobiographical memory. It is not until children have a representational theory of 
mind that they can form episodic traces (Pemer, 1991 ). Representational abilities are 
important for both theory of mind and autobiographical memory development. 
Children cannot understand false belief (a widely accepted caveat of theory of mind) 
until they are able to understand that representations are representations, or in other 
words possess meta-representation. Understanding false belief entails understanding 
that someone may hold a belief that differs from the understood reality. Similarly 
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Pemer (2000b) proposed that young children's problems with representation are the 
source of their childhood amnesia. If the child possesses only a weak representation of 
the event, the representation is more susceptible to interference from similar events so 
will not become an autobiographical memory. 
Pemer and Ruffman (1995) investigated the relation between the children's 
origin of their knowledge and their free recall abilities. They used see-know tasks and 
aspectuality tasks to determine the children's knowledge of experiential awareness. 
The see-know task involves two differing aspects. One is the children's ability to 
explain how they knew where the object was (i.e., were they told where it was, did 
they see it placed there, or did they have no knowledge of the object's location?) The 
second aspect of the task was to differentiate between whether they had known the 
object's location or had just guessed its location (know-guess subtask). In the 
aspectuality task the children are shown two objects where the differences between 
them can only be distinguished by either touch or sight. One of the objects is hidden 
and the child is asked, "How do you find out which object it is, by looking or 
touching?" In a series of experiments they found that the children's knowledge of 
experiential awareness was related to their free recall performance. Their growing 
understanding of tasks such as the see-know task lead to improvements in their free 
recall (Pemer & Ruffman, 1995). 
Pemer and Ruffman (1995) claim that children require an understanding that 
experience leads to knowledge but state that how they acquire this knowledge is not 
established in the current theory. They proposed that social interactions with parents 
may influence the development of experience-knowledge connection (Pemer & 
Ruffman, 1995). 
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Multiple Factor Theory. Welch- Ross (1995) provided a related argument to 
that of Pemer (2000b ). She stated that the level of understanding of mental 
representation needed for the emergence of autobiographical memory is implicit 
rather than explicit as predicted by Pemer's theory. Welch- Ross (1995) suggested 
that the explicit understanding of the relation between experience and knowledge 
(which Pemer posits as the essential cognitive development for the emergence of 
autobiographical memories) is only needed to refine the autobiographical memories, 
but it is implicit knowledge that is needed for the onset. The implicit understanding 
that experience leads to knowledge develops in children between the ages of 3 and 4, 
which is congruent with the onset of autobiographical memory (Welch- Ross, 1995). 
Welch- Ross (1995) also suggested that there are other factors necessary for the 
development of autobiographical memories. Howe and Courage (1993) theorised that 
an understanding of self is a critical factor for the emergence of autobiographical 
memory. Welch- Ross (1995) takes this concept further by proposing that it is not 
until the child has an organised psychological self-concept that autobiographical 
memories can be formed. An organised, psychological self-concept works alongside 
the representational abilities of the child and allows encoding of memories as 
personally experienced (Welch- Ross, 1995). Another factor in Welch- Ross's model 
of autobiographical memory development is social interaction with parents, or talking 
about past events with adults. Through social interactions, children learn about 
verbally reinstating memories, which allows them to be retained for longer periods of 
time. Social interaction will only influence the understanding of verbal reinstatement, 
however if the child has an understanding of the act of remembering (Welch- Ross, 
1995). 
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Welch- Ross, Fasig, and Farrar (1999) found a relation between the 
organisation of the child's self concept and the amount of emotion talk mothers used 
in joint conversations. There was no relation found between the mothers' mental state 
talk and children's organised self-concepts. These results suggested that mother-child 
talk about emotions could influence the development of autobiographical memories 
by helping the child develop an organised self-concept, which can be used to encode 
memories (Welch- Ross, Fasig, & Farrar, 1999). Also mother's emotion talk can help 
foster "a personal, evaluative perspective on events that children use to organise 
events for long-term recall" (Welch- Ross, 2001, p. 104). 
The links between the factors in Welch-Ross's model were more clearly 
investigated in Welch- Ross (1997). She looked at the relation between past event talk 
between a mother and child and the child's theory of mind. Children between the ages 
of 3 Y2 and 4 Y2 years took part in conversations with their mothers about three past 
events and completed several theory of mind tasks. Welch- Ross (1997) found a 
positive relation between the children's memory responses and their theory of mind 
understanding, and this relation still existed when the child's age and linguistic skills 
were accounted for. Welch- Ross (1997) also found that the mothers' frequency of 
elaborative statements related positively to the children's ability to understand 
conflicting mental representations. The results suggested that the amount of new 
information the mother provided about an event made evident to the children that 
others could have a differing representation of the same event (Welch- Ross, 1997). 
Reese and Cleveland (2006) also investigated the relations between mother-
child talk, theory of mind, and autobiographical memory when children were 40 and 
51 months old. At 40 months the children completed an implicit test of understanding 
of mind; at 51 months the children were given an explicit understanding of mind task. 
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The children completed three standard theory of mind tasks at 51 months, and the 
mothers took part in discussions of one-time past events at both time points. Reese 
and Cleveland found no relation between the implicit understanding of mind at 41 
months and the children's autobiographical memory, which would dispute Welch-
Ross's (1995) claims. However, the elaborateness of the mothers' narratives was 
related to the children's implicit understanding of mind at 41 months. Overall the 
children's implicit or explicit understanding of mind was not the main contributor to 
the children's autobiographical memory. Instead, the mother's use of elaborations was 
one of the strongest predictors of autobiographical memory in the children. Another 
interesting finding was that mother's elaborations and their meta-memory talk were 
both related to the children's understanding of mind (Reese & Cleveland, 2006). The 
authors suggested that the links seen between autobiographical memory and 
children's understanding of mind found in other studies (e.g. Pemer & Ruffman, 
1995; Welch- Ross, 1997) are illusory, and it is the underlying language skills 
required for both tasks that maintain the link (Reese & Cleveland, 2006). It may be 
that the amount mothers elaborate during conversations with their children is a 
mediator for both theory of mind and autobiographical memory. 
Joint Reminiscing and the Evaluative Self. Fivush (2001) posits that 
participating in joint reminiscing is a vital part in the development of autobiographical 
memories, that it is "through joint reminiscing that one comes to have a personal past" 
(p. 51). Fivush (2001) acknowledges that language ability is important to the 
development of autobiographical memory. Language is used to communicate and 
structure memories. By participating in joint reminiscing the child learns not only how 
to reminisce, but the importance of reminiscing (Fivush, 2001). It is through joint 
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reminiscing that the child learns of two critical aspects that transform what would 
otherwise be episodic memories into autobiographical memory. The first aspect is the 
understanding that memory is a representation of a past event. The second is that this 
representation is subjective; others can have differing representations of the same past 
event. 
Similar to Pemer's theory, Fivush (2001) has proposed that for 
autobiographical memory development children need to understand that individuals 
can have differing representations. Children show that they understand that others can 
have differing representations during typical false belief tasks. For children to 
successfully pass the false belief task, they need to understand that the protagonist in 
the story has a different representation of the current event than the child, and the 
protagonist's representation will affect his/her actions. Like the false belief task, for 
children to successfully narrate a past event they need to understand that the person 
they are reminiscing with may have a different representation of the event. Fivush 
agrees with Pemer's position that an understanding of representation is necessary for 
autobiographical memory development, but takes the argument one step further by 
proposing that the cognitive developments necessary for autobiographical memory 
development are brought about by joint reminiscing with parents. It is through joint 
reminiscing that children come to see memories as an object that can be shared with 
others through discussion (Fivush, 2001 ). 
In order to develop autobiographical memories the child must also understand 
that the representation they hold of that memory is subjective and unique to 
themselves, and that others may hold a different representation of the same event. By 
evaluating the event during joint reminiscing, children learn that they hold a 
subjective view of the event, and that the parents may hold a differing evaluation of 
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that same event (Fivush, 2001). This second aspect is mainly developed through 
conflicts between the child's and the parents' view of the event and the discussion of 
the conflict (Fivush, 2001 ). 
Social Interaction Theory. One of the most influential theories on 
autobiographical memory is the social interaction theory. The social interaction theory 
differs from the joint reminiscing theory in that it does not posit an understanding of 
representation as an underlying factor in the development of autobiographical 
memory. However, like the joint reminiscing theory proposed by Fivush, Nelson 
(1993) stated that it is during conversation with others about past events that the child 
learns to "structure memories in narrative form" (p.IO). When children are young, the 
talk about the past is 'scaffolded' by a more experienced adult (normally a parent). In 
early conversations about the past, the parents usually provide all the information and 
the child confirms the parent's utterances. As the children get older they become more 
involved in the past conversations and go on to answer questions; even later they will 
initiate conversations about past events (Nelson & Fivush, 2000). At the ages of 2 Y2 
to 3 years, the children are able to actively co-construct the past during conversations 
with adults (Fivush, 1994). This allows the memory to be more easily verbally 
recalled later. Nelson (1993) stated that autobiographical memories are important 
because they are memories that can be shared with other individuals and sharing of 
autobiographical memories is made possible by the development of language. Also 
autobiographical memories serve to provide a continual sense of self across time 
(Nelson, 2003). Nelson (1993) also stated that by the child recounting the memories to 
others, the form of the memory narrative becomes internalised, and therefore the child 
can recount the memory to him/herself, which serves to strengthen the memory. 
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Howe and Courage deny that social factors such as shared narratives about 
past events impact on the development of autobiographical memories. They propose 
that talk about past events with more experienced elders help provide the content of 
early autobiographical memory but not the onset. 
Research on Autobiographical Memory 
There is numerous research that supports the influence of parental 
socialisation on the development of autobiographical memory. 
Mother-Child Talk about the Past. There are many studies that provide evidence 
showing that, while participating in conversations about the past, children are learning 
to construct coherent memory narratives and that the individual difference seen in 
mother's narrative style are leading to differences in the memory narratives (or 
autobiographical memories) of the children (Fivush & Reese, 2002). 
One such study by Reese, Haden and Fivush (1993) analysed the linguistic 
environment of young children. They found that mothers could be divided into two 
groups based on the conversational styles the mothers used with their children (Reese 
et al., 1993). Some mothers were classified as high elaborative; these mothers had 
lengthy discussions about the past and would elaborate on the child's narrative. Other 
mothers were low on elaboration; these mothers had shorter conversations about past 
events and were more likely to repeat the questions they had asked their children 
(Reese et al., 1993). Reese and Fivush (1993) also found a relation between the 
children's participation in the conversations and the amount of elaboration the 
parent's used during the conversation. The directionality of these results cannot be 
inferred due to the cross sectional nature of the experiment. 
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Reese et al. (1993) was one of the first studies to investigate longitudinally the 
relation between mother's narrative style and children's memory development. The 
mother-child dyads discussed shared past events when the children were 40-, 46-, 58-
and 70- months of age. Reese et al. (1993) found that mothers' who were highly 
elaborative early on remained highly elaborative throughout, but all the mothers 
became more elaborative over the course of the study. Reese et al. found that the 
mother's narrative style was not a function of the children's linguistic skills or their 
developing memory abilities. They also found that children were more likely to add 
new pieces of information into a discussion when they had highly elaborative mothers 
and that children whose mothers were highly elaborative at 40- and 46- months were 
more likely to recall more up to 12 months later, at 58 and 70 months of age. When 
the children were 58 and 70 months of age, the influence between mother's narrative 
style and children's recall became bidirectional. Reese et al. concluded that one of the 
critical factors in the development of memory is maternal elaborateness during 
conversations about the past and stated that the "socialisation of complex skills, such 
as memory narratives, may take place over extended periods oftime" (1993, p. 427). 
Another study that investigated the effect of mother's style of talk on 
children's recall by Leichtman, Pillemer, Wang, Koreishi and Han (2000) set up a 
unique event for children between the ages 4 to 6 years. This event included a 
previous teacher coming to school with her newborn infant. The children were 
interviewed about the event by the mothers afterwards and by a researcher three 
weeks later. Leichtman et al. were interested in whether the mothers would still 
display low and high elaborative styles of talk for an event where instead of joint 
reminiscing being the focus, the main goal was to obtain unknown information from 
the child. The researchers also asked whether differences in maternal style might 
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influence the amount the child recalled three weeks later. Leichtman et al. not only 
found the same conversation styles shown during joint reminiscing when the mother 
was questioning the child, but also found that the more elaborative the mother was 
during the interview after the event, the more accurate and the more detailed the 
child's recall was for the researcher three weeks later. The children of more 
elaborative mothers were encouraged during the talk to give more details about the 
event (Leichtman et al., 2000). The elaborative questioning by the mother appeared to 
help the child produce a more detailed representation of the event. The children of 
more elaborative mothers did not simply talk more with the researcher, but were more 
likely to mention a specific object that was discussed with their mothers than objects 
that had not been previously discussed. 
A slightly different approach was taken by Cleveland and Reese (2005). They 
investigated the effect of maternal autonomy, structure, and ultimately reminiscing 
style on the children's ability to recall and reminisce about past events. The children 
talked about past events at 40- and 65-months of age with their mothers and an 
experimenter. Mothers were considered to have autonomy support when they 
validated their children's memories and followed the children's lead during the 
conversation. The structure that the mother's provided during the conversations with 
their children was assessed by the number of questions that were open ended and 
whether they asked the child for new information about the event. Cleveland and 
Reese found that more elaborative mothers, or mothers who provided more autonomy 
support, had children that provided more memory information during the shared past-
event talk. In the long-term, mothers who structured the conversations more had 
children who participated and remembered more at the later time point. The mother's 
level of autonomy support at 40 months also positively predicted children's later 
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memory. Cleveland and Reese concluded that children's remtmscmg IS being 
encouraged by the mother's use of open ended elaborative questions during talk about 
the past. 
Maternal Talk During an Event. Haden, Ornstein, Eckerman, and Didow 
(2001) investigated the effect of mother- child talk on the child's recall one day and 
then three days later for three novel events that took place when the child was 30-, 36-
and 42- months old. Haden et al. found that features of the event that had been jointly 
discussed by the mothers and children at the time of the event were more likely to be 
freely recalled up to three weeks later. These results support the view that mother-
child talk during the event not only directs the children's attention to the salient 
aspects of the event, but also enhances their understanding of the event and could 
serve to structure their memory of the event so that it can be retrieved more readily at 
a later stage. One problem with this interpretation of the results was that the mothers 
had a conversation with the child approximately a week after each event. Although 
the conversation was recorded, the aspects that were discussed were not controlled for 
in the analyses of the recall at three weeks post -event. Therefore, one cannot be 
certain that only the interaction between the mother and child at the time of the event, 
rather than conversation between the mother and child a week later, was the only 
factor influencing what was recalled three weeks later. 
Tessler and Nelson (1994) also investigated the effect of discussion during an 
event on what was later recalled. They hypothesised that language during an event 
will accentuate aspects of the event, which will in tum make them more memorable. 
Tessler and Nelson (1994) found that only objects jointly discussed by 3 to 3 Yz year 
olds with their mothers were later recalled. If either the mother or the child discussed 
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the object alone, it was not later recalled. In the second study on children between the 
ages of 4 and 4 Yz years, the object only had to be discussed by either the mother or 
the child for it to be later recalled. Tessler and Nelson (1994) also investigated 
mothers' style of talk during an event and found that the child's style of talk (narrative 
or pragmatic) mirrored the mother's style of talk even when the child was talking with 
an experimenter. Tessler and Nelson's results demonstrated that children are learning 
what aspects of an event are worth remembering and how to talk about past events 
through talk with their mothers. 
Another experiment on the effect of talk during the event has on later memory 
was done by Clark and Murachver (cited in Murachver, 2001). Children between the 
ages of 5 and 7 experienced a zookeeper event. The children either experienced the 
event with full narration (used lots of elaborations and explanations) or an empty 
narration (labelling of objects and actions only). The children were interviewed both a 
week and 6 months later. Children who experienced the zookeeper event with full 
narration were able to report more information than the children who experienced the 
event with an empty narration (Murachver, 2001). Murachver (2001) concluded that 
the linguistic context can influence what is remembered about an event and this 
influence can persist over months. This finding accentuates the importance of social 
interaction in the development and persistence of memories (Murachver, 2001). 
Maternal Talk During an Event- Training. Boland, Haden and Ornstein (2003) 
proposed that conversations that took place between a mother and child during an 
event would serve to focus the child's attention on important aspects of the event and 
also serve to provide information that could help the child understand the event as it 
unfolds. To investigate the effect of maternal talk during an event, Boland et al. 
22 
(2003) trained mothers to use an elaborative style of talk during a shared camping 
event that took place in the child's home when the child was on average 46 months 
old. The children were then interviewed using free and prompted recall one day and 
then three weeks later by a researcher. The mothers were trained to use Wh- questions 
(e.g., What would you use the matchsticks for?), make associations between the 
current event and the child's previous knowledge or experiences, engage in talk about 
the aspects of the event that the child appeared interested in (termed 'follow-ins') and 
praise the child's behaviours (called 'positive evaluations'). Boland et al. found that 
they could successfully and easily train mothers to use the elaborative style during the 
event and that their elaborative talk differed from the mothers that had not been 
trained. The most interesting and relevant result was that elaboratively trained 
mothers had children who produced richer memories of the event. The children of the 
trained mothers did not produce more features but did talk about the features in a 
more embellished fashion. The same result was found for children who had high 
language skills; they had memories with richer detail than children with lower 
language skills. So "enhanced language skills can be associated with an enriched 
encoding of an event in a manner that facilitates subsequent retrieval and reporting" 
(Boland et al., 2003, p. 61). These results support Nelson's proposition that maternal 
conversational style influences children's memories. 
Gender Differences in Early Memory Talk. Reese and Fivush (1993) 
investigated the effect parental styles of talk had on three-year olds' participation in 
conversations about one-time past events. Reese and Fivush (1993) found that 
although mothers and fathers did not differ in their styles of talk, they differed in their 
conversational style with respect to the child's gender. Both mothers and fathers were 
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more elaborative with girls than with boys. The boys and girls did not differ in terms 
of their language or memory abilities, but they did differ in their willingness to 
participate in conversations with their parents. The girls talked more during 
conversations with their parents. They also provided more new memory information 
throughout the conversation. Therefore, there is some indication, that the parent's 
conversational style is influencing the children's memory. Reese (1996) also found 
gender differences in the children's birth stories between mother- daughter and 
mother-son dyads. She found that mothers focused niore on the interpersonal aspect of 
the birth story with daughters than with sons. 
Reese, Haden and Fivush (1996) extended this study longitudinally. They 
analysed past event talk between children with the mothers, fathers, and an 
experimenter when the children were 70 months of age. Similar to their findings at the 
previous time point, they found no difference in the narrative styles of the mothers 
and fathers. At the 70- month time point there was no longer a difference in the 
amount of elaborative talk the parents used with their sons and daughters. Reese et al. 
found that the girls provided more memory responses than did the boys with all three 
of the conversational partners, moreover that both the sons and daughters provided the 
most memory responses when they were discussing a past event with their fathers. 
One interesting finding was that the mothers were more likely to evaluate their 
daughter's memory responses than their son's memory responses. The fathers did not 
differ in the use of evaluations for their sons and daughters. These results show that 
gender differences that are sometimes seen in autobiographical memory recall m 
adults are evident very early on in the development of autobiographical memory. 
Haden, Baine and Fivush (1997) looked at conversations about past events 
between children and their parents when they were 40 and 70 months of age. Unlike 
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the results of Reese and Fivush (1993), they found that the parents did not differ in the 
narrative style with respect to the child's gender. However there were gender 
differences in the children's narratives. Girls provided more context information in 
the narratives and also provided longer narratives than the boys (Haden et al., 1997). 
Gender Differences in Autobiographical Memory Recall. Davis (1999) 
investigated whether there were gender differences in the accessibility of 
autobiographical memories in five separate studies with children and adults. There 
had been mixed findings previously on whether there were gender differences in 
autobiographical memory but the studies had not explicitly looked at gender 
differences. Davis (1999) asked children in Grades 3, 5, 8 and 11 to recall as many 
memories for 5 different emotions and measured the latency it took to report the first 
memory. She found that girls not only recalled more memories but were able to recall 
them at a faster rate. Four similar studies with adults consistently found that females 
recalled more emotions. When latencies were measured females were able to retrieve 
them at a faster rate (although in one study this was found only for memories that 
were associated with fear or embarrassment). The gender differences were also found 
for emotional memories about other people as well. There was notably no gender 
difference for non-emotional memories (Davis, 1999). Davis (1999) proposed that the 
gender differences seen were due to different socialisation when parents talk to their 
children about memories. 
Wang (200 1) found across the sample of American and Chinese participants 
that females were more likely to provide memories about distinct one-time events 
than males and were also more likely to have either thought about or discussed the 
memory previously. In another cross-cultural study, Mullen (1994) found that females 
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were more likely to report earlier memories than males. However, Wang (2004) did 
not find any gender differences in the age or amount recalled in American and 
Chinese children. 
Role of Language Development. Simcock and Hayne (2002) gave young 
children a unique event when they were 27-, 33- or 39- months old. The children's 
receptive and productive language abilities were also measured at the time. The 
children were questioned about the event either 6 months or a year later. Overall the 
children did not verbally recall much about the event, but the verbal report only 
contained words that had been in the child's productive vocabulary at the time ofthe 
event. Although the children's vocabulary improved over the retention interval the 
children seemed they were only able to report the event using their language skills at 
the time of the event not their language skills at the time of the recall test (Simcock & 
Hayne, 2002). 
Role of Siblings. Wang, Leichtman, and White (1998) looked at the effect of 
growing up as an only child in China and the effect this would have on 
autobiographical memories. It was predicted that the children who had grown up in 
only-child families would have more private descriptions of self and would also have 
earlier first memories than children with siblings. It was found that Chinese 
adolescents from only-child families had a more self- focused orientation, which 
resembled that found in Western cultures, than the Chinese adolescents that had 
grown up with siblings (Wang et al., 1998). Wang et al. (1998) found that adolescents 
who did not have siblings had their first memories almost 9 months earlier than 
Chinese adolescents who had brothers and/or sisters. The early memories of the only-
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child participants were found to be more self-oriented, whereas other-oriented 
memories (mentions social interactions and family) were more likely to be found in 
individuals who had siblings (Wang et al., 1998). Also, there was a relation found 
between private self descriptions and memory, the participants who had more private 
self descriptions had a higher memory narrative volume, they mentioned the self in 
their memories more frequently and their memories were more specific. This study 
shows that how the child is brought up and socialised has an effect on the 
development of early autobiographical memory (Wang et al., 1998). A similar result 
was found by Mullen (1994). She found that first born individuals had earlier 
memories than later born siblings. 
Cultural Differences. Mullen (1994) investigated what factors influenced the 
onset of autobiographical memory. The four experiments investigated differences 
cross-culturally. Mullen (1994) found that children who had moved house before the 
age of four reported earlier memories than children who had not moved house. This 
was not due to the move itself being memorable; instead the move served as a tool to 
date other memories. It was also found that children who attended preschool also had 
earlier memories than children who did not attend preschool. This may also be 
because preschool served as a mechanism for dating the memory. Most importantly it 
was found by Mullen (1994) that Asian individuals had significantly later earliest 
memories than Caucasian individuals. 
One possibility for the differences in timing of early memories across cultures 
could have been caused by the Asian participants answering the questionnaire in their 
secondary language. To test this, Mullen (1994) looked at the timing of the earliest 
memory in Koreans with a questionnaire given in Korean. It was found that on 
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average, the earliest memory of the Koreans was at 55.5 months, which was 
significantly later than the average age of earliest memory for the Caucasians from the 
other three studies, which was 38.8 months (Mullen, 1994). This study supports the 
social interaction theory, that one fundamental difference between the Caucasian and 
the Asian culture is the goal of socialisation. Children in Asia are raised to value 
conformity to the social norms, an interdependent view, whereas Caucasian cultures 
foster independence (Mullen, 1994). Due to the differences in socialisation goals, 
children from Caucasian cultures would be more encouraged to talk about their past 
experiences in a story- telling format than children from the Asian cultures. Learning 
to express themselves in the form of a narrative style enhances the development of 
autobiographical memory (Mullen, 1994). 
To further test the social interaction theory, Mullen and Yi (1995) looked at 
conversations between Asian and Caucasian mother-child dyads. Mullen and Yi 
(1995) stated "the child's early linguistic environment may influence the development 
of autobiographical memory" (p. 408). Mullen and Yi (1995) recorded all naturally 
occurring discussions between the mother-child dyads in one day. They found that the 
Caucasian mother-child dyads talked about past events almost three times more 
frequently than the Asian (Korean) mother- child dyads. The child was more often the 
primary focus of the event for the Caucasian dyads, than the Asian dyads and the 
Caucasian dyads were more likely to focus on the feelings of the child (Mullen & Yi, 
1995). It was also found that the Asian dyads focused discussions more on social 
norms and appropriate behaviour but referred to the child's attributes less often than 
Caucasian dyads (Mullen & Yi, 1995). The results of Mullen and Yi (1995) when 
combined with the findings of Mullen (1994) support the social interaction theory, 
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that the amount of experience the child has when talking about his/her past will 
influence the onset of autobiographical memory (Mullen & Yi, 1995). 
A study comparing the onset of autobiographical memory in different cultures 
in New Zealand was done by MacDonald et al. (2000). They compared the age of 
earliest memories in Maori, Pakeha and Asian individuals; it was found that a large 
percentage of the earliest memories reported occurred between the ages of 3 and 4 
years old. It was also found that the Maori participants had earlier childhood 
memories than the Pakeha and Asian participants, with the Asian memories being 
reported significantly later than memories of the Pakeha participants. MacDonald et 
al. (2000) also found that Maori participants sourced their early memories from a 
family story more often than the other participants, but the different source did not 
contribute to reporting earlier memories. It is thought that Maori, Pakeha and Asians 
come from very different linguistic backgrounds, for example, in the Maori culture 
discussion about the past, not only an individual's past but the tribe's past is 
encouraged, this would contribute to the Maori reporting earlier memories 
(MacDonald et al., 2000). 
In another cross-cultural study, Wang (200 1) found that the average age of the 
earliest memories for an American sample was at 3.5 years. Wang (2001) also found 
that the earliest reported age of memory for a Chinese sample was on average 6 
months later than the American sample. Another cultural difference emerged in the 
form of the memories; the American's memories were of discrete one-time events 
whereas the Chinese memories included more routine events which centred on 
collective activities (Wang, 2001). 
Wang and Brockmeier (2002) suggest that the autobiographical memory 
themes of individuals from different cultures will reflect the different ways the culture 
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conceives of the self. For example autobiographical memories in an American sample 
(who overall have an independent culture) have the individual as the main character, 
whereas autobiographical memories of Chinese (whose culture is more interdependent 
in nature) tend to focus on others (Wang & Brockmeier, 2002). Wang (2004) also 
compared memories in American and Chinese children between the ages of 3 years 
and 3 months and 8 years and 11 months. Unlike Wang (200 1 ), who used college 
students, there were no cultural differences in the age of the earliest memories. Wang 
(2004) did find that the American children had lengthier memories of specific one-
time events and their memories were more likely to spontaneously contain references 
to emotion than the Chinese children. Wang (2004) also found that the Chinese 
children were more likely to mention other people in their memory narratives and they 
talked more frequently about group activities they had been involved in than the 
American children. The focus of the Chinese children on social interactions in their 
memory narratives is congruent with the interdependent nature of the culture. 
There is a lot of support for theories which focus on the influence of social 
interaction, however, one aspect of the definition of autobiographical memory by 
Howe and Courage (1993) is that the events must relate to the individual. This aspect 
is not part of the social interaction theory. 
Research on the Role of Self- Recognition. Harley and Reese (1999) 
investigated the interaction of self-knowledge and the styles of parental talk when 
discussing past events with their children. The study spanned the child's ages of 19 to 
33 months, using three different time points and three testing session at each time 
point. Children who passed the mirror test of self-recognition at 19 months of age 
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(and were classified as early self- recognisers) provided more new information during 
talk about past events than those who failed the mirror recognition test at 19 months 
of age (Harley & Reese, 1999). It was also found by Harley and Reese (1999) that 
both early and late recognisers elaborated more as time increased and that maternal 
reminiscing style predicted how able the child was to talk about his/her past 
experiences. These results found by Harley and Reese (1999) support the theory 
proposed by Howe and Courage (1993, 1997) that the child's ability to recognise the 
self was a strong predictor of the child's ability to report an event from memory. 
However, the results also show that it is not just the onset of self-recognition that 
could lead to the onset of autobiographical memory, but that maternal reminiscing and 
style of talking also play a role in the child's ability to talk about the past (Harley & 
Reese, 1999). Therefore the results show that it is not just the onset of self-
recognition, which leads to the offset of childhood amnesia, but social and 
experiential factors also play a role, possibly as mediators (Reese, 2002b ). 
Autobiographical Memory in the Deaf Population. There is one area of 
research that does not provide support for the social interaction theory. Language 
acquisition in the deaf population varies greatly; deaf children with deaf parents have 
been shown to acquire language skills at approximately the same rate as hearing 
children with hearing parents. In contrast, deaf children with hearing parents 
commonly experience minimal communication in the early years with their parents 
(Williams & Bonvillian, 1989). 
Weigle and Bauer (2000) looked at early memories in deaf and hearing adults. 
It was expected that due to delayed language acquisition and therefore delayed 
exposure to the narrative form of memories that the deaf participants would have later 
,J 
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onset of autobiographical memory. There were no differences in the age of the earliest 
memories. However, the average age of the two earliest memories was 19 months 
earlier for the hearing participants than the deaf participants. Weigle and Bauer (2000) 
noticed that the memories reported by the deaf participants were less dense and 
contained fewer imaginal and location properties than the memories reported by the 
hearing adults. Weigle and Bauer (2000) suggested that "children born deaf to hearing 
parents may take a different less linguistically based route into autobiographical 
memory" (p. 305). This results in a sparser linguistic representation of the memory 
(Weigle & Bauer, 2000). 
Williams and Bonvillian (1989) also investigated the role of early language 
acquisition by comparing the age of onset of early memories in three groups, hearing 
adults with hearing parents, deaf adults with deaf parents and deaf adults with hearing 
parents. Williams and Bonvillian (1989) found no differences in the mean age of 
earliest memory in the three groups. There was a substantial difference in the 
language acquisition of the three groups but this difference was not reflected in the 
age of onset of autobiographical memories (Williams & Bonvillian, 1989). To my 
knowledge there is no experiment that investigates talk about the past between deaf 
children and their hearing parents. 
Problems with Autobiographical Memory Research 
One problem that is associated with previous research on the age of earliest 
memories is that the participants may be being asked to recall events that were not 
encoded at all. Events that are deemed important by the adults are not always 
considered important by the child. Reese (1999) found that important events by 
adults' standards were occurring to the children, but these were not the events that the 
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child was likely to recall. The events that were spontaneously recalled by the child 
were considered mundane to an adult (Reese, 1999). So events that adults chose to 
discuss were probably not the events that the child would have chosen to discuss. 
Another problem with current research is that the child is also being asked to recount 
an event verbally that most likely occurred before the child was verbal (Howe & 
Courage, 1993). 
Eacott (1999) stated that the theory that will best explain childhood amnesia 
needs to account for not only an adult's failure to recall events that occurred early on 
in their childhood but will also need to be able to explain why more memories are 
recalled as the child's age increases across the preschool years. The theory will also 
need to explain why there are differences in the onset of autobiographical memories 
across individuals (Eacott, 1999). 
As Wang and Brockmeier (2002) stated, "the practises of autobiographical 
memory, self-construction, and narrative exhibit a developmental dynamic in which 
they mutually construct and confirm each other" (p. 58). 
Summary 
The development of autobiographical memory and the related offset of 
childhood amnesia are issues that have intrigued clinicians and researchers for over a 
century. Converging evidence suggests that autobiographical memories are not 
reliably established before the age of three years. A number of factors are related to 
the children's ability to report on past events. The most promising of these include 
children's language skill, maternal use of elaborative talk and a sense of self. In the 
next chapter I explore the development of children's theory of mind and the factors 
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associated with its development. These factors share remarkable overlap with those 
implicated in the development of autobiographical memory. 
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Chapter 2 
Theory of Mind Development 
Theory of Mind- Definition 
Premack and Woodruff (1978, cited in Flavell & Miller, 1998) defined theory 
of mind as the attribution of mental states to either the individual or others. These 
mental states include belief, feelings, intentions, or attention (Stone, Baron-Cohen, 
Calder, Keane, & Young, 2003). Theory of mind is "one of the quintessential abilities 
that makes us human" (Baron-Cohen, 2000, p. 3). Since Premack and Woodruff first 
coined the term theory of mind in 1978, there has been an explosion in the number of 
articles and research done in the area. Theory of mind has become one of the most 
widely studied topics in psychology, and research on it spans a number of areas from 
cognitive, to developmental, social, neuropsychological, clinical, and cultural, to 
name a few (Flavell, 2004). Theory of mind is considered the cognitive component of 
empathy that occurs when we "identify another person's emotions and thoughts, and 
respond to them with an appropriate emotion." (Baron-Cohen, 2003, p. 2). 
The litmus test of theory of mind has been widely accepted to be test of false 
belief understanding, because for a child to understand false belief tasks they need to 
understand that the character in the story has a different belief to the reality the child 
knows (Flavell & Miller, 1998). Young preschoolers show little evidence of a full 
fledged theory of mind. They do not understand "that people think and act in 
accordance with the way they represent the world mentally rather than they way the 
world actually is" (Flavell, 1999, p. 23). Theory of mind - or mindreading as it is 
sometimes referred to - is a valuable contributor to human interactions including 
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important aspects such as communication and behavioural predictions (Baron- Cohen, 
1995). 
Theory of Mind Assessments 
There have been many tasks devised to test theory of mind in preschool 
children. These include the unexpected location task (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983), the 
unexpected contents task (Pemer, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987), and the appearance-
reality task (Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 1983). These tasks are designed to measure 
first order beliefs. To be successful on a first order belief task the child only has to 
infer the beliefs or mental state of one person (Baron-Cohen, 2000). More recently 
tasks have been devised to investigate a deeper understanding of theory of mind. 
These are used with older children and adults and include the second order false belief 
task (Pemer & Wimmer, 1985), the faux pas task (Baron-Cohen, O'Riordan, Stone, 
Jones, & Plaisted, 1999), and the reading the mind in the eyes task (Baron-Cohen, 
Joliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Spong, Scahill, 
& Lawson, 2001 ). These more sophisticated theory of mind tasks require 
understanding of beliefs about beliefs or embedded mental states (Baron-Cohen, 
2000) and understanding of more complex emotions or subtle social exchanges. 
Unexpected Location Task. The task was initially described by Wimmer and 
Pemer (1983) and is now widely used in various forms throughout theory of mind 
research. The main paradigm used involves a boy called Maxi, who has some 
chocolate, puts it away in a cupboard, and then goes away to play. While he is outside 
playing his mother gets the chocolate out of the cupboard. She uses it, and then puts it 
away in another cupboard (the cupboards were generally described using different 
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colours, e.g., blue cupboard versus a green cupboard). Maxi's mother then leaves the 
kitchen and Maxi returns, hungry, and wants the chocolate. The children are asked, 
"Where will Maxi look for the chocolate?" To successfully pass this task the children 
must acknowledge that Maxi has an incorrect belief about the current location of the 
chocolate. Wimmer and Pemer (1983) tested the paradigm on a range of children of 
different ages. They concluded that to be successful on the unexpected contents task 
the children had to be able to deal with two conflicting representations, and that this 
cognitive ability develops and becomes firmly established between the ages of 4 and 6 
years. 
Unexpected Contents Task. The task was initially described by Pemer, 
Leekam, and Wimmer (1987) and was developed in conjunction with Hogrefe, 
Wimmer, and Pemer (1986). In this task children are shown a container (e.g., a 
smarties container) and asked, "What do you think is inside the container?" Once the 
children respond correctly (this would be a product that is highly familiar) they are 
shown the actual contents of the box (in reality it contains a pencil). The children are 
then asked to confirm what is really in the box and asked about their previous belief, 
"Before the box was opened what did you think was in the box?" The children are 
then told that their friend would be shown the closed box and asked what they think 
their friend would think is in the box. Pemer et al. (1987) tried to improve the 3- year-
olds performance on the false belief tasks by directly having them experience the 
same mistaken belief and situation as their friend, so making the false belief more 
salient. Pemer et al (1987) found even with direct experience of the situation three 
year olds still did not understand false belief. Their results confirmed their previous 
findings (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983) that false belief understanding develops at around 
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4 years of age; children over the age of 4 are able to consistently attribute false beliefs 
to others and "assign conflicting truth values to models" (Pemer et al., 1987, p. 136). 
Appearance-Reality Task. Flavell, Flavell, and Green (1983) initially 
described this task. In this task children are shown an object whose appearance differs 
from the reality of the object (e.g., a sponge is painted to look like a rock, so it 
appears to be a rock, whereas in reality it is a sponge). In this task the child is shown 
the object and asked, "When you look at this with your eyes right now, what does it 
look like?" (Flavell et al., 1983, p. 102). The experimenter then demonstrates to the 
child that the reality of the object is actually different (i.e., squeezing the rock). The 
child is then asked, "What is this really, really?" and given forced choice alternatives 
between the reality of the object and its appearance. The child is then asked, "When 
you look at this with your eyes right now, does it look like a (rock) or does it look like 
(a piece of sponge)?" (Flavell et al., 1983, p. 102). To succeed the child has to 
understand that an object can have two representations- appearance and reality. 
Flavell et al. (1983) found that four year olds performed better than 3 year olds and 
that the performance of the five year olds on the appearance reality task was nearly at 
ceiling. So the appearance-reality task shows the same developmental trends as the 
other first order belief tasks. 
Second Order False Belief Task. The task was designed by Pemer and 
Wimmer (1985). In this task children are asked about the false belief a character in the 
story has about another character's belief. The task is told in story form with the story 
often varying between researchers. For example in the story used by Pemer, Kain, and 
Barchfeld (2002) a young boy's mother wants to surprise him with a puppy for his 
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birthday, so she tells him he will be getting a toy for his birthday. In the meantime the 
boy discovers the puppy hidden in the basement without his mother's knowledge. The 
boy's grandmother rings to find out if the boy knows what he is getting for his 
birthday. The children are asked, "What does the mother say? That he knows or he 
doesn't know?" The grandmother also asks, "What does he think he is getting for his 
birthday?" and the children are asked how the mother will respond. The children are 
also asked control questions such as "Does he know he is getting a puppy for his 
birthday?" Pemer and Wimmer (1985) found that by the age of 6 most children were 
able to understand second order false belief and pass the task. 
Faux Pas Task. This task was designed by Baron-Cohen et al. (1999) to 
investigate theory of mind understanding in individuals who are passing first order 
false belief tasks. Baron-Cohen et al. (1999) posits that instead of crediting 
individuals with a theory of mind when they pass first order false belief tasks, this 
milestone "should really be considered as relatively early points in the acquisition of a 
ToM [theory of mind], rather than the end point" (p. 407). Faux pas are difficult to 
define, but they are generally accompanied by that "uh oh" feeling after someone has 
said something insensitive that the listener may not have wanted to hear (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1999). Baron-Cohen et al. (1999) designed a task to test how skilled 
individuals were at detecting faux pas. They designed ten stories, and each story had 
two or three characters. In each story a faux pas occurred either in the last phase, or 
the penultimate phase, and no reference was made to the emotions felt by the 
characters in the stories. Once the story was read to the children they were asked four 
questions: the faux pas detection question, "In the story did someone say something 
they should not have said?"; the identification question, "What did they say that they 
39 
should not have said?" The comprehensive question differed for each story and asked 
for some fact about the story. The final question was the false belief question, which 
asked about the character's knowledge about the situation. Baron-Cohen et al. (1999) 
found a significant increase in performance with age of the participants. Nine year 
olds performed better than 7- year-olds and 11- year- old children performed 
significantly better than the 9 -year-olds. These results confirmed that the faux pas 
task was more difficult than the first order belief tasks (or standard theory of mind 
tasks). 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task. In a series of experiments by Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, and Joliffe (1997) they found that for complex mental states the 
eyes contain as much information as the whole face and adults could consistently 
interpret the mental state of an individual from a picture of the eyes. From this they 
devised a test to measure complex mental state understanding using the eye region of 
the face only. This task comes in two forms: the child and adult version. The versions 
are similar in that they use the same stimuli, but differ in the number of stimuli and 
the language used. In both tasks the participant is shown a photograph of the eye 
region. Surrounding the photograph are four mental state words that include one target 
word and three foil words. The participant has to choose the word which best 
describes what the person in the picture is thinking or feeling. In the child's version 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a) there were 28 pictures, so a score of 9/28 indicates an 
above chance performance. Baron-Cohen et al. (2001a) found that performance was 
above chance on children between the ages of 8 and 12 years. It could be argued that 
the eyes task is a complicated emotion recognition task. Baron-Cohen et al. (2001a) 
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argue against this. They state that the task uses both affective and cognitive mental 
state words and so is a measure of theory of mind. 
The adult's version of the reading the mind in the eyes task was originally 
designed by Baron-Cohen et al. (1997a). In the original version there were only two 
words associated with each of the 25 pictures: the target word and a semantically 
opposite foil word. This task was later revised by Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, 
Raste, and Plumb (2001). They increased the number of pictures used from 25 to 36 
and also increased the number of words surrounding the picture from 2 to 4 words. 
They also decided to exclude basic common emotions such as happy and sad and limit 
the test to complex mental states. They also removed any pictures in which the correct 
answer could be determined by the direction of the eye- gaze (e.g., words such as 
ignoring). Baron-Cohen et al. (200 1 b) also removed the foil options that were 
semantically opposite to the target word in favour of words that had the same 
emotional valence as the target word. 
Theories of Theory of Mind Development 
There are many theories proposed to explain the development of theory of 
mind in children. These range from theories which propose an innate module of 
development, to theories that state that theory of mind development is due to 
sociolinguistic input. The majority of the theories described here share commonalities, 
but may differ in their focus. For example, several theories mention the use of 
representation in theory of mind understanding but they differ in whether the 
children's theory of mind understanding is innate or learned. 
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Innate Modularism. Fodor (1992) proposed that children have an innate 
modularised theory of mind that is very basic. He claimed that it is not competence 
changes that lead to theory of mind understanding, but instead the changes are 
performance based. Fodor (1992) stated that there is "no reason to believe that 3-year-
old's theory of mind differs in any fundamental way from adult folk psychology" (p. 
284). There is nothing absent from the theory of mind in a 3-year-old. They hold a 
very basic form of theory of mind consisting of beliefs and desires. Fodor (1992) 
proposed that in order to make predictions of actions, 3- year-olds and 4-year-olds 
make predictions based on two heuristics. 
3-year-olds use the first heuristic when it is available, and can make unique 
predictions with it. They would only resort to using the second heuristic when the 
prediction made is not unique. 4- year- olds and adults would also use the first 
heuristic when beliefs are true, but would automatically resort to the second heuristic 
when the agent has a false belief. The heuristics Fodor (1992) proposed are as 
follows: 
HI: predict that the agent will act in a way that would satisfy his desires. 
H2: predict that the agent will act in a way that would satisfy his desires if his 
beliefs were true. 
The use of the second heuristic is computationally more demanding, but also more 
reliable than the first heuristic. Fodor (1992) suggested that instead of a change in 
children's meta-cognitive theory understanding, what changes are the computational 
resources available so that using the second heuristic is easier. 
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The Mindreading System- Four Mechanisms. This is a similar theory to 
Fodor's (1992) theory, for it also postulates that theory of mind is an innate 
mechanism. Baron- Cohen (1995) proposed that theory of mind is developed through 
the development of four mechanisms. The four mechanisms increase in complexity, 
and the final mechanism, the Theory of Mind Module (ToMM), can only occur once 
the individual has a Sharing Attention Mechanism (SAM). The first of these 
mechanisms is the Intentionality Detector (ID), and is available from infancy. The ID 
interprets an object that moves as having goals and desires (termed volitional mental 
states). The second mechanism is called the Eye-Direction Detector (EDD). It 
functions to detect eyes, or to judge whether the eyes are looking back at it or if the 
eyes are looking at something else. The third mechanism is reliant on the EDD, but 
can be formed without the EDD (in the case of the congenitally blind). The Shared 
Attention Mechanism (SAM) allows the children to know if another agent is attending 
to the same object as they are. It is a triadic representation, and it builds on both the 
ID and EDD, so it can relate seeing or attending to an object with desires for the 
object. SAM is the foundation for the development of the final mechanism, ToMM 
(Baron-Cohen & Swettenham, 1996). The final mechanism functions to represent 
epistemic mental states (such as belief, thoughts and knowledge) and is called the 
Theory of Mind Module (ToMM). Baron- Cohen (1995) proposed that it is not until 
this final mechanism is in place that children can possess a theory of mind, and that 
this mechanism does not develop until the child is between 18 and 48 months. Baron-
Cohen (1995) links the different mechanisms to related parts of the brain such as the 
superior- temporal sulcus, the amygdale, and the orbital- frontal cortex. Baron- Cohen 
(1995) does not specify whether the development of the mechanisms is innate or 
related to learning, and provides cases of autism to support his theory. 
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Theory of Mind Mechanism- Selective Processing. Leslie (1994) also proposes 
an innate mechanism for the development of theory of mind. According to Leslie, 
individuals are born with a theory of mind mechanism (ToMM). The theory ofToMM 
is guided by five ideas. First, theory of mind understanding is time pressured. The 
interpretation of the agent's intentions must occur quickly in order to be concurrent 
with the flow of behaviour. Second, the ToMM is post-perceptual, spontaneous, and 
domain-specific (i.e., the information used to make inferences comes from multiple 
senses, and the mechanism is specifically concerned with making cognitive 
interpretations). Third, the ToMM is based on a representational system or the use of 
metarepresentation (referred to as the M-representation). Fourth, the ToMM is the 
innate basis of an individual's theory of mind, and it works without explicit 
instruction. Finally, in cases of autism the ToMM is damaged. 
According to Leslie's theory, the ToMM is present from birth and can 
function early on to enable a child to take part in pretend play and in interpreting 
agent's desires and beliefs. The difficulty that normal three year olds experience with 
understanding false belief tasks is not due to a lack of ToMM, but due to the three 
year olds' general capabilities. Leslie (1994) posited that along with a ToMM, 
children also have a selective processor (SP). The ToMM under normal circumstances 
(where beliefs are generally true) would share the same content as the current facts. In 
the case of false belief, however, the current facts are incorrect and need to be 
inhibited to be successful on the task. The SP functions to inhibit the prepotent 
response (e.g., for an unexpected location task the current location of the desired 
object) and select the relevant response based on the beliefs the character had. So for 
the unexpected location task, the child needs to inhibit the object's current location in 
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favour of the previous but now incorrect location. Leslie (1994) posits that it is not 
changes in the ToMM that allow children at the age of four to pass false belief tasks. 
Instead it is the general increase in the children's selective processor which allows the 
correct response to be made; with increases in the selective processor the child is not 
subjected to a "performance squeeze" (p. 236). 
Jenkins and Astington (1996) found a gradual onset of theory of mind, that "at 
some point children may show partial or insecure understanding, which is 
independent of any ordering of difficulty within tasks" (p. 75). This gradual dawning 
of understanding cannot be explained using innate modular theories. Innate modular 
theories cannot explain Jenkins and Astington's findings that children pass one theory 
of mind task while failing another task. Jenkins and Astington (1996) "did not find 
that one task was more difficult than another overall, or that language and memory 
demands were higher for one task rather than another" (p. 76). The innate modular 
theory would predict that children have the same level of performance on tasks with 
similar cognitive demands. 
Simulation Theory. Harris (1991) proposed that children predict what another 
person would think or feel in a situation by imagining (or simulating) how they would 
think or feel in the same situation. The process of mental simulation requires that the 
child understand two constructs; they need to be able to imagine having a particular 
belief or desire, and be able to simulate how they would act or feel based on that 
particular belief or desire. If they can simulate themselves into a situation, they can 
also simulate how another person would feel or behave in that same situation. 
Children make their predictions using default settings, which can be in two distinct 
states: the current intentional state ofthe self, and the current state of the world. To be 
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successful on theory of mind tasks, children have to adjust their default setting. For 
example, in an unexpected location task they have to alter the default setting of the 
current state of the world from where the chocolate currently is to where the character 
currently believes it is. Children's increasing abilities with theory of mind tasks 
coincide with their increasing ability to adjust the default settings, and errors seen in 
theory of mind tasks can be attributed to a failure to adjust these default settings (e.g., 
they do not use the default setting of where the chocolate currently is to predict where 
the character will look for it). As the children get older they become increasingly 
flexible in being able to override their default settings in favour of another setting, and 
the increasing flexibility allows the child to solve increasingly difficult theory of mind 
tasks. Harris (1991) like Fodor (1992) and Leslie (1994), assumes that theory of mind 
abilities are innate. He argues that children are born with a working model of other 
people, and that the predictions the child makes are based on an assumed analogy 
between themselves and others. Harris discounts the child's need for a theory to 
predict others' behaviour. Instead, he posits that a working model is all that is 
required. 
The simulation account and the innate modular accounts have been criticised 
for not adequately explaining the lag seen between the understanding of desires and 
the later understanding of beliefs (Harris, 1996). It has been documented that children 
talk about desires before they talk about beliefs (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). Harris 
(1996) extended his simulation account to address this issue. He proposed that 
through conversations with others who do not share the same view or knowledge 
about a situation, especially when talking about desires and later beliefs, children 
become more adept at simulating what another person could be thinking or feeling. 
Harris (1996) also proposed that in order to successfully take part in conversations, 
' ; 
46 
children must simulate the other person's perspective, that "conversation demands this 
constant shuttling back and forth between our actual stance- which we voice as a 
speaker- and the stance of our interlocutor- which we temporarily take on as we listen 
and comprehend" (p. 218). In other words, conversation with others aids in children's 
ability to simulate and hence their theory of mind understanding. 
Gopnik and Wellman (1992) criticise the simulation theory for not adequately 
explaining the differences seen between the onset of desire and belief understanding. 
According to the simulation theory, attributing beliefs and desires to others should be 
equally easy, but it has been documented that children come to understand desires up 
to two years prior to beliefs. The simulation theory also fails to explain false 
interpretations of one's own mental states (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992). This is shown 
by the failure of three year-old children in the unexpected contents task to correctly 
identify that before they had seen inside the (smarties) box they thought the contents 
were candies. This failure is also seen in the appearance-reality task where the young 
will claim that they have always known the reality of the object 
'Theory' Theory. Gopnik and Wellman (1992) propose that children's theory 
of mind is just that, a 'theory' and that changes in theory of mind development can be 
construed as changes to the 'theory'. They state that there are fundamental aspects of 
theory of mind that can also be seen in a scientific theory. The constructs of the 
theory must be unobservable, abstract entities that can causally explain the evidence 
that has been found. The constructs must be coherent and interrelated. The theory 
must lead to predictions and interpretations of a wide range of evidence, and be able 
to do this for situations that have not been part of the theories initial basis. Another 
aspect of developing a 'theory' is that it must be open to defeasibility, and because of 
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this be able to change. When a 'theory' encounters counter-evidence firstly it will be 
ignored then it may be postulated as an auxiliary hypothesis but will eventually lead 
to a change in the 'theory'. The shift in the children's theory of mind has been equated 
to a scientist who considers new facts which are inconsistent with an established 
scientific theory (Smith, Cowie & Blades, 1998). How does this relate to theory of 
mind development? 
Gopnik and Wellman (1992) posit that children change from a non-
representational theory of mental states to a representational theory of mental states 
between the ages of 2 Yz years to 4 years of age. They proposed that 2- year- olds do 
not have a representational theory of mental states such as beliefs, but they structure 
their 'theory' in terms of two internal states -desires and perceptions. For 3-year-old 
children, they post an intermediate phase where their understanding of mental states 
functions as an auxiliary hypothesis. Wellman (1990) states that there are similarities 
between a 3- year- olds' theory of mind and that of adults, but at this age the theory 
"must undergo sizable changes to become the interpretative- homuncular belief-desire 
psychology of older children and adults" (p. 295). In this stage the children will 
understand beliefs, but the notion plays little part in their prediction of behaviour. In 
the final phase, 4- year-olds develop a representational theory of mental states, or as it 
has also been termed a belief-desire psychology (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992). 
In a series of three experiments, Ruffman (1996), found support for the theory-
theory. Children between the ages of 4 and 8 years of age were given a variety of see-
know tasks and true and false belief inference tasks. In the tasks the child viewed a 
sweet being moved from a round dish which only contained red sweets to a box. A 
doll who knew the colour of the sweet while it was in the dish did not witness the 
sweet being moved, but was told about the move later. When the children were asked 
48 
whether the doll would know the colour of the sweet they often replied that the doll 
would have a false belief of the sweet's colour. The results over the three experiments 
showed that the children used the see-know rule inflexibly, and inferred that because 
the doll had not seen the sweet being moved that they would not know the colour and 
would therefore have a false belief of the colour (Ruffman, 1996). The children's 
inflexibility in the use of the see-know rule shows that the children use rules to predict 
another's knowledge or beliefs which is in line with the theory- theory. Nelson, Plesa 
and Henseler (1998) discount the 'theory' theory. They proposed that the 'theory' 
theory gives a misleading picture of the child's perspective. It places the child as a 
scientist- observer instead of placing them in a position of being the experiencer, or 
actor in their own life (Nelson et al., 1998). 
Belief- Desire Psychology. Bartsch and Wellman (1995) extended the 'theory' 
theory by clearly defining the stages that the child goes through in the process of the 
developing a theory of mind. They proposed that there are three steps to theory of 
mind development. Children initially begin with a desire psychology, then develop a 
desire-belief psychology and finally onto a belief-desire psychology where theory of 
mind is possible. In the first phase children do not show any evidence of knowledge 
of beliefs and simply make predictions of people's behaviour in terms of desires. 
Once the children get to the age of three (on average), they begin to incorporate talk 
about beliefs into their everyday talk, but they still heavily rely on desires to make 
most of their predictions or explanations of other's behaviour, and will only use 
beliefs when desire is not sufficient to explain others' actions. Bartsch and Wellman 
(1995) termed this phase desire-belief psychology, because desire psychology is still 
at the core of their understanding, but beliefs are beginning to be used, although not 
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consistently. At approximately 4 years of age, beliefs become increasingly utilised in 
explaining others' actions, and the child is said to possess a belief- desire psychology 
(Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). 
Representational Theory of Mind. This theory of mind theory has a very 
qualitative approach. Perner (1991) proposes that infants until the age of 12 to 18 
months only have a single model of the world, which is updated when new 
information is provided. After 18 months of age, the infants are then able to construct 
more than one model of the world. At this stage of development Perner (1991) terms 
children as being "situation theorists" who are able to differentiate between two 
models (i.e., real and imagined), but this differentiation is only at the level of the 
situation. As a situation theorist, the infant can also understand that thinking 
influences action. It is at this stage that the infants can not only distinguish between 
the past and present, but can also begin to engage in pretence. The act of pretence 
requires that the children have a model of reality (e.g., banana) and a model of the 
non-real alternative of reality (e.g., banana as a telephone). Even though the children 
can entertain two models simultaneously they are not able to successfully pass false 
belief tasks. They still possess an immature concept termed "prelief' where they are 
unable to distinguish between beliefs and pretend (Perner, 2000a). Therefore, they 
base their predictions of the characters actions "as-if' the propositional attitude is true 
(Perner, 1995). Mental states have been defined as propositional attitudes that relate a 
person to a proposition. Before children develop into representational theorists, they 
can assign truth values to propositions (i.e., are they true or false in relation to the real 
world). But the child does not grasp that they are evaluating the proposition. Without 
knowing that propositions can be evaluated differently by others, they cannot 
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understand that a person may evaluate a proposition that is false to be true (i.e., hold a 
false belief). Situation theorists have no concept of representation, therefore they also 
do not possess the concept of misrepresentation (Pemer, 1991 ). As a situation 
theorist, the infant cannot understand that others can possess a different sense 
(representation) of the same referent (proposition or what is being represented, e.g., a 
picture). At around the age of 4 years, children change from situation theorists to 
representation theorists (or possess a representational theory of mind). They are able 
to meta-represent which involves the understanding that representations are 
representations. A representational theorist understands that a situation is open to 
different interpretations, and that a situation contains both a sense and a referent 
(Pemer, 1991). As a representational theorist, they can predict another's behaviour on 
the basis of the sense they have of the referent, instead of using the sense that they, 
themselves, have of that same referent. 
Wellman (2002) criticises Pemer's theory for its failure to explain the deficits 
in theory of mind seen in individuals with autism. The deficits are seen in their 
failures on the false belief task. However, individuals with autism have been found to 
pass false photograph tasks (Leekam & Pemer, 1991, cited in Wellman, 2002). So the 
individuals with autism are failing a mental representation task, but not a physical 
representation task. This indicates that failures in representational reasoning are not 
able to account for the failure of individuals with autism on false belief tasks, which 
would also indicate that representational abilities are not an essential basis of theory 
of mind development (Wellman, 2002). 
An Experiential Approach. Nelson, Skwerer, Goldman, Henseler, Presler and 
Walkenfeld (2003) proposed an experiential course of development for theory of 
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mind. This theory states that the mam factor which leads to theory of mind 
understanding is the use of language, and more particularly, the use of language in 
social contexts. Over the preschool years children learn through conversations with 
more experienced others to use language as a mode of representation. Children 
initially do poorly on theory of mind tasks because they do not understand the 
pragmatics of the situation, i.e., they do not understand what the experimenter is 
asking of them. When the task is made easier, the procedure is slowed down and the 
questions are changed from "What did you think?' to "What did you say?" 
performance on unexpected contents task improved for 3- year- olds, although it is 
still not at the level of a normal developing 4- year- old (Nelson et al., 2003). During 
talk with more experienced others about representations of situations and events that 
are not currently present children learn that others can represent the same situation 
differently. Children use language to form representations of objects and situations. 
Early in the preschool years children can only hold one representation at a time. For 
example, as in the case of the unexpected contents task, if they have the representation 
that the box contains raisins and then the child discovers that the box actually contains 
crayons, they then have a representation of the new contents which has overridden 
their previous representation of the box containing raisins. It is not until further 
experience with others through conversations that the child learns to hold multiple 
representations of the same event or situation and it is not until the child can deal with 
more than one representation simultaneously that they can successfully and 
consistently pass theory of mind tasks (Nelson et al., 2003). Nelson concludes that 
"discussions with others about knowledge states and differing experiences is critical 
to coming into the community of mindful people and requires the ability to maintain 
different representations in mind" (Nelson 1996, cited in Nelson et al., 2003, p. 41). 
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Nelson et al. (1998) state that this is not a one- way process, that the children must 
work to make sense of the world around them and that the development of a theory of 
mind is a slow collaborative process between children and more experienced others. 
Research on Theory of Mind 
Social Interactions and Theory of Mind. Why is theory of mind understanding 
important? Being able to understand others' beliefs and desires and to use these to 
predict and explain others' behaviours will be beneficial when interacting socially 
with others. Slaughter, Dennis and Pritchard (2002) found that children who had more 
advanced theory of mind understanding were more likely to be rated as more popular 
by the other children in their classes. Also, the children with the poorest theory of 
mind understanding were more likely to be rejected by their peers. However, this 
finding was only for children over the age of five. Social-cognitive understanding is 
not having an impact on peer acceptance until the children are getting older. Children 
who are rejected by others may miss out on opportunities to improve their situation. 
Because of their poor theory of mind understanding, they are rejected by others, and 
because of this rejection they would not experience the same social opportunities that 
could facilitate theory of mind understanding (Slaughter et al., 2002). 
Social Skills and Theory of Mind. Watson, Nixon, Wilson, and Capage (1999) 
found that preschool children's theory of mind understanding measured using false 
belief tasks was a significant predictor of the teacher's ratings of the children's social 
skills, even after controlling for the child's age, language abilities, and general 
talkativeness. Nguyen and Frye (1999) gave children between the ages of 3 and 5 
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years a task similar to a typical false belief task, but while one character is out of the 
room the remaining character that remained in the room changes the game that he was 
playing. This task is referred to as a social activity false belief task. They predicted 
that the children would have more difficulty on this task than a typical false belief task 
because social situations are more volatile than physical situations. Nguyen and Frye 
(1999) found the same developmental trajectory for the social activity false belief task 
as found in a typical false belief task for the 3- to 5- year- olds, however, the children 
seemed to find this task more demanding than a false belief task with physical 
referents. They concluded that "theory of mind in social situations is not identical to 
that found for mental states about the physical world" (p. 77). 
Social skills in peer interactions have also been associated with theory of mind 
understanding in preadolescent children. Bosacki and Astington (1999) found that 
preadolescents' theory of mind understanding was related to one aspect of social 
competence - the ability to solve social problems. Adolescents' theory of mind 
understanding was not related to their peer-rated likeability. In a study on adults, 
Rutherford (2004) found that theory of mind understanding could change with 
changes in a person's social status. He found that changing the status of an individual 
by labelling them either a 'winner' or 'loser' after competing with another person 
changed their theory of mind understanding. The participants labelled 'losers' had 
better theory of mind understanding than those labelled 'winners' 
Language and Theory of Mind. Some have claimed that syntax understanding 
is the critical component leading to false belief understanding (e.g., de Villiers, 2000, 
de Villiers & de Villiers, 2003; Astington & Jenkins, 1999) whereas other studies 
have shown that both semantic and syntactic understanding are related to false belief 
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understanding (Ruffman, Slade, Rowlandson, Rumsey & Gamham, 2003). What is 
not under debate is the widely accepted fact that language abilities are related to 
theory of mind understanding (Slade & Ruffman, 2005). Jenkins and Astington 
(1996) found that false belief understanding was related to the children's general 
language abilities. One of the most interesting aspects of this study was that it was not 
until the children attained a linguistic level of 4 years and 1 month that they started 
passing the false belief task This result is consistent with the age that most children 
begin to consistently pass false belief tasks. 
It has been suggested that there may be a factor which mediates the 
relationship, and it is changes in this factor that lead to developments in both language 
and theory of mind. Astington and Jenkins (1999) suggested that this factor could be 
the child's working memory. Slade and Ruffman (2005) investigated the relation 
between language and theory of mind using four different language assessments, two 
which measured syntax and two which measured semantic abilities. They also 
measured working memory, and investigated how these factors interacted with time 
using a longitudinal design. They found that the relation between language and theory 
of mind was not mediated by working memory. Slade and Ruffman (2005) also found 
that both syntax and semantics contributed equally to theory of mind understanding. 
The results by Slade and Ruffman (2005) were also supported by Ruffman, Slade, 
Rowlandson, Rumsey and Gamham (2003). Ruffman et al. (2003) found that 
children's language abilities were related to their false belief understanding over a 
period of 2.5 years. They had conflicting findings in their two experiments, in the first 
experiment Ruffman et al. (2003) found that semantic understanding was related to 
false belief understanding, whereas, in the second experiment syntactic understanding 
was uniquely related to the children's false belief understanding. Ruffman et al. 
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(2003) did use different language measures in each experiment which could explain 
their conflicting results. They concluded that, because there was a high degree of 
inter-relatedness between semantic and syntactic understanding and that both of these 
are rapidly developing in early childhood, that both syntax and semantics (or general 
language abilities) contributed to the children's theory of mind (Ruffman et al., 2003). 
In a related study by Astington and Jenkins (1999) investigated the 
relationship between theory of mind and language abilities longitudinally. They found 
that early language abilities were related to later theory of mind abilities but did not 
find the reverse relation that early theory of mind abilities influenced later language 
abilities. Bosacki and Astington (1999) have also found a relation between 
preadolescent's theory of mind understanding and their general vocabulary ability. 
In a case study by Varley, Siegal and Want (200 1 ), they investigated theory of 
mind understanding in a patient with severe aphasia. They found that he had intact 
theory of mind reasoning, and concluded that grammatical knowledge was not a 
necessary component of theory of mind understanding. However, the patient in Varley 
et al. 's (200 1) study did not have aphasia until his adult years, therefore, had 
grammatical knowledge during his preschool years when his theory of mind was 
developing. 
Mental State Talk and Theory of Mind. It has been proposed that mothers who 
can accurately put their own and their child's thoughts and feelings into words will 
have an effect on their child's mental state understanding (Harris, de Rosnay & Pons, 
2005). This has been the focus of a variety of research. 
One study that has investigated mental state talk (which consisted mainly of 
talk about desires) between mothers and 15 month old infants found that the amount 
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of mental state talk by the mother when the infant was 15 months was related to the 
children's performance on an emotion task (Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006). So talk 
about mental states can influence social understanding as early as the second year of 
life. Taumoepeau and Ruffman (2006) also found that mothers moved from referring 
mostly to desires to talk about thoughts and knowledge over time. 
Peterson and Slaughter (2003) used a new task they named the Maternal 
Mental State Input Inventory (MMSII). The task involved 12 different everyday 
situations which centred on a four year old child and each situation included a 
dilemma that required solving. The mothers were asked to choose from one of four 
possible explanations that they would provide their own child if in a similar situation. 
These explanations were divided into four types; elaborated mental state explanations, 
non-elaborated mental state explanations, elaborated non-mental state explanations, 
and non-elaborated non-mental state explanations. The relation between the mothers' 
preferred explanation and their children's theory of mind was investigated. They 
found individual differences in the ways mothers preferred to explain a situation to 
their children. Peterson and Slaughter (2003) also found that mothers who used 
elaborated mental state explanations had children with a more developed theory of 
mind understanding. 
In a fundamental study, Ruffman, Slade and Crowe (2002) investigated 
longitudinally the impact of mothers' mental state talk on theory of mind 
development. Ruffman et al. (2002) gave children language measures, theory of mind 
tasks and a picture task, where the child discussed pictures with their mothers at three 
time points. At the first time point children were on average three years of age, the 
second time point was five months after the first and the third time point was in a 
further seven months, so there were twelve months between the first and third time 
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points. Ruffman et al. (2002) found that the amount of mothers' mental state 
utterances significantly contributed to the children's later theory of mind 
understanding, even after controlling for language abilities, early theory of mind 
understanding, and current mental state talk. Ruffman et al. (2002) also found that the 
type of mental state utterance did not matter but it was mental state talk in general that 
influenced theory of mind understanding. Another interesting finding was that 
emotion talk was not related to theory of mind understanding. Ruffman et al. (2002) 
clearly show that mothers' mental state talk facilitates the children's later theory of 
mind. In a later study utilising similar measures Ruffman, Slade, Devitt, and Crowe 
(2006) also found that the mothers' use of mental state talk was related to the 
children's theory of mind understanding a year later. 
Mental state talk does not only happen between mother-child dyads. Brown, 
Donelan-McCall, and Dunn (1996) found a higher rate of talk about mental states 
between sibling dyads and child-friend dyads than mother-child dyads in 47- month-
old children. Like Ruffman et al. (2002) there was a relation between the amount of 
mental state talk in sibling dyads and child-friend dyads and the children's false belief 
understanding, however due to the cross-sectional nature of the study directionality 
was not established (Brown et al., 1996). 
Role of Siblings. The effect siblings have on a child's theory of mind 
development has been found to vary across studies. Some studies have found a 
relation between the number of siblings and theory of mind performance. A child who 
has more siblings has a higher theory of mind understanding. Some researchers have 
found that it makes no difference on theory of mind understanding if the siblings are 
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older or younger, where other studies have found only an impact if the siblings are 
older. 
Pemer, Ruffman and Leekam (1994) investigated the effect of having siblings 
on the onset of theory of mind understanding. In two experiments they measured 
theory of mind using standard false belief tasks in children between the ages of 3 and 
6 years. They found that children with siblings have better theory of mind 
understanding than only-children. In the second experiment they investigated whether 
older or younger siblings had more influence on theory of mind development, and 
whether the age of the other sibling and the age difference between the siblings had an 
effect. Pemer et al. (1994) found no difference in theory of mind understanding 
between children who had an older versus a younger sibling. Also the age difference 
between the siblings did not influence theory of mind understanding. 
Unlike Pemer et al. (1994), Ruffman, Pemer, Naito, Parkin and Clements 
(1998) found that older but not younger siblings had more influence on theory of 
mind development. In four experiments Ruffman et al. (1998) found that younger 
siblings did not facilitate theory of mind understanding, whereas older siblings did 
facilitate false belief understanding but this effect was only found in the children who 
were over 3; 3 years of age. Older siblings did not facilitate theory of mind in children 
under 3; 2 years of age. They also found that older siblings not only facilitated theory 
of mind understanding in western children but also in a sample of Japanese children 
(Ruffman et al., 1998). Results from Ruffman, Pemer and Parkin (1999) also showed 
that theory of mind understanding was related to the number of older siblings the 
child had. 
Peterson (2000) also investigated the role of siblings on theory of mind 
development in two studies. In the first study the preschoolers who on average were 4; 
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10 years were either only- children, the oldest child in the family or the youngest child 
in the family. Peterson's results were similar to those found by Pemer et al. (1994). 
She found that children who had siblings outperformed only-children, and that there 
was no difference on theory of mind performance whether the child had older or 
younger siblings or whether the child had one or more siblings. In the second 
experiment children who had both older and younger siblings were also included. 
Again Peterson found that only-children had less sophisticated theory of mind 
understanding than children with siblings, but theory of mind advances were only 
seen for children who had siblings within the age range of 12 years to 12 months old. 
Children who had siblings who were teenagers or young infants did not show 
significant differences in theory of mind understanding when compared to children 
with no siblings. The effect siblings have on theory of mind development is only 
when the siblings are within a certain age span. Also, the number of siblings and 
whether they were older or younger made no difference to the theory of mind 
performance (Peterson, 2000). 
Jenkins and Astington (1996) also found that having siblings influenced theory 
of mind understanding; however, they found that having siblings was only more 
beneficial for children's theory of mind understanding in children who had lower 
levels of language ability. Like Pemer et al (1994) and Peterson (2000) they also 
found that whether the siblings were older or younger did not matter for theory of 
mind understanding, it was the number of siblings the child had that was more 
important. Children with more siblings had a more sophisticated theory of mind 
understanding. 
The study by Foote and Holmes-Lonergan (2003) took on a slightly different 
focus on the influence of siblings on theory of mind. They focused on the influence of 
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conflicts between siblings on theory of mind development and found that conflict 
between siblings was positively related to the children's understanding of theory of 
mind. More specifically, the use of other-oriented arguments that take into 
consideration the other siblings' interests by the child during a conflict with the 
sibling was related to the children's false belief understanding. Harris (1996) 
proposed that the advantage of having siblings on the theory of mind performance 
may be due to exposure to more conversational partners where the child is exposed to 
more evidence that others may differ in their knowledge about a shared topic or an 
event. 
Another aspect of sibling relationships on theory of mind was investigated by 
Woolfe, Want and Siegal (2003). They investigated the relationship between the 
quality of the sibling relationship and theory of mind in twenty deaf children with 
deaf parents and found that children who indicated a close relationship with their 
sibling performed better on theory of mind tasks. 
Some studies have not found a relationship between the number of siblings 
and children's theory of mind understanding (Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Peterson & 
Slaughter, 2003; Taylor & Carlson, 1997). Many of these studies, however, included 
sibling analyses as a minor point of interest. Across a large number of studies it 
appears that the presence of siblings exerts a positive but small influence on children's 
theory of mind understanding. 
Pretence and Theory of Mind. Pretend play has been defined as "the 
projecting of a supposed situation onto an actual one, in the spirit of fun rather than 
survival" (Lillard. 1993, p. 349). Lillard (2002) proposed that partaking in pretend 
play may lead to a more developed theory of mind. Social pretend play involves the 
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discussion of emotions and is often centred on emotion-driven scripts. It may be this 
aspect of pretend play that aids theory of mind development (Lillard, 2002). 
Children's use of fantasy during pretend play has also been linked to their 
understanding ofminds (Sobel & Lillard, 2001). 
Both theory of mind and pretence involve the ability to represent an object as 
two things. However, pretence is seen in children before theory of mind (Lillard, 
1993) and may be an early demonstration of children's theory of mind (Leslie, 1987). 
Astington and Jenkins (1995) found that children who performed better on theory of 
mind tasks were also more likely to use joint proposals during pretend play with 
others. The children were also more explicit in their role assignments in regard to the 
roles they assigned themselves and others during pretend play. However, the total 
amount of pretend play that the children engaged in was not related to their theory of 
mind understanding. The direction of these effects was not able to be tested in this 
study, longitudinal research is needed to explore whether aspects of pretend play 
influence theory of mind development or whether a more advanced theory of mind 
leads to advances in pretend play (Astington & Jenkins, 1995). A longitudinal study 
on the relation between joint planning and role assignment during pretend play and 
theory of mind understanding was undertaken by Jenkins and Astington (2000). They 
observed children's pretend play with friends and measured their theory of mind 
understanding at 3 time points over 7 months when the children were between 3 and 4 
years of age. They found that changes in the children's use of joint planning and role 
assignment were predicted by their theory of mind understanding. Nielsen and 
Dissanayake (2000) found that different aspects of pretend play were related to false 
belief understanding in 36- to 53- month- old children. They found that the children 
who used more object substitution and role assignment during pretend play had better 
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theory of mind understanding. In another longitudinal study by Y oungblade and Dunn 
(1995) children's use of role enactment at 33- months was related to their false belief 
understanding at 40- months. As well as the children's use of social pretence relating 
to their later theory of mind, they also found that it was related to their affective 
understanding. Charman, Baron-Cohen, Swettenham, Baird, Cox, and Drew (2000) 
did not find a longitudinal relation between the children's pretend play with their 
friends and their theory of mind understanding. 
Autism and Theory of Mind. Autism is a rare condition only occurring in 
approximately 4 in every 10,000 children (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985). The 
key symptoms of autism have been identified as being both social and communicative 
problems and difficulties with pretend play. These problems are evident in the first 
few years of life (Baron-Cohen, 1995). There is a reliably identifiable impairment in 
communication with autism, both verbal and non-verbal and children with autism can 
"find even the immediate social environment unpredictable and incomprehensible" 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985, p. 38). There is a subset of individuals with Asperger 
syndrome (AS) who are considered to be on the autism continuum because they also 
show social deficits but are generally found to have normal levels of language abilities 
(Rutherford, Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2002). 
Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) were first to investigate theory of mind in 
individuals with autism. In the study they compared children who have autism with a 
verbal age of 5; 5 years to normal developing preschoolers and children with downs 
syndrome. They found that 80% of the children with autism failed the unexpected 
location task, whereas 85% and 86% of the normal and Down's syndrome children 
passed the task. The performance of the children with autism could not be attributed 
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to deficits in intelligence. They had on average higher IQ scores than the Down's 
syndrome children. The children with autism had similar performance to the normal 
and Down's syndrome children on the control questions of the task; they only differed 
on the question, "Where would she look?" The children with autism consistently 
pointed to the actual location of the marble. These results showed that children with 
autism fail to show theory of mind understanding and this deficit could explain their 
inability to engage in pretend play (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). 
The performance of children with autism has also been compared to those with 
specific language impairments on false belief and belief term comprehension tasks. 
Ziatas, Durkin and Pratt (1998) found that children with autism showed significantly 
impaired performance on both false belief and belief term comprehension tasks when 
compared to normally developing children, and children with specific language 
impairment. This result led the authors to conclude that there is a relationship between 
false belief performance and belief term comprehension. 
Baron-Cohen et al. (1999) found that individuals with Asperger syndrome who 
had passed both first-order and second- order false belief tasks showed impaired 
performance compared to a control sample on the faux pas task. Adults with autism 
and Asperger syndrome were impaired at recognizing complex mental states from 
pictures of whole faces (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997b). Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) also 
found impaired performance for adolescents with Asperger syndrome on the reading 
the mind in the eyes task. The impairment in theory of mind performance was also 
found using the adult's version of the task on adults with Asperger syndrome and 
autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997a). 
Rutherford, Baron-Cohen, and Wheelwright (2002) had individuals with 
Asperger syndrome and high function individuals with autism judge emotions from 
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recorded dialogue from a dramatic performance (called the reading the mind in the 
voice task). Rutherford et al. (2002) found that the theory of mind deficit seen in 
individuals with Asperger syndrome is amodal. The performance of the individuals 
with autism on the reading the mind in voice task was significantly worse than a 
control group of typically developing adults. 
In another task, that was designed to be a sensitive and naturalistic assessment 
of theory of mind, individuals with autism who passed second order false belief tasks 
were found to perform significantly worse compared to normal children (average age 
of 8 years) and normal adults. In Happe (1994) a new theory of mind test was used 
called the Strange Stories test. In this test participants were given 24 stories or 
vignettes. The stories contained everyday situations where a character would say 
something that they did not literally mean (i.e. could be a joke, a lie, sarcasm). The 
test, as well as distinguishing performance between able children with autism and 
normal children and adults, also found differences between individuals with autism 
who had differing levels of theory of mind understanding. Individuals with autism, 
who passed second order false belief tasks, performed significantly better on the 
strange stories when compared to individuals with autism who had not passed any 
theory of mind tasks or those who had only passed the first order false belief task 
(Happe, 1994). Joliffe and Baron-Cohen (1999) confirmed the findings by Happe 
(1994). They also found that performance in clinical groups with autism or Asperger 
syndrome was significantly poorer on the strange stories task than a normal control 
group. In a similar study Brent, Rios, Happe, and Charman (2004) found that 
individuals with autism spectrum disorder did not perform as well as normal controls 
on both the eyes task and the strange stories task. Happe (1993) found individuals 
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with autism who passed second order false belief tasks were also able to understand 
1rony. 
The results from these varied studies consistently show that individuals with 
autism and higher functioning individuals with normal language and cognitive 
abilities with Asperger syndrome perform poorly on theory of mind tasks. Their poor 
performance could be due to neurocognitive deficits that are genetic in origin. There 
has been some evidence that disorders on the autism spectrum occur at a higher rate 
within families (Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997; Baron-Cohen Wheelwright, Lawson, 
Griffin & Hill, 2002). Individuals with Autism Spectrum disorders are known for their 
disinterest in socialising with others, therefore the theory of mind deficit seen could 
be due to a lack of opportunities to discuss mental states (as in the socialisation 
theory proposed by Nelson et al., 2003). 
Deafness and Theory of Mind. Access to conversations about mental states 
has been suggested as an important contributor to theory of mind development. It has 
been proposed that language in a social context is more influential than the 
grammatical structure that language uses (Siegal, Varley, & Want, 2001). Deaf 
children in hearing households are often in situations where they are communicatively 
separated from the rest of their family. Even if the family members do learn a manual 
form of communication it is frequently insufficient to carry out conversations about 
beliefs and thoughts (Gray & Hosie, 1996; Peterson, 2004; Peterson & Siegal, 1998; 
W oolfe, Want, & Siegal, 2002). Deaf children with hearing parents frequently acquire 
sign language outside of the family home, once they reach school age, and are 
referred to as 'late signers'. It is possible that children in this situation (late signers) 
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may expenence the same struggles of communicating with family members as 
witnessed in children with autism (Garfield, Peterson, & Perry, 2001). 
One issue that has arisen with investigating theory of mind m a deaf 
population is the use of theory of mind tasks that are heavily reliant on language, 
either to understand the test or to respond to the questions (W oolfe et al., 2002). In 
order to investigate the theory of mind understanding of deaf individuals 
independently of their language abilities W oolfe et al. (2002) gave deaf children 
between the ages of 4- and 8- years and hearing 3- and 4- year olds a test low on 
language requirements. In the 'thought bubble' test the children were shown a picture 
and required to fill in the characters 'thought bubble' with a picture that represented 
what the character was thinking. For example the children were shown a picture of a 
boy fishing, what he had caught was hidden by some reeds. The child could pull back 
the flap of reeds to see what the child had caught. There were two possible scenarios; 
the boy was shown either catching a fish (true belief) or a boot (false belief). The 
children then had four pictures; two distractor pictures, one of the true belief, and one 
of the false belief. The children were asked to pick a picture to show what the boy 
thought he had caught (W oolfe et al., 2002). They found that the 'native signers' 
(children who have deaf parents) performed significantly better than the 'late signers' 
and that the performance of the 'late signers' was equivalent to that of the 3- year-old 
hearing children. One important point to note is that the 'native signers' and 'late 
signers' did not differ in their language abilities, and the 'later signers' were on 
average a year older than the 'native signers' (Woolfe et al., 2002). Another study to 
minimise the language demands of the theory of mind tasks was completed by 
Figueras-Costa and Harris (200 1 ). Like W oolfe et al. they also found a delay in the 
children's theory of mind understanding, with the children not passing until 8 or 9 
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years of age. These studies show that the linguistic task demands do not seem to be 
the factor constraining the performance of deaf children on theory of mind tasks 
(Remmel, Bettger, & Weinberg, 2001 ). These studies support the claim that 
conversational competence influences theory of mind development. 
Another factor that could be influencing the performance of deaf individuals 
on theory of mind is the access to mental state talk as children. Even mothers of deaf 
preschool children who are skilled at using manual communication have been found 
to limit their conversation to concrete and visible topics (Peterson & Siegal, 1995). 
Peterson and Siegal (1995) hypothesised that "the acquisition of a theory of mind is 
fostered by early conversational experience in the family. Spontaneous 
communication about intangible thoughts and feelings supplies windows into the 
mental states of others." (p. 463). In their study investigating theory of mind in 
prelingually deaf children, Peterson and Siegel (1995) found that deaf children in 
hearing households had significant delays in the onset of their theory of mind 
understanding in children aged between 8 and 13 years. Across all the participants, 
only 35% passed a standard false belief task, and the ages of those who failed and 
passed did not differ significantly, nor did their IQ as measured by the Goodenough -
Harris Drawing test (Peterson & Siegal, 1995). The children in this sample were at 
least four years above the age at which hearing children pass the task, showing a 
significant delay in theory of mind development. The deaf children's performance is 
similar to what could be expected from a sample of children with autism. Peterson and 
Siegal (1995) concluded that limited access to mental state talk may be a plausible 
explanation for the poor performance on the deaf participants. 
A further study by Peterson and Siegal (1999) supported this conclusion. 
Similarly, they found the deaf signing children raised in hearing households 
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performed equivalently with children who have autism, on several theory of mind 
tasks. Another interesting finding of this study was the deaf children brought up in 
either oral households (speaking/listening) and deaf native signers (who had at least 
one other signer in the household) performed significantly better than the deaf signing 
children in hearing households and they did not differ from normal preschoolers in 
their theory of mind understanding (Peterson & Siegal, 1999). Deaf children who had 
access to communicative partners in their preschool years did not differ from hearing 
children in their theory of mind performance; this also supports the hypothesis that 
early conversational access to mental state talk is important for developing a theory of 
mind (Peterson & Siegal, 1999). Peterson and Siegal (1998) found that deaf children 
and children with autism performed similarly on a false photograph task. Their 
performances were not significantly worse than those of normally developing 4- year-
olds, but their theory of mind understanding was. This result suggests that the deaf 
children do not have a problem understanding representation. They concluded that 
even though deaf children and children with autism are both excluded from 
conversations about mental states at home for different reasons it has the same effect 
on their theory of mind (Peterson & Siegal, 1998). In a further study Peterson (2002) 
found that four year old hearing children outperformed deaf 6- to 13- year- old 
children on a mental representation task where the mother goes to buy ribbons to 
match the dolls red dress, while the mother is away the dress is changed to a yellow 
colour, and the child is asked what colour ribbons the mother will bring back. 80% of 
the preschoolers in Peterson's study passed this task, whereas only 38% of the deaf 
children passed. The results of the studies on deaf children with hearing parents 
systematically point to the importance of conversational access at home on the 
development of a theory of mind understanding and heavily support a conversational 
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account of theory of mind development. A conversational account also finds support 
in the individual rates of theory of mind development in children whose parents talk 
about mental states at differing rates (Peterson & Siegal, 2000). 
Mothers' use of mental state terms with their deaf children was specifically 
investigated by Lundy (2002). The results showed that the mother's use of mental 
state terms did not significantly influence theory of mind understanding in these deaf 
children, and that the age of the children was the most important predictor of theory of 
mind acquisition, with most children not passing until they were 7 or 8 years of age. 
Language was also a predictor of theory of mind understanding; children with better 
language skills had a more advanced theory of mind than children with low language 
skills. However, language was not as strong a predictor of theory of mind 
understanding as age was. This result is inconsistent with the conclusions made by 
Peterson and Siegal (2000). 
Other studies have supported the results by Peterson and Siegal, one study by 
Russell, Hosie, Gray, Scott, Hunter, Banks, and Macaulay (1998) found delays in the 
acquisition of theory of mind. In this study only 28% of the deaf children aged 4- to 
16- years passed theory of mind tasks. The poor performance was not due to low IQ 
scores for the IQ scores of the children that did pass were on average lower than the 
IQ scores of the children who failed the false belief tasks. The authors found that the 
age of the participants was related to theory of mind understanding; a higher 
proportion of the older children passed the false belief tasks. Russell et al. (1998) 
proposed a critical period for theory of mind acquisition in the preschool years after 
which even given appropriate experience theory of mind acquisition is still possible 
but is significantly slowed. Many of these studies have found that deaf children in 
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hearing households show developmental delays m theory of mind acquisition 
(Peterson, 2004). 
A positive finding for theory of mind development in deaf children was one by 
Courtin (2000). He found that children who learn sign language will acquire theory of 
mind at a faster rate than orally trained children, this difference was attributed to the 
visual perspective that is required to successfully learn sign language, and 
understanding different visual perspectives is one of the first steps to theory of mind 
understanding. Like visual perspective skills, desire understanding is said to precede 
theory of mind understanding. A study by Steeds, Rowe and Dowker (1997) found 
that the deaf children had no problem with understanding desires. Another precursor 
to theory of mind development is line of regard, i.e., being able to monitor what other 
people are looking at. Deaf children do use of line of regard to monitor what others 
are looking at but struggled to use line of regard as a predictor of other's mental states 
(Scott, Russell, Gray, Hosie & Hunter, 1999). These results combine to provide 
powerful evidence in support of social and language development being important 
factors in theory of mind development (Garfield et al., 2001, de Villiers, 2000). 
One study did not find a difference in theory of mind for deaf versus hearing 
participants. In the study by Al-Hilawani, Easterbrooks, and Marchant (2002) found 
that deaf and hearing children with an average of 9 years did not differ in their theory 
of mind understanding. However in this study the age of the participants and their 
hearing status was significantly correlated, with deaf children being older than the 
hearing children. So it is possible that the deaf children's equal performance on the 
picture judgement task was simply a result of their older age. 
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Gender Differences in Theory of Mind. There is some debate over whether 
there is a gender difference in theory of mind performance; some studies find a 
difference where others do not. If a difference is found it is always in the direction of 
the females having superior performance, and often the difference is not significant 
but females have higher theory of mind understanding on the tasks (e.g., Baron-Cohen 
et al., 2001b). 
Charman, Ruffman and Clements (2002) investigated gender differences in 
theory of mind understanding in two different samples of children. Charman et al. 
(2002) did a post- hoc analysis on two large datasets from two separate laboratories. 
In one dataset there were 375 children with an average age of 4.24 years (ranging 
from 2 to 6 years of age). The second dataset was larger with 1093 children with an 
average age of3.92 years (range from 2 to 6 years). The children from the first dataset 
all experienced an unexpected contents task, while the children in the second dataset 
experienced an unexpected location task. Charman et al. did find a gender difference 
in the children's theory of mind understanding with girls performing better than the 
boys. Although there was a significant difference it was weak and only existed for the 
younger children of both datasets. Charman et al. (2002) found that age rather than 
gender was a stronger predictor of theory of mind understanding. Cutting and Dunn 
(1999) found gender differences on three theory of mind tasks with the 4- year-old 
girls outperforming the boys. 
In more sophisticated tests of theory of mind in older populations gender 
differences have also been found. Baron-Cohen et al. (1999) found that girls 
performed better on the faux pas task than boys. Females have also shown better 
performance on the reading the mind in the eyes task than males (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1997a; Baron- Cohen et al., 200lb). Bosacki and Astington (1999) found that girls 
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scored significantly higher in their social understanding, as measured using their 
responses to socially ambiguous stories. 
Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla, and Youngblade (1991b) did not find a 
gender difference for children aged 40 months on a false belief task. In a sample of 
children from 3 to 4 years of age, Ruffman et al. (2006) did not find any significant 
gender differences. There was also no difference in performance for boys and girls in 
an older sample of third graders used in a study by Al-Hilawani et al. (2002). 
In summary, there is mixed support for gender differences in theory of mind 
performance. Where differences have been found females demonstrate earlier and 
more advanced theory of mind abilities than do boys. 
Link Between Theory of Mind and Emotion Understanding. Emotion 
understanding has been identified as an early developing aspect of social 
understanding (Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006). A study by Brown and Dunn (1991) 
found that children as young as 24 months were referring to emotional states and 
desires but not mental states. Dunn et al. (1991b) were one of the first studies to 
experimentally investigate the relation between mother-child talk, theory of mind and 
emotion understanding. They observed children at home with their mothers when they 
were 33- months and then measured their affective perspective abilities (emotion 
understanding) and false belief understanding when the children were 40- months-
, old. They found no relation between the children's false belief and affective 
perspective. However, a later study by Hughes and Dunn (1998) found a strong 
relation between the children's theory of mind performance and emotion 
understanding. The children's performance on an affective perspective taking task 
when the children were 47- months was found to predict their theory of mind 
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understanding 13 months later. Cutting and Dunn (1999) also found a relation 
between theory of mind understanding and children's affective perspective taking 
abilities in 4- year- olds, the relation existed after the children's language abilities 
were partialed out. They concluded that theory of mind and emotion understanding 
are related but distinct abilities. Harris, Johnson, Hutton, Andrews and Cooke (1989) 
found in a series of studies that children can use other's beliefs to predict and explain 
someone's emotional reaction and that this ability is evident when the children are 3-
years- old. By the time the children are 6 years of age it is well established. In another 
study the children's theory of mind and emotion understanding related to different 
aspects of their acceptance by peers and their perceptions of schooling (Dunn, 1995). 
Separate but inter-related deficits in theory of mind and emotion understanding have 
been found in hard-to-manage preschool children (Hughes, Dunn & White, 1998). 
However, there are populations where deficits in theory of mind understanding and 
emotion understanding are dissociated from each other. In a large review of the 
research Blair (2002) concluded that "theory of mind is independent of most aspects 
of emotional intelligence" (p. 424). In autistic populations there is ample evidence of 
impairments in theory of mind understanding, but mostly their emotion understanding 
is unimpaired. Conversely, psychopathic individuals have been found to have 
impaired emotion understanding but intact theory of mind understanding (Blair, 
2002). 
Emotion Understanding 
"Understanding of emotion concepts specifically draw on implicit and socially 
shared theories of mental states- such as beliefs, desires, intentions, and goals- and 
their links to overt behaviours" (Cervantes & Callanan, 1998, p. 89). Development in 
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emotion understanding has been related to increases in verbal abilities (Gross & 
Baliff, 1991). Children's language abilities have been found to highly correlate with 
their emotion understanding (Dunn & Cutting, 1999) even after the children's age has 
been statistically controlled for (Pons, Lawson, Harris, and de Rosnay, 2003). Infants' 
experience with discrete emotions emerges early; within the first 6 months (Stein & 
Levine, 1999). Children begin to discuss a range of emotions with others by 24 
months of age (Dunn, Bretherton & Munn, 1987). Children also use emotion labels in 
more sophisticated ways as they get older. They not only use emotion labels with 
reference to their own feelings, but the feelings of others and also begin to use them to 
influence other's behaviours (Bretherton, Fritz, Zahn-Waxler, & Ridgeway, 1986). 
The preschool child can accurately identify the situational determinants of another 
child's emotional reaction, and the consequences of an emotion (Fabes, Eisenberg, 
McCormick, & Wilson, 1988; Russell, 1990; Saami, Mumme, & Campos, 1998). 
Eventually the children can reconcile conflicting information on emotion (Gnepp, 
1983). The individual differences in emotion understanding have been found to be 
stable over time, with children at three years who show a high level of emotion 
understanding also having a higher level of emotion understanding at 6 years of age 
(Brown & Dunn, 1996). It has been proposed that children's understanding of 
emotions is 'scaffolded' during conversations with their parents (Lagattuta & 
Wellman, 2002). Denham and Kochanoff (2002) found that how attentive a mother 
was towards her child's display of emotions and her willingness to help the child deal 
with an emotional upset predicted the child's emotion understanding at 3- and 4- years 
of age. 
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Gender differences in emotion. Gender differences have also been found in 
emotion talk. Cervantes and Callanan (1998) found an increase in emotion talk for 
boys over time and not girls; this is different to other studies that generally find 
differences in terms of girls' superiority. The 2- year- old girls in the study referred to 
emotion more frequently and this was not a factor of girls being more talkative 
overall, there were no gender differences in overall talkativeness. Cervantes and 
Callanan (1998) also found that mothers gave more emotion explanations to boys than 
to girls, and there was a pattern of labelling emotions more frequently with girls but 
this did not reach significance. A similar finding by Dunn et al. (1987) showed even at 
18 months of age mother's encouraged more emotion talk with girls than with boys 
and that when the same children were 24 months old the girls referred to emotions 
more frequently than boys during conversations. 
Dunn et al. (1991 b) found a gender difference in performance on labelling 
and explaining emotions. They found that girls significantly outperformed the boys on 
these tasks. Girls were also found to outperform boys on a conflicting emotions task 
(Brown & Dunn, 1996). Cutting and Dunn (1999) only found a marginally superior 
difference for girls over boys in emotion understanding that did not reach 
significance. 
Talk about emotions. It is proposed that children learn to understand emotions 
through everyday conversations where children hear references and interpretations of 
emotions (Cervantes & Callanan, 1998). This was investigated through mother-child 
emotion talk during a shared storytelling situation. There was a moderate correlation 
between mothers' and children's emotion talk. Lagattuta and Wellman (2002) found 
that parents were more likely to discuss the causes of emotions rather than the 
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consequences of emotions with their children. Dunn et al. (1991 b) also found a 
correlation between mother-child talk about feeling states and the children's affective 
perspective understanding 7 months later. They concluded that the children's affective 
perspective taking skills could have been encouraged through conversations with their 
mothers. This result was also replicated by Dunn, Brown and Beardsall (1991) who 
found that children in families who frequently talked about emotions when the child 
was three years old made better judgements regarding others emotions on an affective 
perspective taking task three years later at the age of six. 
Kuebli, Butler and Fivush (1995) investigated emotion talk between 
mothers and their children during past event conversations when the children were 40, 
58 and 70 months. They found that mothers talked about emotions more and used a 
greater variety of emotion words in conversations with girls than with boys. At the 
start of the experiment there was no difference in the emotion talk for girls and boys. 
A year and a half later the girls used emotion terms more often and a greater range of 
emotion terms in their past event discussions. There is evidence that the amount of 
emotion words the mothers used influenced the children's later use of emotion words. 
For mothers who mentioned emotions more when the children were 40 months had 
children who discussed emotion more frequently a year and a half later (Kuebli et al., 
1995). Parental influences on emotion understanding have also been supported by 
Denham, Mitchell-Copeland, Strandberg, Auerbach, and Blair (1997). They found 
that both parents and children's use of emotion language during conversations 
predicted the children's emotion understanding. It may be that maternal talk about 
emotions during conflict is an important factor in children's emotion development. 
Liable and Thompson (2002) found mothers who referred to emotions during conflicts 
in the home when the children were 30 months old had children who demonstrated a 
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better emotion understanding 6 months later. Children who engage in more 
conversations about emotions will become more aware of its subjectivity (Harris, 
2000). 
The Present Research 
The present research focuses on the factors which are related to the 
development of theory of mind, emotion understanding, and autobiographical 
memory. It also explores the relations between theory of mind, emotion understanding 
and autobiographical memory. Chapter 3 describes a longitudinal study exploring how 
children's language and maternal mental state talk are related to children's theory of 
mind, emotion understanding, and autobiographical memory. Children were seen at 
42-, 48- and 54- months of age. Chapter 4 continues to examine the factors involved 
in the development of theory of mind, emotion understanding, and autobiographical 
memory in a different sample of 4- year- olds. It also examines the relation between 
the children's theory of mind and emotion understanding, and mothers' theory of 
mind and emotion understanding. Chapter 5 describes the final study of this thesis, 
which examines the relationship between theory of mind, emotion understanding, and 
autobiographical memory in an adult sample. Each of these three studies has a brief 
introduction to focus the reader on issues impertinent to the study. As a consequence, 
there is some repetition of research previously mentioned in the general introductory 
chapters (Chapter 1 and 2). 
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Chapter 3 
Children's Theory of Mind and Autobiographical Memory over Time 
The average age of an adult's first memory- the onset of autobiographical 
memory- is between three and four years of age (Macdonald, Uesiliana, & Hayne, 
2000; Mullen, 1994). Autobiographical memory is defined as "memory for 
information and events pertaining to the self' (Howe & Courage, 1993, p. 306). The 
research on children's autobiographical memory development focuses on memories 
for specific one-off events that are verbally accessible (Reese, 2002a). This research 
has established that even very young children can remember events months later 
(Meltzoff, 1995). No one, to date, has been able to satisfactorily resolve this paradox. 
There are many theories that have been proposed to explain the paradox. 
These theories vary from the child repressing early memories due to the aggressive 
and sexual nature of the memory (Freud, 1905/ 1953, cited in Pillemer & White, 
1989), to proposed changes in memory structure where the child develops from 
having a non-verbal memory system that consists of memory for locations and 
feelings, to a verbally accessible system (Pillemer & White, 1989). Pemer (1991) 
proposed that the development of a dual representational system leads to the offset of 
childhood amnesia; this occurs when the child can simultaneously represent the 
current situation and have a representation of the past. The child must also understand 
the relation between experience and knowledge, or more specifically that 
experiencing an event leads to knowing about the event. Pemer (1991) proposed a 
link between theory of mind and autobiographical memory. Welch- Ross (1995), in a 
related argument, posited that an implicit understanding of mind is an essential 
component in the development of autobiographical memory. Fivush (2001) also 
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posited that representational abilities were required for autobiographical memory, 
however she took this proposal further than Perner (1991) and suggested that 
representational abilities were developed through shared narratives with the parents. 
Nelson (1993) also proposed that autobiographical memory develops through 
conversations about a past event with a more experienced conversational partner 
(normally the children's parents). 
It is unlikely that a simple explanation will eventually resolve the question of 
autobiographical memory development. Research has shown that there are multiple 
influences on the development of autobiographical memory. Culture, maternal 
conversations, siblings, self-recognition, and performance on theory of mind tasks 
have all been related to autobiographical memory development. 
One question this study aimed to address was the influence of maternal talk on 
the children's developing memory. Parental talk during an event and about past events 
has been linked to the child's ability to recall information later. Leichtman et al. 
(2000) found that mothers who provided new information or requested more 
information soon after an event had children who recalled more information three 
weeks later. Reese and her colleagues have firmly established the link between 
mothers' style of talk and the children's later recall. Reese and Fivush (1993) found 
that the children's participation in conversations was related to their mothers' use of 
elaboration during the conversations. Reese et al. (1993) found that children of 
mothers, who were highly elaborate during conversations at 40 and 46 months, 
recalled more details up to 12 months later. 
One of the main questions this study aimed to address was whether there exists 
a relation between the children's theory of mind understanding and their 
autobiographical memory. Welch-Ross (1997) demonstrated a relation between theory 
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of mind understanding and the child's memory responses during conversations with 
their mothers. Conversely, Reese and Cleveland (2006) found no relation between the 
children's implicit understanding of mind and the children's autobiographical memory 
for an event. They did find that different aspects of maternal talk contributed to both 
the children's theory of mind and autobiographical memory. The mothers' elaborative 
talk was related to both the children's autobiographical memory and theory of mind, 
and mothers' meta-memory talk was related to the children's theory of mind (Reese & 
Cleveland, 2006). 
Similar to autobiographical memory, there are a wide range of theories 
proposed to explain theory of mind development, from changes in representational 
abilities (Perner, 1991), to having an innate domain-specific module (Fodor, 1992; 
Leslie, 1994), to social linguistic influences (Nelson et al., 2003). Theories such as the 
one by Perner (1991) have used the notion of representation. Perner (1991) disagreed 
that theory of mind is an innate ability and stated that theory of mind is only possible 
when the children can meta-represent. It is not until the children have a change in 
cognition from updating a single representation to being able to understand that a 
representation is a representation of a referent that they develop a theory of mind. 
Nelson et al. (2003) also mention representations in their theory but proposed that 
language is the most important factor in theory of mind development. More 
specifically, they argue that theory of mind understanding develops through 
conversations with more experienced others, where the child learns that others can 
have differing representations of the same event. 
Language has been widely accepted as a major contributor to theory of mind 
development. Ruffman et al. (2003) found that language abilities were related to the 
children's theory of mind understanding 2.5 years later. This finding has been 
81 
replicated by many others (e.g., Astington and Jenkins, 1999). One aspect of 
language is talk about mental states. One question this study addressed was whether 
this specific language input might be driving the theory of mind- language 
relationship. The study addressed whether it was not simply talk between mother-
child dyads, but talk about mental states, that leads to a more developed theory of 
mind. It is possible that children learn that their thoughts and beliefs about a situation 
can differ from others' thoughts and beliefs through talk with their mothers about 
mental states. 
A relation between maternal talk about mental states and theory of mind 
understanding in children has been found in some studies. Peterson and Slaughter 
(2003) found that mothers who used more elaborative mental state explanations when 
describing a set of pictures to their children, who were between 4;0 and 5;7 years, had 
children with better theory of mind performance. In a longitudinal study, Ruffman et 
al. (2002) found that maternal mental state talk when the children were three years old 
was significantly related to the children's theory of mind understanding up to a year 
later, even after the children's language abilities had been controlled for. 
Whether the child has siblings or not has also been proposed as a contributor 
to theory of mind development. The current study investigated the relation between 
the number of siblings the child had and their theory of mind understanding. Perner, 
Ruffman and Leekam (1994) found a relation between the number of siblings 3- to 6-
year- old children had and their theory of mind understanding. Children with siblings 
outperformed children without siblings on a false belief task. Two studies have found 
that it made no difference to the children's theory of mind understanding whether the 
siblings were older or younger (Perner et al., 1994; Peterson, 2000). On the other 
hand, Ruffman et al. (1998) found that having older, but not younger siblings, was 
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associated with better theory of mind performance in both a western sample and a 
sample of Japanese children, who were over the age of3;3 years. 
A relation between the number of siblings an individual has and the onset of 
autobiographical memory has also been established. Wang et al. (1998) found that 
Chinese only -children had earlier memories than Chinese children with siblings; 
there was a difference of almost 9 months. The influence of siblings on the onset of 
autobiographical memory appears to be reversed to effects that siblings have on 
theory of mind development. Being the only-child is associated with having earlier 
autobiographical memories but later theory of mind development. 
It is possible that opportunities to communicate with others about one's own 
and other's mental and emotional states lead to a better theory of mind understanding. 
Children and adults with autism or a related disorder such as Asperger syndrome have 
been found to consistently be impaired in a variety of theory of mind tasks. In the first 
study of theory of mind impairments in children with autism, Baron-Cohen et al. 
(1985) found that 80% of children with autism failed an unexpected location task. 
Autistic and Asperger syndrome individuals have shown impairments in performance 
compared to normal controls on tasks such as the reading the mind in the eyes task, 
the faux pas task, and strange stories task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2001; Brent et al., 2004; Happe', 1994). Social and communicative problems are 
some of the key symptoms that have been associated with autism (Baron-Cohen, 
1995). The lack of opportunities to communicate with others about feelings and 
thoughts that is associated with autism may limit the individual's theory of mind 
understanding. 
Further evidence for the idea that a lack of communication opportunities 
hinders theory of mind development comes from studies of deaf children. Deaf 
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children who have hearing parents are another group who consistently show delays in 
theory of mind development. Peterson and Siegal (1995) found that only 35% of deaf 
children aged between 8 and 13 years passed a standard false belief task. Even when 
deaf children with hearing parents are given a theory of mind task with low language 
demands their performance shows delays. W oolfe, Want and Siegal (2002) found that 
4- to 8- year- old deaf children with hearing parents (or 'late signers') performed 
equivalently to hearing three- year- olds on the same test and were significantly worse 
than deaf children with deaf parents ('native signers') on the same task. 
Another question the current study addressed was whether gender differences 
exist in theory of mind understanding. In studies which find a gender difference in 
theory of mind understanding, it is always in favour of girls having a superior theory 
of mind understanding. Not all studies have found gender differences in theory of 
mind understanding, however. Dunn et al. (1991 b) found no difference in 
performance on a false belief task when the children were 40 months old. Studies that 
have found gender differences have generally used large samples of children, 
suggesting that if gender differences exist they are weak, and are not as strong a 
predictor as other factors such as age and language abilities. A study by Charman et 
al. (2002) analysed data from over a thousand children ranging in age from 2 to 6 
years and found that girls outperformed boys on an unexpected contents task and 
unexpected location task. The gender differences, however, were only found in 
younger children. 
The next question the current study addressed was the relation between 
emotion understanding and theory of mind understanding- are the two abilities related 
or distinct? Dunn et al. (1991b) investigated this relation using affective labelling and 
affective perspective tasks when the children were 33- months- old and a false belief 
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task when the children were 40- months- old. They did not find a relation between the 
two social-cognitive skills. They did, however, find that emotion understanding in the 
children was related to mother-child talk about feeling states. In studies using older 
children, a relation between theory of mind and emotion understanding has been 
found. Hughes and Dunn (1998) found a relation between the children's affective 
perspective taking skills when they were 47- months and their theory of mind 
understanding at 60- months. In another study, Cutting and Dunn (1999) found a 
relation between theory of mind understanding and the children's affective 
perspective taking at 4 years of age. The relation existed even after the children's 
language abilities were controlled for. 
One question the current study addressed was whether children's language 
abilities and maternal talk are related to children's emotion understanding. Studies by 
Dunn and Cutting (1999) and Pons et al. (2003) have found a relation between the 
children's language abilities and their emotion understanding. There have also been a 
number of studies which have established a relation between maternal talk about 
emotions and the children's emotion understanding. One study by Dunn et al. (1991a) 
found that 3- year- old children, in families which frequently referred to emotions, had 
better emotion understanding when they were 6- years- old. This result was 
supported by Dunn et al. (1991b), who found a relation between the mother's emotion 
talk when the children were 33 months old and their emotion understanding at 40 
months. 
I also asked whether there are gender differences in children's emotion 
understanding. Dunn et al. ( 1991 b) found that girls significant! y outperformed boys 
on labelling and explaining emotions. The gender difference found in emotion 
understanding may be due to different socialisation of emotions for boys and girls. 
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Dunn et al. (1987) found that mothers were more likely to talk about emotions with 
girls than with boys when the children were 18 months, and 6 months later the girls 
mention more emotions than the boys. 
The overarching goal of the current experiment was to investigate the relation 
between language abilities, talk about past events, memory for a laboratory event, 
theory of mind abilities, and emotion recognition. These abilities were measured in 61 
children over three time points six months apart, starting when the child was 42 
months of age. Based on past research the following hypotheses were generated; Hl: 
that children with more developed language abilities will demonstrate a more 
sophisticated theory of mind understanding at a younger age. H2: that the relation 
between language and theory of mind understanding will be unidirectional, early 
theory of mind abilities would not relate to later language abilities. H3: that emotion 
understanding and the children's language abilities would be related. H4: that the 
children's theory of mind and emotion understanding would be related. H5: that 
mother's talk about mental states would also relate to the theory of mind abilities of 
the child and that talk about emotions would not relate to theory of mind abilities. H6: 
that maternal emotion talk would correlate with their children's emotion 
understanding. H7: that the children's theory of mind abilities would be related to 
their memory recall for past events (both the events discussed by the mother and 
recall for a laboratory event experienced 6 months previously). In this study there 
were three main research aims. The first is to establish the existence of a link between 
theory of mind and autobiographical memory. The second research aim is to establish 
the existence of a link between theory of mind and emotion understanding, and the 
third aim is to investigate which factors are associated with the development of theory 




Sixty-one New Zealand children were recruited through an existing pool of 
families that were originally contacted through birth records. At the first time point 
there were 30 females and 31 males. The participants were seen within three weeks of 
their 42-month birth date (M= 41.91 months, SD= 10.6 days). Two children were not 
seen within the three-week period; they were seen at 42.7 and 42.8 months of age. 
The next two assessments took place at six-month intervals. At the second time point 
there were 59 participants, comprising 29 females and 30 males. Most of the children 
were 48 months old (M= 48.02 months, SD= 13.2 days), but three children were seen 
outside the three-week window (47.2 months, 49.3 months, and 49.5 months). At the 
final time point, when the children were 54 months old, there were 58 participants, 
comprising 28 females and 30 males (M= 53.91 months, SD= 16.5 days). Five 
children were seen outside the three-week window; they were 53.1, 53.2, 55.0, 55.2 
and 55.4 months. After the first time point when the participants were 42 months, two 
participants were discontinued from the study for failing to show for appointments, 
and another participant moved towns after the second time point. The final sample 
consisted of 58 participants, including 28 females and 30 males. 
Fifty-four of the children were identified by their parents as being New 
Zealanders of European descent. Four of the children were identified as being ofNew 
Zealand Maori descent, two children were of Pacific Island descent, and one child was 
described as Pacific Island and Kenyan descent. 
Socioeconomic status (based on the occupation of the parent with the highest 
status employment) averaged a 2 on the Elley- Irving Socio-Economic Index (Elley 
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& Irving, 1985). This scale is based on the 1981 New Zealand Census, and takes into 
account both income and educational status. It ranges from 1- 7 with 1 being the 
highest and 7 the lowest. The median maternal education was a post secondary 
diploma, whereas the median paternal education was a tertiary degree. The median 
household income was over $40, 000. Informed consent was obtained form 
participants' parents, and children were asked for their verbal assent. 
Materials 
The experiment was run in a room designed to resemble a family room with 
couches and a coffee table. A discretely mounted camera on the ceiling was linked to 
a television and video- cassette recorder. Two microphones were positioned from the 
ceiling and were linked to an audiotape recorder. All sessions were videotaped. 
Audiocassette recordings were taken only for the event narration between the mothers 
and their children. 
Test of Early Language Development- 3. The Test of Early Language 
Development-3 (TELD-3) by Hresko, Reid and Hammill (1999) was used to assess 
the participants' spoken language level at 42- and 48- months. The TELD can be 
administered in less than thirty minutes to assess expressive language, receptive 
language, and overall spoken language. It is scored as a quotient with a mean of 100 
and a standard deviation of 15. Children can be tested from the ages of 2; 0 to 7; 11. 
The individual test items measured either the participant's syntax (form) or their 
semantics (content) on two subtests of receptive and expressive language. 
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Unexpected Contents Task. This task was based on Perner, Leekam and 
Wimmer (1987). It was given to the participants when they were 42- and 48- months. 
The procedure at both time points was the same except that at each time point 
different props were used, and when the children were 48- months they were asked a 
justification question based on Ruffman, Slade, and Crowe (2002). 
The participant was presented with a closed box and asked, "What do you 
think is inside the box?" If the child did not spontaneously respond, they were 
prompted for the correct answer (i.e., "What does the box look like?"). Once the 
participant had responded, the box was opened and the participant was shown the 
contents of the box. The children were asked, "What is really inside the box?" After 
the participant had identified the unexpected contents, the researcher closed the box 
and asked, "Before, when it was all closed up like this, before we opened it, what did 
you think was inside?" If the participant failed to respond to this representational 
change question, the question was repeated but with two forced choice alternatives, 
"Do you think its [box appearance] or [actual contents]?" The order of the alternatives 
was counterbalanced across children. 
The participants were then introduced to a puppet and told, "This is [puppet 
name]. [Puppet name] has never seen inside the box. What does [puppet name] think 
is inside?" If the participants failed to answer this false belief question, they were 
given a forced choice alternative, "Do you think that [puppet name] thinks it's [box 
appearance] or [actual contents] inside?" Again the order of the forced choice 
alternatives was counterbalanced across the children. 
At 48 months, if the participants responded correctly to the false belief 
questions, they were asked a justification question, "Why will [puppet name] think 
there are [box appearance] inside?" 
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At 42- months the participants were shown a toothpaste box, which contained 
the unexpected content of a hairbrush. The hand puppet used was that of a horse. At 
48- months a cracker box was used with the unexpected content of silk flowers. The 
participants were introduced to a finger puppet of a 'friendly' frog. 
The participants received 1 point if they answered the representational change 
question correctly (they identified that they thought the box would contain its 
expected contents). The participants also received 1 point if they correctly identified 
that the puppet would hold a false belief of the box's contents, and 1 point for the 
justification question if they referred to the misleading appearance of the box. These 
summed to a total possible score of 2 at the 42 -month time point and 3 at the 48 -
month time point. 
Unexpected Location Task. This task by Wimmer and Pemer (1983) was 
adapted from Welch-Ross (1997). This task was presented to the participants at all 
three of the time points. The story followed the basic format of the Sally- Ann story 
but the props were changed to support the story at each time point. 
At 42- months the props used consisted of a cot, a blanket, and two Fisher-
Price figures of a mother and a father. The participants were told that Kelly's mother 
had brought a new doll for Kelly. When they arrive home from shopping the phone 
rings and Kelly's mother leaves the doll in the bag to go and answer the phone. While 
Kelly's mother is away her father looks at the doll and places it in the cot before he 
goes outside. Once her mother returns the participants are told, "Here comes Kelly's 
Mum again, she wants to get the doll for Kelly. Where will she look first? Where does 
she think the doll is?" If children do not respond they are given the forced choice 
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alternatives of "inside the bag" or "inside the cot". The alternatives were 
counterbalanced across the participants. If the participants responded correctly with 
the expected location (the bag) they were then asked, "Where is it really?" 
At 48- months the scene was set at a fire station, with a fire station, fire engine 
and two fire fighters: Fire fighter Joe and fire fighter Sam. The participants were told 
that fire fighter Joe has a new torch. He puts the torch away in a box in the fire station 
and goes away for lunch. Fire fighter Sam wants to look at the torch; he gets it out and 
shines it around and then puts it away in the fire engine before he leaves to go home. 
Then fire fighter Joe returns from lunch. The researcher tells the participant, "Look, 
here comes fire fighter Joe back. He wants his torch. Where will he look first for it? 
Where does he think it is?" If participants did not respond they were given a forced 
choice alternative of "inside the box" or "inside the fire engine". The alternatives 
were counterbalanced across participants. If children correctly answered the false 
belief question, they were asked the justification question, "Why does he think it is in 
the box?" based on Ruffman, Slade, and Crowe (2002). Participants were then asked, 
"Where is it really?" 
At 54- months a farm scene was created with a bam, some goats, a basket and 
two farmers (farmer Jo and farmer Bob). Farmer Jo was looking after her animals, but 
she has to go home for lunch, so she puts the baby goat safely away in the bam. While 
she is out to lunch, farmer Bob stops by. He sees the baby goat and gets the goat out 
to play with it. When he is done he puts the baby goat safely away in the basket and 
goes away. The participants are then told, "Look, farmer Jo has returned from lunch. 
She wants her baby goat. Where does she think her baby goat is? Where will she 
look?" If the children did not respond, they are given counterbalanced forced choice 
alternatives of "inside the bam" or "inside the basket". The participants were then 
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asked the justification question, "Why will she look there?" and then were asked for 
the current location of the goat. 
The participants received 1 point if they correctly answered the false belief 
question. At 48- and 54- months the participants also received 1 point if they correctly 
answered the justification question by referring to where the story character had 
initially put the target object, or if they referred to the mistaken belief held by the 
story character that the object had not been moved. At 42- months there was a 
possible maximum score of 1 (participants were given a score of 0 if they failed to 
correctly respond to any of the questions). At 48- and 54- months the maximum 
possible score was 2. 
Second Order False Belief Task. This task was done at 54- months. It was 
based on the task used by Pemer, Kain, and Barchfeld (2002). The participants were 
introduced to the props used, which included a Fisher-Price girl, boy and clown and a 
small toy cat. The story was enacted using these props. Participants were told that 
Jenny wants to get Clown a special present for his birthday. She wants to get him a 
kitten. She doesn't want him to know, so she tells him she is going to the toy store to 
buy him a fun toy for his birthday. Jenny then goes away. While Jenny is away Clown 
goes down to the laundry and finds a box. Inside the box he finds a kitten. Later on 
their friend Ben stops by to talk to Jenny and asks what is she getting Clown for his 
birthday. The participant is then asked the reality question, "What is Clown getting for 
his birthday?" Ben then asks Jenny, "What does Clown think he is getting for his 
birthday?" The participants were asked the false belief question, "What will Jenny 
say?" If participants showed confusion over this question, the researcher asked, "What 
does Jenny think clown knows about his present?" If participants answered the false 
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belief question correctly they were asked the justification question, "Why will Jenny 
say that?" The participants were then asked a reality and a memory question, "Does 
clown know what his present really is?" and "Does Jenny know that clown found the 
kitten in the laundry?" The participants were given a score of 1 for correctly 
answering the false belief and justification questions (answering that Jenny is unaware 
that Clown found the kitten) for a maximum score of2. 
Emotion Recognition Task. This task was done at 48- and 54- months. The 
emotion recognition task used the "JJ" faces by Ekman & Friesen (1976). There were 
six different emotions: happy, sad, afraid, angry, surprised, and disgust. Each emotion 
was presented to the participant twice for a total of 12 trials. The target emotions were 
presented on an A4 piece of laminated paper alongside a second distracter face on the 
same A4 sheet. The side of presentation of the target emotion was changed so the 
same target emotion (e.g., happy) was presented once on the left and once on the 
right. Throughout the task the target emotion was never presented more than three 
times in a row on the same side. Each emotion was presented between two to five 
times. The happy face was only paired with angry and surprise, whereas surprise and 
angry were paired with all five other emotions. Sad, disgust, and scared were paired 
with the four emotions except happy. It was decided that the happy emotion would 
only be presented twice due to the ease of recognising happy emotions compared to 
negative emotions. The participants were asked to point to the face that felt the way 
the researcher said, i.e., "Which face looks happy, can you point to the happy face?'' 
Throughout the task the child was encouraged for pointing, i.e., "good pointing", but 
was not given any feedback on their performance. The same target emotion was never 
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presented twice in a row, and there was a fixed order of presentation. The participant 
was given a score of 1 for each correct response for a maximum possible score of 12. 
Emotion Labelling Task. This task was only done at 48- months. Like the 
emotion recognition task the emotion labelling used the face of "JJ" from Ekman and 
Friesen (1976). There were six emotions used: happy, sad, afraid, angry, surprised, 
and disgust. Each face was displayed once for a total of six trials. The participants 
were told that, "sometimes you can tell how a person feels by the look on their face. I 
want you to tell me how the man feels. How does he feel?" The participants were not 
given any corrective feedback. The participants were given a score of 1 for each 
response for a total possible score of 6. 
Emotion Situation Task. This task was only administered at 48- months. It is 
adapted from a task by Denham (1986) and Ruffman, Slade, and Crowe (2002). 
Firstly the participants were shown four small round cartoon faces and asked to 
identify the emotion shown in each one. If the participant did not correctly label the 
emotion they were corrected by the researcher and then asked to point to the face 
which showed that emotion. There were four emotions used: happy, sad, afraid, and 
angry. The participants were told, "We are going to play a game with these faces. I am 
going to tell you a story and I want you to put the face on to show me how the person 
feels." The researcher demonstrated how the task worked with a practise situation 
which involved Sarah's reaction to a larger spider (scared). Each situation was 
represented with a cartoon (line) drawing. The cartoon faces could be adhered to the 






the cartoon picture (in the place where the face would go). The researcher presented 
the 8 situations to the participant while pointing to the relevant part of the picture. An 
example story is "Sarah's favourite toy is broken" (See Figure 3.1 ). At the end of each 
situation the researcher asked the participant, "How does [character's name] feel? Put 
her face on her to show how she feels." For four of the situations two possible 
emotions were accepted as correct because adults in Ruffman et al. (2002) had named 
two emotions as likely in that situation. These situations involved the emotions of 
anger and sadness. The participant was given a score of 1 for each correct emotion 
identified. There was a maximum score of 8 for this task. 
Figure 3.1. Sarah and Her Broken Skateboard. 
Emotion Discrimination Task. This task was only done at 54- months. The 
faces for this task were initially used in Sullivan and Ruffman (2004b ). The faces 
were developed using a computer graphics program that morphed together images 
taken from Ekman and Friesen (1976) to alter the emotion expressions of"JT' . 
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There were six emotions used: Happy, sad, angry, scared, surprise and disgust. 
Each image was presented twice in a fixed order for a total of 12 trials. Each emotion 
face was presented as 100% of the emotion (i.e., 100% sad). The faces were also 
morphed with another emotion so there was only 70% of the target emotion. Each 
emotion was shown at 100% and 70%. The angry face was morphed with happy; the 
disgusted face was morphed with anger; the scared face was morphed with a sad face; 
the happy face was morphed with a scared face and the sad face was morphed with an 
angry face. Each face at 100% and 70% was presented side by side on a laminated A4 
sheet of paper. The target face (100%) was presented once on the left side and once on 
the right side. The same emotion was never presented twice in a row. 
The participants were asked to point to the face that looks most like the way 
that the researcher says (i.e., "which is more angry?"). In this task the participants 
were not required to provide an emotion label, they were only required to identify the 
emotion. The participants were given a score of 1 for each correct response for a 
maximum score of 12. 
Event Narration. This task was done at 42- and 48- months. The participant's 
mother was asked to discuss both a positive (e.g., happy) and negative event (e.g., sad, 
fearful, angry) while the researcher was in another room getting ready for the next 
task. The mother was not given any time or topic constraints and was asked to talk as 
naturally as possible to the child about the event and not to press the child if he/she 
was unwilling to talk. The mother was asked to discuss events that had occurred 
within the last six months. Most conversations only lasted a few minutes in length. 
The mother-child talk was recorded onto an audiocassette tape. It was later transcribed 
verbatim from the audiotapes. The transcripts were parsed into clauses, and each 
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clause was coded for mental state and emotion terms and for the style of talk for both 
the mother and the child. The positive and negative events were coded separately for 
each participant. The coding scheme followed that of Ruffman, Slade and Crowe 
(2002) and Farrant and Reese (2000). 
The child memory conversations were coded for five different types of 
mutually-exclusive responses and were based on the coding scheme of Farrant and 
Reese (2000). A Child Memory Response was when a child provided a new piece of 
information. When the child responded to a mother's question by simply saying "yes" 
or "no" it was not considered a child memory response. When the child confirmed or 
negated the mother's previous utterance ("yes' or "no") it was coded as a Child 
Evaluation. If the child took a conversational tum but did not provide any new 
information or replied; "I don't know" it was coded as a Child Placeholder. Child 
Repetitions were instances where the child repeated the mother's or his own previous 
utterance, and did not provide any new information. The final child conversation code 
was Child Memory Questions when the child asked a question about the event. 
There were 7 mutually-exclusive mother conversation codes used, and these 
were again based on the coding scheme of Farrant and Reese (2000). Mother 
Elaborative Questions occurred when the mother asked the child to provide new 
information by asking a question (i.e., "What did we see at the zoo?''). The mother 
could also provide new information in the form of a statement (i.e., "The zebras were 
being feed"); this was coded as a Mother Elaborative Statement. The mother repeating 
the exact words or the gist of the previous utterance was coded as Mother Repetitions; 
these could be either statements or questions. Mother Placeholders occurred when the 
mother took a conversational tum that did not contain any content (e.g., "Oh really"). 
Mother Confirmations were utterances that confirmed or negated the child's previous 
~. \ 
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utterance; they could include a repetition of the child's previous utterance (e.g., child-
"a chair" mother- "yes a chair"). Or a mother confirmation could simply be a 
statement like "yes that's right". When the mother requested that the child provided 
more information but the request did not contain any information itself, this was 
coded as a Mother Remember Prompt (e.g., "What else?"). The final coding category 
for the mother conversation codes was developed to deal with the numerous examples 
of closed questions the mother asked which only required a yes or no response from 
the child, so did not require any elaboration on the event from the child, but provided 
the child with new information about the event. Mother Yes/ No Questions were any 
questions that required the child to confirm or deny a piece of information; this 
category included tag questions (e.g., "We enjoyed the horse ride, didn't we?") 
The transcripts were also coded for mental state terms based on the coding 
scheme of Ruffman, Slade and Crowe (2002). The first category was for the cognitive 
terms of 'Think and Know'. These were coded if the term 'think' was referred to as a 
mental activity (e.g., "he's thinking about it"), beliefs (e.g., "I think it was red"), 
desires (e.g., "I think it's beautiful") or used as a contrastive (e.g., "I used to think that 
but now I don't"). Incidents when the term was used such as "I think so" and "what 
do you think?" were not coded. Genuine instances of 'Know' were coded when they 
referred to a lack of knowledge (e.g., "I didn't know that") or when they questioned 
the knowledge source (e.g., "How do you know that?"). Any utterance of "I don't 
know" was not coded as a 'think/know' term. The think and know terms could be 
further separated into prompts or statements. When the term was used in a question to 
elicit knowledge it was coded as a prompt (e.g., "What do you think happened at the 
party?"). 
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Desire terms were also coded for in terms of whether it was a prompt or a 
statement. An example of a desire prompt was "What did he want?" The desire terms 
coded were "want, like, love, dream, hope, wish, prefer, keen on." Statements such as 
"I don't care" and "I want a bike" were not coded as desire terms. 
Other mental state terms were also coded for. These included "remember, 
understand, forget, remind, realise, idea, consider, have in mind, daydream, mean 
imagine, wonder and expect". These were also coded as prompts (e.g., "Do you 
remember your birthday?" or statements (e.g., "I remember the black cat"). 
Emotion terms were also coded as prompts and statements. However, not 
every question was coded as a prompt. For example, "How did you feel?" was coded 
as an emotion prompt, whereas "Why were you sad?" was not. The second question 
was not eliciting the child to talk about emotion whereas the first statement was a 
direct elicitation of emotion talk and so was deemed as an emotion prompt. The 
emotion terms coded for included "happy, sad, unhappy, cross, angry, grumpy, 
scared, afraid, disappointed, worried, upset, surprised, pleased, enjoy, excited, fun, 
interested, frustrated, missed, annoyed, hurtful, bored and fed up". The term "feel" 
was also coded dependent on the context of the statement (e.g., "I felt bad" was an 
emotion statement, whereas "It felt furry" was not). 
Another category coded for was Modulations of Assertions, which included 
any term that intended to modify the certainty of the statement. These included 
"might, maybe, perhaps, possibly, probably, could be, must, certainly, definitely, sure, 
guess, figure, reckon, certain, suppose, wonder, expect, curious and bet." 
Physical State terms were the only non-mental state terms that were coded 
for. These were term such as "cry, laugh, smile, giggle, hurt, ill, sleepy, tired, hungry 
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and thirsty." They do not refer to internal mental states, but are physical 
manifestations of internal states. 
A second researcher independently coded 25% of the transcripts for the 
mother-child event narration at 42- and 48- months. Intra-class correlations were 
calculated. Overall, Cronbach's alpha at 42- months was .845. The intra-class 
correlations for the categories used in the analyses ranged from .786 to 1.00. 
Cronbach's alpha at 48- months was .857, with a range of intra-class correlations from 
.773 to 1.00. 
Laboratory Event Recall. When the children were 48- months they 
experienced a laboratory event. They were then tested on the recall of the event 6 
months later at 54- months. Each child experienced the same two events. Firstly the 
children were assisted in making a badge to take home with them. They were given a 
piece of circular paper and asked to choose a coloured pen that was used to write their 
name on the piece of paper. The children could write their own name on the paper or 
have the main researcher do it for them. Once the children had written their name they 
were able to choose stickers to add to the piece of paper. The children then added a 
plastic cover and plastic backing to the piece of paper and the badge bits were put into 
the badge maker. The children helped the researcher press the handle down two times. 
The badge was removed and pinned to the children's tops. The children were then 
asked to select a balloon (from a range of colours). A hand pump was used to inflate 
the balloon, the children were told that the balloon had to be held tight to the pump or 
it would fly away. The researcher at the time let the balloon 'escape'. The balloon was 
retrieved then successfully blown up using the pump. A white stick was added to the 
bottom of the balloon (the knot of the balloon was used to join the stick and the 
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balloon together). The children were then asked to choose two eyes to stick on 
balloon. The children also choose ears, mouth and a nose for the balloon. Once the 
balloon had been given a face the children were asked to name the balloon. After this 
the children were given the opportunity to dance and sing along with the balloon, feed 
the balloon using a toy dinner set and put the balloon to bed on a small foam mattress 
and cover it with a blanket. Once the balloon had a nap, the children were asked if the 
balloon could go home with them. 
Six months later at 54- months the children were asked to talk to a different 
researcher about what happened last time they had come to visit. If the child did not 
spontaneously mention either making the badge or the balloon they were told, "I 
heard that you made a balloon/ badge, tell me about that?" The children were given 
the opportunity to freely recall as much information as they could about either the 
balloon or the badge then, depending on how much information they had supplied, 
they were prompted for answers. The researcher asked, "What was on the balloon/ 
badge?" Each memory interview was recorded and transcribed verbatim. The 
transcripts were coded for the amount of information the children supplied in both 
free recall and prompted recall. Each memory interview was also coded for the 
number of objects and actions that the children supplied in free and prompted recall. 
Different names were accepted for some of the objects recalled (e.g., machine instead 
of badge maker) on the condition that it was obvious to the coder what the child was 
referring to. The children were also given credit for descriptors that were used. For 
example if the child said, "I put a star sticker on it" they were given one point for 
action (i.e., put) one point for descriptive (e.g., star) and one point for the object (e.g., 
sticker). If the child was vague on details e.g., "I popped it in a thing" they were only 
given credit for the action. The children were only given one point if they told the 
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researcher the balloon had a face, but were also given one point if they mentioned 
each of the facial features on the balloon. No points were given for incorrect 
information or any information that had simply been repeated from the researcher or 
the child's mother. The frequency of actions and objects for the badge and balloon 
were summed to get a total for free recall object, free recall action, prompted recall 
object and prompted recall action and also a total recall. 
Procedure 
At the three time points the children and parents visited a research room at the 
Psychology Department of the University of Otago. This room was set up as a lounge 
and contained two couches, a dresser, a coffee table, and a child's table with two 
small chairs. Due to the numerous tasks at the 42- and 48 -month time points testing 
was done in two separate 50 -minute sessions (not all the tasks are reported here). The 
two 50- minute sessions were approximately a week apart. At 54- months there was 
one session of approximately 50 minutes. Each session was conducted by two female 
researchers. At least one of the researchers remained constant at both the sessions 
within that time point. The second researcher was required to start the video and audio 
recording and recorded all the child's answers on a score sheet. 
At the end of each time point the child was given a small age appropriate gift 
and the parents was given $20 to cover travel expenses. The additional tasks that were 
administered at the three time points (not all tasks were administered at all time 
points) but not included in this thesis were narration of a wordless picture book, 
symbolic relations, pretend play, deception, working memory, desire emotion and 
desire action tasks, and executive function tasks. 
'! 
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Table 3.1 shows which tasks were administered at each time point and within which 
sessiOn. 
Table 3.1 
Tasks administered during each session at 42, 48 and 54 months. 
Child's age in months 42 48 
Session I II I 
Language (TELD) + 
Unexpected Contents + + 
Unexpected Location + + 
Event Narration + 
Emotion Labelling + 
Emotion Recognition + 
Emotion Situation + 
Emotion Discrimination 
Second Order False Belief 














Table 3.2 shows the number and percentage of participants who have missing 
data for each task. When doing composite scores, the mean score for that task was 
substituted for each missing data point. Substituting for the missing values did not 
change the pattern of results. Across all tasks and time points, 3% of the data is 
missing. There is 2.5% of the data missing at 42- months, 4.5% missing at 48-
months, and less than 4% of the data missing at 54- months. In order to analyse the 
data for the event narration some of coding categories were combined. To get a 
measure of the frequency of the mother's elaborative talk, the amount of mother's 
elaborative questions, the elaborative statements and the yes/ no questions were 
summed across the positive and negative event talk. To obtain a measure of the 
frequency of the children's elaborative talk the amount of memory responses and 
memory questions were summed across the positive and negative events. The 
frequency of mental state talk for both the mothers and children were obtained by 
summing the think/ know statement, think/ know prompts, other mental state 
statements and other mental state prompts for the positive and negative events. The 
frequency of the mothers' and children's emotion talk was measured by summing the 
amount of emotion statements and emotion prompts for the positive and negative 
events. The frequency of desire talk was also obtained by summing the amount of 
desire statements and desire prompts across the positive and negative events for the 
mothers' and children's talk. 
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Table 3.2 
Number of Data Points Missing for Each Task at Each Time Point 
Tasks N missing %missing 
42 months 
Unexpected Contents 2 3 
Unexpected Location 1 1.6 
Event Narration 2 3 
48 months 
Unexpected Contents 2 3 
Event Narration 3 5 
TELD 2 3 
Emotion labelling 5 8 
Emotion recognition 3 5 
Emotion situation 2 3 
54 months 
False Belief- second order 1 1.7 
Emotion recognition 2 3 
Emotion discrimination 1 1.7 
Laboratory Event Recall 5 8.6 
Descriptive Statistics 
Composite scores for theory of mind and emotion understanding were used in 
the analyses. A composite score for theory of mind was obtained by summing across 
each theory of mind task (i.e., unexpected contents and unexpected location) within 
each time point. Therefore, a theory of mind composite score was calculated for the 
participants at 42-, 48- and 54- months. Higher values indicate a greater level of 
theory of mind understanding. The maximum possible theory of mind composite was 
3 at 42- months, 5 at 48- months and 4 at 54- months. The composite scores for 
emotion understanding were similarly obtained by summing across the emotion tasks 
within each time point resulting in an emotion understanding score at 48- and 54-
months for each participant. Higher values indicate a greater emotion understanding. 
The maximum emotion composite score was 26 at 48- months and 24 at 54- months. 
105 
The standardised scores for the language task (TELD) were used in all 
analyses. The mean scores and standard deviations for each task are presented in 
Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3 
Range, Means and Standard Deviations for Language, Theory of Mind and Emotion 
Tasks 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
TELD- 42 months 61 68 141 107.28 17.88 
TELD- 48 months 57 53 172 108.14 18.75 
Theory of Mind- 42 61 0 3 1.06 0.99 
months 
Theory of Mind- 48 59 0 5 2.48 1.61 
months 
Theory of Mind- 54 58 0 4 1.42 1.15 
months 
Emotion- 48 months 59 9 24 18.27 3.02 
Emotion- 54 months 58 10 22 17.45 2.45 
An independent samples t- test was conducted on the language, theory of mind 
and emotion tasks to examine any gender differences in performance on the tasks. The 
mean scores with respect to gender are presented in Table 3.4. 
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Table 3.4 
Mean Scores for Girls and Boys on Language, Theory of Mind and Emotion Tasks 
Tasks Gender N Mean Standard t-value 
Deviation 
TELD-42 Female 30 114.50 15.69 3.36 
months** Male 31 100.29 17.29 
TELD- 48 Female 29 112.83 14.12 1.97 
months Male 28 103.29 21.77 
False Belief- 42 Female 30 1.20 .94 1.10 
months Male 31 .92 .05 
False Belief- 48 Female 29 2.83 1.61 1.63 
months Male 30 2.15 1.58 
False Belief- 54 Female 28 1.57 1.17 .98 
months Male 30 1.27 1.13 
Emotion- 48 Female 29 19.21 2.67 2.44 
months* Male 30 17.63 3.11 
Emotion- 54 Female 28 17.86 2.46 1.20 
months Male 30 17.09 2.41 
* p < .05, ** p <. 01 
Girls had significantly higher scores on the TELD (language scores) at 42-
months than the boys (t (59)= 3.36, p < .05). A significant difference remained once 
Stepwise Bonferroni corrections were carried out to reduce the family- wise error rate. 
Girls also had significantly higher scores than boys on the emotion composite at 48-
months (t (57) = 2.44, p <.05). A MANCOV A controlling for language scores showed 
that once language was controlled for there was no longer a significant gender 
difference in understanding of emotion at 48- months. Mean scores on language tasks 
at 48- months, theory of mind composites at 42-, 48- and 54- months and emotion 
composites at 54- months, did not significantly differ between girls and boys. 
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Correlation Analyses 
Correlations between Theory of Mind Performance at 42-, 48- and 54-
Months. Pearson product correlations were calculated between the theory of mind 
composite scores at 42-, 48- and 54- months. The participants' performance on theory 
of mind was consistent across time. The three theory of mind composite scores were 
significantly correlated with each other. Theory of mind performance at 42- months 
was significantly correlated with the performance at 48- months and at 54- months. 
Theory of mind performance at 48- months was also significantly correlated with 
theory of mind performance at 54- months. These correlations are presented in Table 
3.5. 
Correlations between Language Scores with Theory of Mind Composites. 
Language scores at 42- months were positively correlated with theory of mind 
performance at 42- months, 48- months, and 54- months. Language scores at 48-
months were also significantly correlated with theory of mind performance at 48-
months and at 54- months. Language scores at 48- months were not correlated with 
theory of mind performance at 42- months. These correlations are presented in Table 
3.5. These results show that early language scores predict later theory of mind abilities 
and concurrent theory of mind abilities. As anticipated there was a strong relation 
between theory of mind and language. 
Correlations between Emotion Composite Scores and Language Abilities. 
Emotion understanding at 48- months was positively correlated with emotion 
understanding at 54- months. This indicates that performance on emotion tasks is 
consistent across time. Language scores at 42- months were also highly correlated 
~·) 
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with language scores at 48- months also indicating that language abilities are 
consistent across time. Language scores at 42- months were significantly correlated 
with emotion understanding at 48- and 54- months. Language scores at 48- months 
were also significantly correlated with emotion understanding at 48- and 54- months. 
These results show that there is a strong relation between emotion understanding and 
language abilities. These correlations are presented in Table 3.5. 
Relation between Theory of Mind Composite and Emotion Composite Scores. 
Theory of mind performance at 42- months was significantly correlated to emotion 
understanding at 48- months but was not correlated with emotion understanding at 54-
months. Theory of mind scores at 48- months were significantly correlated with 
emotion understanding at 48- and 54- months. Theory of mind at 54- months was 
significantly correlated with emotion understanding at 48- and 54- months. These 
results show that theory of mind understanding and emotion understanding were 




Correlations between Theory of Mind Composites, Emotion Composites and 
Language Scores 
TELD- TOM- TOM- TOM- Emotion- Emotion-
48 42 48 54 48 54 
months months months months months months 
TELD- 42 .571 ** 285* .527** .606** .569** .373** 
months 
TELD-48 .208 .344** .400** .292* .273* 
months 
TOM-42 .443** .392** .435** .143 
months 
TOM-48 .530** .435** .361 ** 
months 
TOM- 54 .449** .460** 
months 
Emotion- 48 .363** 
months 
*p < .05, **p< .01 
Event Narration. I was also interested in whether the frequency of mothers' mental, 
emotion, and desire state talk during discussions about past events was associated 
with children's theory of mind and emotion understanding. Table 3.6 shows the 
means and standard deviations for maternal talk. A series of Pearson product 
correlations were performed to test these relationships. These correlations are shown 
in Table 3.7. 
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Table 3.6 
Range, Means and Standard Deviations for Maternal Narration at 42- and 48-
Months 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mother total talk- 42 47 9 86 38.36 15.21 
months 
Mother elaborations- 47 7 69 31.70 12.63 
42 months 
Mother mental talk- 47 0 16 4.30 3.61 
42 months 
Mother emotion 47 0 13 3.32 3.14 
talk- 42 months 
Mother desire talk- 47 0 10 1.98 2.41 
42 months 
Mother total talk- 48 55 8 66 29.18 13.39 
months 
Mother elaborations- 55 7 53 24.02 10.80 
48 months 
Mother mental talk- 55 0 13 3.45 2.91 
48 months 
Mother emotion 55 0 17 3.84 3.71 
talk- 48 months 
Mother desire talk- 55 0 14 2.11 2.78 
48 months 
Correlations of maternal talk were done over time to investigate the stability of 
mother talk across the three time points. The correlations are shown in Table 3.7. 
Only three correlations were significant. The mothers' use of mental state talk at 48-
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months was related to the mothers' total talk, elaborative talk and mental talk at 42 
months. Mothers' use of total talk, elaborative talk, mental state talk, emotion talk and 
desire talk at 48- months was not related to the maternal talk categories measured at 
42- months. 
Table 3.7 
Correlations of Maternal Talk over Time 
Mother Mother Mother Mother Mother 
total talk- elaborative mental talk- emotion desire talk-
42 months talk- 42 42 months talk- 42 42 months 
months months 
Mother .235 .178 .024 .025 -.118 
total talk-
48 months 




Mother .333* .308* .345* .027 -.218 
mental talk-
48 months 




Mother .185 .192 .207 .143 -.123 
desire talk-
48 months 
* p < .05 
Correlations between Mental State Talk and Theory of Mind. Mothers' mental 
state talk when the child was 42- months old was not related to theory of mind 
performance at 42- and 48- months, but was significantly related to theory of mind 
performance a year later at 54- months. Mothers' mental state talk when the child was 
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48- months was not related to earlier theory of mind understanding at 42- months, but 
it was significantly correlated with theory of mind understanding at 48- and 54-
months. These results are shown in Table 3.8. 
Correlations between Mental State Talk and Emotion Understanding. One 
question I had was whether maternal mental state talk would be similarly associated 
with children's emotion understanding. Correlations showed that mothers' mental 
state talk at 42- months was not associated with emotion understanding at 48- and 54-
months. Mothers' total amount of mental state talk at 48- months was significantly 
correlated with emotion understanding at 48- months. However, there was no relation 
between total amount of mental state talk by the mother when the child was 48-
months and the child's emotion understanding at 54- months. These results are shown 
in Table 3.8. 
Correlations between Emotion Talk and Theory of Mind and Emotion 
Understanding. Correlations were also performed to investigate the relation between 
the mothers' emotion state talk and the children's theory of mind and emotion 
understanding. Mothers' emotion state talk at 42- months was not related to emotion 
understanding at 48- and 54- months. Similarly, mothers' emotion state talk at 48-
months was unrelated to emotion understanding at 48- and 54- months. An inspection 
of correlations between mothers' emotion state talk and children's theory of mind 
performance revealed no significant relationship within or between time points. These 
results are shown in Table 3.8. 
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Correlations between Desire Talk and Theory of Mind and Emotion 
Understanding. The relation between the mothers' amount of talk about desires and 
the children's theory of mind and emotion understanding was also investigated. 
Mothers' talk about desires at 42- months was significantly related to the children's 
theory of mind understanding at 42- months, but not later at 48- and 54- months. Also, 
mothers' desire talk at 48- months was not correlated with theory of mind 
understanding at any time point. In addition, there were no significant correlations 
between mothers' talk about desires and children's emotion understanding at any time 
point. These correlations are shown in Table 3.8. 
Table 3.8 
Correlations between Mother Mental, Emotion and Desire State Talk and 
Performance on Theory of Mind and Emotion Understanding 
Mental talk- 42 
months 






Desire talk- 42 
months 


















TOM- 54 Emotion- 48 Emotion- 54 
months months months 
.450** .229 .192 
.346* .388** .189 
.235 -.059 .111 
.088 .137 .123 
.156 -.094 .023 
-.072 -.004 .032 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
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Elaborative Talk. Correlations were also carried out between the children's 
language levels, theory of mind and emotion understanding and the amount of 
elaborative talk the mothers used. These correlations are shown in Table 3.9. Mothers 
who used more elaborative talk at 42- months had children with greater theory of 
mind understanding at 54- months. This relationship was not present on theory of 
mind performance at earlier time points. It also did not extend to emotion 
understanding at any time point. 
One interesting finding was that the amount of elaborative talk by mothers at 
42- months was related to their children's language score at 42- months. There was 
also a positive correlation between the amount of elaborative talk used by the children 
at 42- months and their language scores at 42- months. The mothers' and children's 
use of elaborative talk at 42- months was also significantly correlated (r = . 782, p < 
.01). Mothers' amount of elaborative talk at 48- months was not significantly 
correlated with the children's language abilities, theory of mind performance or their 
emotion understanding at any time point. The children's amount of elaborative talk at 
48- months was correlated to the mothers' amount of elaborative talk at 48- months (r 
= .550,p < .01). These results are shown in Table 3.9. 
Correlations between the Children 's Theory of Mind, Emotion Understanding 
and Autobiographical Memory. The amount of elaborative talk used by the child at 
42- months was not related to theory of mind or emotion understanding at any point. 
Similarly the children's amount of elaborative talk at 48- months was not correlated 
with theory of mind performance, emotion understanding and their language scores at 
any time point. There was no relation between the children's recall (as measured by 
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the amount of elaborative talk) and their theory of mind and emotion understanding. 
These results are shown in Table 3.9. 
Table 3.9 
Correlations between Mother and Child Elaborative Talk and Theory of Mind, 























































*p< .05, **p < .01 
Talk over time. Paired sampled t-tests were conducted to investigate changes 
in the amounts of mental, desire and emotion talk over time for both the mothers and 
the children. It was found that the amount mothers talked about emotion significantly 
increased over time, from 42- to 48- months (t (54)= 2.172, p < .05). There were no 
significant changes in the mothers' amount of desire and mental state talk over time. 
There was also a significant increase over time for the amount of emotion talk by the 
children (t (54) = 2.855, p < .05). There was no significant change over time for the 
children's desire talk, although the children's amount of mental talk did not 
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significantly increase over time, this approached significance (t (55) = 1.903, p = 
.062). 
Siblings. Descriptive statistics of sibling numbers, number of older siblings 
and younger siblings are shown in Table 3.10. 
Table 3.10 
Descriptive Statistics of Number of Siblings Total, Number of Younger Siblings, and 
Number of Older Siblings 
Number Frequency of Total Frequency of Frequency of Older 
Siblings (%) Younger Siblings Siblings (%) 
(%) 
0 15 (24.6) 41 (67.2) 32 (52.5) 
1 32 (52.5) 20 (32.8) 18 (29.5) 
2 11 (18.0) 0 8 (13.1) 
3 2 (3.3) 0 2 (3.3) 
5 1 (1.6) 0 1 (1.6) 
Independent sample t-tests were conducted to investigate whether there was 
an effect of having siblings on the children's theory of mind and emotion 
understanding. There was no significant difference in theory of mind performance at 
all three time points based on whether the child had siblings or not. There was also no 
significant difference of having siblings or not on the children's emotion 
understanding at 48- and 54- months. Independent sample t-tests were also done to 
investigate the effects of older or younger siblings. Children with older siblings did 
not significantly differ from children without older siblings in their theory of mind 
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understanding at the three time points. There was also no significant difference in the 
theory of mind understanding of children with or without younger siblings at the three 
time points. Similar results were found for the children's emotion understanding at 
48- and 54- months. There was no difference in emotion understanding for children 
with older siblings and the oldest child. There was also no difference in emotion 
understanding for children with or without younger siblings. 
Pearson product correlations were also done to investigate whether there was 
a relation between the children's theory of mind and emotion understanding and the 
number of siblings the children had. There were no significant correlations between 
the number of siblings and the children's theory of mind and emotion understanding 
at any time point. There were also no correlations between the number of older 
siblings the child had and their theory of mind and emotion understanding, nor were 
there correlations between the number of younger siblings the child had and their 
theory of mind and emotion understanding. 
Pearson product correlations were done to investigate the relation between 
the number of siblings and the children's recall of the laboratory event. There was a 
significant relation between the number of siblings the children had and their 
prompted recall of objects (r = .318, p < .05). No other correlations were significant. 
Independent sample t-tests were also done to compare the recall abilities of children 
with siblings to only-children. Children with siblings recalled more prompted objects 
than only-children (t (51) = 2.069, p < .05). There were no other significant 
differences in the laboratory recall for children with siblings versus only-children. 
There was also no relation between the number of siblings the children had and their 
memory elaborations at 42- and 48- months. 
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Further analyses were done with children categorised into three groups: 
children with no siblings, children with one sibling and children with two or more 
siblings. This categorisation did not change the overall pattern of results. 
Memory for Laboratory Event. One further point of interest was whether 
there was a relation between the amount recalled about a laboratory event that had 
been experienced 6 months previously and the children's theory of mind performance, 
emotion understanding and language abilities. 
Firstly independent sample t- tests were conducted to investigate whether 
there were differences in recall for girls and boys. There were no significant gender 
differences in free recall of objects or actions and prompted recall of objects and 
actions or overall recall of the laboratory event. 
Pearson product correlations were conducted to investigate the relation 
between theory of mind performance, emotion understanding and language abilities of 
the children and the amount recalled. There were no significant relations between the 
amount recalled and the children's theory of mind and emotion understanding at any 
time point. There was a significant relation between the amount recalled and the 
children's language abilities at 42- months (r = .338,p < .05). 
We were also interested in whether the frequency of mothers' elaborative, 
mental, emotion and desire talk was related to the children's recall of the laboratory 
event. There was a significant correlation found between mother's desire talk at 42-
months and the children's total recall and free recall of objects (r = .325, p < .05 and r 
= .487, p < .01 respectively). There was also a significant correlation between the 
children's prompted recall of objects and both the mothers' and children's mental 
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state talk at 48- months (r = .365,p < .01 and r = .280,p < .05 respectively). No other 
correlations reached significance. 
Partial Correlations 
A series of partial correlations were done to control for the children's early 
language at 42- months. The correlations between children's language ability at 48-
months and their theory of mind performance at 48- and 54- months were no longer 
significant. Similarly, the correlations between children's language ability at 48-
months and their emotion understanding at 48- and 54- months were no longer 
significant. Once the children's language scores at 42- months had been controlled 
for, the children's emotion understanding and theory of mind at 48- and 54- months 
were no longer significantly related. Furthermore, the correlations between mothers' 
mental state talk at 48- months the children's theory of mind abilities at 48- and 54-
months were no longer significant once the children's language abilities at 42- months 
were controlled for. 
Interestingly, the correlation between children's theory of mind performance 
at 54- months and the mothers' use of mental state terms at 42- months was still 
significant (r = .322, p < .05). Also the correlation between amount of mothers' 
mental state talk at 48- months and the children's emotion understanding at 48-
months was still significant (r = .335, p < .05). 
Children's theory of mind understanding at 42- months was still significantly 
correlated with their theory of mind understanding at 48- months (r = .3663,p < .01), 
and at 54- months (r = .3073, p < .05). The correlation between the children's theory 
of mind understanding at 48- and 54- months was still significant (r = .3155,p < .05). 
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Due to language being highly correlated with both theory of mind and emotion 
understanding, and the fact that theory of mind and emotion understanding are no 
longer correlated once language abilities at 42- months are partialed out, further 
analysis was carried out to investigate whether language mediated the relation seen 
between theory of mind and emotion understanding. Analyses showed that language 
abilities at 42- months fully mediated the relation between emotion understanding at 
48- months and theory of mind understanding at 48- months (Sobel's z = 2.872, p = 
.004). Language abilities at 42- months also partially mediated the relation between 
theory of mind understanding at 42- months and emotion understanding at 48- months 
(Sobel's z = 2.038, p = .04). Language abilities at 42- months did not mediate any 
other relations involving theory of mind and emotion understanding taken at 54 
months. Mediations were also done for the children's language abilities at 48- month. 
The children's language abilities at 48- months did not mediate the relation between 
theory of mind and emotion understanding at any time point. 
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Discussion 
This study was designed to explore the relation between language and the 
development of social understanding. One important finding was that the children's 
language abilities were correlated with both the theory of mind understanding and 
their emotion understanding. I found that the children's early language abilities 
predicted their theory of mind performance up to a year later. This result supports the 
hypothesis that there would be a relation between the children's theory of mind and 
language abilities. More specifically, it was hypothesised that the more developed the 
children's early language abilities, the greater their theory of mind understanding 
would be at a later point. The results also support the findings by Ruffman et al. 
(2003), who found that children's language abilities were related to their false belief 
understanding over a period of 2.5 years, and the results of Astington and Jenkins 
(1999), who also found that early language abilities were related to later theory of 
mind abilities. Astington and Jenkins (1999) found the reverse relation, that early 
theory of mind abilities were related to later language abilities, did not exist. It is also 
important to note that in the current study the reverse relation was not true; early 
theory of mind abilities were not related to the children's later language abilities. The 
findings lend some support the hypothesis that the link between theory of mind and 
language is unidirectional (but see Slade & Ruffman, 2005) and lend support to the 
idea that language is a major contributor to theory of mind understanding (Jenkins & 
Astington, 1996). 
There was support for the hypothesis that emotion understanding and language 
would be linked. Children's language abilities at 42- months related to their emotion 
understanding at 48- months. I was unable to establish directionality for the relation 
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between emotion understanding and children's language abilities, however. I could 
not show that language ability at 48- months was not related to their earlier emotion 
understanding because emotion understanding was not measured before 48- months. 
Directionality for language and emotion understanding cannot be determined in this 
study. The results of the current study are consistent with the findings of previous 
studies. Dunn and Cutting (1999) found a high correlation between the children's 
language abilities and their emotion understanding. Pons et al. (2003) also found a 
high correlation between the children's emotion understanding and language abilities 
even after the children's ages had been controlled for. 
The results of Study 1 show that theory of mind and emotion understanding 
are related. I found that five out of the six possible correlations between theory of 
mind and emotion understanding were significant. However, when the children's 
early language abilities were controlled for, the correlations were no longer 
significant. Also, when a mediating model was completed, the children's language 
abilities at 42- months fully mediated the relation between the children's theory of 
mind and emotion understanding at 48- months, and partially mediated the relation 
between the children's theory of mind understanding at 42- months and their emotion 
understanding at 48- months. However, not all the relations between emotion 
understanding and theory of mind were mediated by language, so it is suggested that 
language is a mediating factor in the relationship between the two abilities and that 
both theory of mind understanding and emotion understanding are heavily reliant on 
language abilities. My results partially support the hypothesis that theory of mind and 
emotion understanding would be related. One problem with this conclusion may be 
that the tasks that measure theory of mind and emotion understanding in children 
require a certain level of language understanding to be successfully passed and that 
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the relation between language and both these abilities is simply caused by the 
language demands of the tasks used to measure theory of mind and emotion 
understanding 
One of the most interesting findings of the current study was the relation 
between mother's early mental state talk and the children's later theory of mind 
understanding. As hypothesised, the mothers' who used more mental state talk during 
conversations about past events had children who displayed better theory of mind 
understanding a year later. This result was found even after the children's language 
abilities were controlled for. This result is consistent with those of Ruffman et al. 
(2002) who found that mothers' mental state utterances were a significant contributor 
to the children's later theory of mind understanding. The mothers' use of mental state 
terms at 48- months also predicted children's concurrent theory of mind 
understanding and their theory of mind understanding 6 months later. However, the 
children's early theory of mind understanding was not related to the mothers' later use 
of mental state terms, which suggests that the influence is unidirectional. It appears 
that mothers' mental state use is influencing the children's theory of mind 
understanding, rather than being a consequence of children's theory of mind 
development. It should be noted that this could not be fully tested in the present study 
due to the lack of maternal talk data at 54- months. 
No clear relationship emerged between mothers' mental state use and 
children's emotion understanding. Only one out of the four possible correlations was 
significant between mothers' mental state use and the children's emotion 
understanding, and the relation was concurrent. Mothers' use of mental states at 48-
months was related to the children's emotion understanding at 48- months. I have 
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concluded from this result that the mothers' mental state talk does not reliably 
influence the children's emotion understanding. 
If mental state talk influences theory of mind understanding but not emotion 
understanding, then it is possible that maternal emotion talk will influence their 
children's understanding of emotion. However, I found that mothers' emotion talk 
was not related to emotion understanding at any stage, nor was the mothers' emotion 
talk related to the children's theory of mind understanding. These results do not 
support the hypothesis that maternal emotion talk would relate to emotion 
understanding in the children, but the results do show support for the hypothesis that 
talk about emotions would not relate to theory of mind abilities. These results are at 
odds with the findings of Dunn et al. (1991a), who found that mother-child talk about 
feelings during routine everyday activities when the children were 36- months- old 
was related to the children's affective labelling and perspectives at 6 years. One 
possible explanation for the difference between our results and those of Dunn and her 
colleagues may be because in the current study the mother-child dyads are discussing 
past events and past emotions, whereas, in Dunn et al. 's study the conversations took 
place in the context of everyday interactions. It is possible that talk centred around the 
causes and consequences of the emotion the child is currently experiencing will be 
more influential in developing understanding of other's emotions than talk about a 
previously experienced emotion. During talk about previously experience~ emotions 
the child would also have to reflect back on how they felt, the emotion they 
previously felt would not be as salient as a currently experienced emotion 
I also found a concurrent relation between mothers' desire talk and the 
children's theory of mind understanding at 42- months. Again there were no other 
correlations between later desire talk and later theory of mind performance. This 
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result supports the research findings that desire understanding develops first (such as 
the research by Bartsch and Wellman (1995), who showed that desire talk precedes 
talks about belief). In the current study, desire talk influenced early theory of mind 
and talk about beliefs influenced later theory of mind. The results are consistent with 
those of Taumoepeau and Ruffman (2006) in that mothers moved from referring to 
mostly desires, to talk about thoughts and knowledge over time. It should be notes 
that Taumoepeau and Ruffman (2006) found this change between 15- and 24- months 
of age, whereas, the present study found the change between 42- and 54- months. 
They also found that the mothers' mental state talk when the children were 15 months 
of age was related to the children's later performance on an emotion task. Future 
research could examine the developmental relations of desire and belief talk and their 
relations to theory of mind understanding. 
Mothers' elaborateness was associated with their children's language abilities. 
Mothers of children with greater language abilities elaborate more during 
conversations with the child. The results suggest that the relation does not go the other 
way, so mothers' who elaborate more during conversations about the past do not 
influence the children's language development. There was no relation between the 
amount of mothers' elaboration at an early time point and the children's later 
language abilities. Another finding was that children with better language scores were 
also more elaborate during mother-child conversations about past events. Also, 
mothers who were highly elaborate had children who were highly elaborate, this 
supports the results of Reese and her colleagues, who have firmly established a link 
between the amount of maternal elaborative talk and the amount of elaboration the 
children provide during conversations (Reese & Fivush, 1993; Reese et al., 1993, 
Reese et al., 1996). Exactly how the mothers' elaborateness affects children's 
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elaborateness and language abilities can not be determined in this study but could be 
an avenue for future research. 
Numerous researchers have found that having siblings was associated with 
more advanced theory of mind understanding. Perner et al. (1994) found that children 
with siblings had a more sophisticated theory of mind understanding then only-
children. Peterson (2000) also found that children with siblings had a superior theory 
of mind understanding to only-children. In Peterson's study there was no difference 
on theory of mind performance whether the children had older or younger siblings. 
Conversely, Ruffman et al. (1998) found that older siblings and not younger siblings 
influenced theory of mind understanding. In the current study, I found no relation 
between the number of siblings, or an influence of having siblings on theory of mind 
or emotion understanding. The results of the current study did not find an effect of 
older siblings, having either older or younger siblings had no effect on the children's 
theory of mind or emotion understanding. It is possible that no difference was found 
for theory of mind for only-children and children with siblings because there were a 
low number of only-children in the current study. 
Siblings have also been found to have an influence on autobiographical 
memory. Wang et al. (1998) found that adolescents, who did not have any siblings, 
had earlier autobiographical memories than adolescents with siblings. Similarly, 
Mullen (1994) found that first born individuals had earlier memories than later born 
siblings. In the current study, no relation was found between the number of siblings 
the children had and the amount of memory elaborations they provided during past 
event talk. There was a relation between the number of siblings the children had and 
their prompted recall of objects in the laboratory event. To my knowledge, no 
research has investigated the effect of siblings on children's autobiographical recall. It 
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may that our results are inconsistent with previous research due to the different 
participant ages and memory measures used. 
Pemer (1991) and Welch-Ross (1995) have proposed a relation between 
theory of mind and autobiographical memory. In the current study we investigated the 
children's memory for a unique event that they had experienced 6 months previously. 
In the current study, I did not find a relation between the children's theory of mind 
understanding and the amount they recalled about a previous event. Similarly there 
was no relation between the amount of memory elaboration the children provided 
during past event talk and their theory of mind understanding at any time point. The 
results do not support the hypothesis that the children's theory of mind abilities would 
be related to their memory recall for past events. My results do not support Pemer and 
Welch-Ross's position on autobiographical memory development. It is in line with the 
findings of Reese and Cleveland (2006) who did not find a relation between explicit 
theory of mind and autobiographical memory. In Reese and Cleveland's study there 
was a relation found between the mothers' use of mental state talk at the time of the 
event (but not during the event because the mother was not part of this particular 
event, she only witnessed it) and the amount later recalled by the children. The current 
study supports Reese and Cleveland's results. I found a relation between both the 
mothers' and children's use of mental state terms at 48 months and the children's 
prompted recall of objects. Also, the mothers' desire talk at 42 months was related to 
the children's total recall and their free recall of objects. Exactly how the mental state 
talk influences later memory recall is not certain. Included in the coding of mental 
states in the current study were words such as remember and forget (and they were 
used more frequently than other mental state words) so it may be that talk about 
memory does influence the children's later memory. 
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The results of the current study found that there was only a gender difference 
for language abilities for children at 42- months. Girls were found to significantly 
outperform the boys on the language measure. Once the children's language abilities 
were controlled for there were no gender differences in emotion and theory of mind 
understanding. These results appear to contradict Charman et al. (2002) and Baron-
Cohen et al. (1997, 1999, 2001b) who found gender differences in theory of mind 
understanding with girls outperforming boys, and are also contradictory to Dunn et al. 
(1991b) who found girls had better emotion understanding than boys. Our results are 
also concordant with Dunn et al. (1991 b) who did not find gender differences in 
theory of mind understanding. However, these studies did not partial out language 
skills before comparing girls and boys. The results of the present study suggest that 
gender differences in theory of mind and emotion understanding are driven by gender 
differences in language abilities. 
A strength of the current study is its longitudinal design. It does allow for 
some exploration into the directionality of the correlations that were found. Although 
some further research is needed to explore these in more detail, by possibly extending 
the study to start at an earlier age. Due to time constraints by having the children visit 
in a single session and trying to avoid a session that was too long, language measures 
were not taken at the final time point of 54- months. Having language abilities for the 
54- month- olds could have extended our results of directionality between the 
children's theory of mind understanding and their language abilities and allowed an 
investigation into whether there is a directional influence between emotion 
understanding and language abilities. A further strength of the study is the multiple 
measures for theory of mind and emotion understanding. This provides a clearer 
picture of the children's theory of mind and emotion understanding, for if only one 
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task for each ability had been done, false positives would have had a greater impact 
on the results. Jenkins and Astington (2000) posited that theory of mind 
understanding should not be seen as an all- or- none phenomenon in children. They 
found that children were passing some tasks with a similar level of difficulty while 
failing others. Also this study is the first to my knowledge to measure longitudinally 
the relation between theory of mind, emotion understanding, language abilities, 
maternal talk and memory, so will provide new insight into the relations between all 
these factors simultaneously. 
In terms of support for theories mentioned in the introduction, the theory that 
best fits the results found is that of Nelson's experiential theory of theory of mind. 
Nelson et al. (2003) proposed that the main factor leading to the development of 
theory of mind is language, and in particular the use of language in a social context. In 
the current study, both the language abilities and the mothers' mental state language 
were related to the children's theory of mind understanding. 
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Chapter 4 
Relation between Parents' and Children's Theory of Mind 
Understanding others' minds is one of the abilities that is universal to human 
beings (Baron-Cohen, 2000). It is a remarkable phenomenon that allows us to predict 
and explain our own and others' behaviours, and without this ability everyday social 
interactions would seem confusing and unpredictable. One fundamental question that 
psychologists ask is how does this essential ability develop? What influences its 
development? 
Theory of mind has been defined as "our ability to understand the mental 
states- beliefs, desires and intentions- of others, and to appreciate how these differ 
from our own" (Siegal & Varley, 2002, p. 463). Many theories have been proposed to 
explain the development of theory of mind. These theories range from innate modular 
theories, to theories based on the children's representational abilities, and to a social 
linguistic approach. One group of theories similarly propose that theory of mind is an 
innate ability due to a specialised theory of mind module or mechanism, or in the case 
of Fodor (1992), a set of innate heuristics. Fodor (1992) proposed that all children 
possess a very basic theory of mind from birth and that their understanding becomes 
more developed when they begin to use heuristics to predict and explain behaviour. 
Leslie (1994) stated that everyone possesses a theory of mind mechanism (ToMM) 
which is domain-specific and works quickly to keep up with the changing 
environment. The ToMM is available from birth and does not change. What does 
change and allow children more sophisticated performance on theory of mind tasks is 
the selective processor (SP). Changes in the SP can be compared to changes in the 
child's cognitive capacity. Leslie (1994) proposed that the ToMM makes meta-
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representation possible, which is what makes theory of mind understanding possible. 
Similarly to Leslie (1994), Perner (1991) proposed that meta-representation is the 
essential cognitive development which allows theory of mind development. It is not 
until the child understands that a representation is a representation of a referent that 
they can understand false beliefs. 
Nelson et al. (2003) also used the concept of representation in their 
experiential approach. They proposed that representational abilities are important, but 
the essential factor influencing theory of mind development is language 
developments. They proposed that through language children can have conversations 
with more experienced others, and it is through these conversations that children learn 
that others can have differing representations of the same event or situation. 
Other researchers have proposed that children develop a 'theory' much like the 
development of a scientific theory to explain and predict behaviour. According to this 
view, the changes seen in their theory of mind understanding are due to the theory 
being updated through experience (Gopnik and Wellman, 1992). 
Over twenty years of research has investigated the factors that influence theory 
of mind development. Factors which have consistently been shown to relate to theory 
of mind understanding include language abilities, maternal talk about mental states, 
social experience (e.g., having siblings) and pretence. 
Language has been consistently found to relate to theory of mind 
understanding (Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Ruffman et al., 2003; Slade & Ruffman, 
2005). Not only are language abilities and theory of mind understanding related, but 
early language abilities are related to later theory of mind abilities. The reverse 
relation is not consistently found. Earlier theory of mind abilities do not consistently 
I 
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predict later language abilities (Astington & Jenkins, 1999). This unidirectional 
relation was even found over a period of two and a half years (Ruffman et al., 2003). 
One particular aspect of language that has been found to relate to theory of 
mind development is mental state language. Mothers who use more mental state talk 
during conversations with their children have children who display a more 
sophisticated understanding of theory of mind. Ruffman et al., (2002) found that 
mothers' use of mental states while discussing pictures with their children had 
children with better theory of mind understanding up to a year later. This relation is 
also seen in sibling dyads and friend child-dyads. There was a relation between the 
amount of mental state talk with siblings and friends and the children's theory of mind 
understanding (Brown et al., 1996). 
Another factor related to theory of mind development is maternal mind-
mindedness ("the proclivity to treat one's infant as an individual with a mind rather 
than merely an entity with needs that must be satisfied" (Meins, Fernyhough, 
Wainright, Clark-Carter, Das Gupta, Fradley, & Tuckey, 2003, p.1194)). They found 
that the mothers' appropriate mind-related comments when the child was 6 months 
old were related to the child's theory of mind understanding at 45- months. Another 
study by Meins and Fernyhough (1999) found that the mother's willingness to 
attribute mental states to their children as infants was related to the children's false 
belief at age 5. This finding was also supported by the results of Meins, Fernyhough, 
Wainright, Das Grupta, Fradley, & Tuckey (2002) who found a link between mothers' 
use of mental state terms when referring to their 6-month-old infants and later theory 
of mind understanding when the children were 45- and 48- months old. Although I am 
not explicitly looking at maternal mind-mindedness in the current study, I am 
investigating the relation between mothers' theory of mind and emotion 
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understanding and the theory of mind and emotion understanding of their children. 
Mothers who focus on theory of mind and emotions (and have a good theory of mind 
and emotion understanding) might incorporate this in the way they communicate with 
their children (i.e., the might focus on mental and emotional explanations). 
Research has also established that the presence of siblings is related to a better 
theory of mind understanding. Pemer et al. (1994) found a relation between the 
number of siblings the child has and their theory of mind performance. There is some 
debate over whether it is just having siblings which produces this result or whether 
having older siblings is especially beneficial. Pemer et al. (1994) found no difference 
in theory of mind understanding as a consequence ofhaving older or younger siblings, 
whereas Ruffman et al. (1998) found that it was only the presence of older siblings 
which facilitated theory of mind development. 
One aspect of sibling relationships that could be particularly beneficial to 
theory of mind development could be the use of pretence during play. Jenkins and 
Astington (2000) found a relation between the children's ability to use joint planning 
(which is used to assign roles during pretend play) and the children's theory of mind 
understanding. Youngblade and Dunn (1995) found that the children's use of role 
enactment during pretend play was related to their theory of mind understanding 7 
months later. 
Emotion understanding and theory of mind understanding have often been 
seen as related abilities, with emotion understanding viewed as an early developing 
aspect of social understanding (Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006). Hughes and Dunn 
(1998) found that children's emotion understanding at 47 months of age was related to 
their theory of mind understanding at 60- months. Similarly, Cutting and Dunn (1999) 
found that children's emotion and theory of mind understanding were related even 
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after the children's language abilities had been controlled for. Not all studies have 
found a relation between emotion understanding and theory of mind understanding. 
Dunn et al. (1991b) did not find a relation between the children's emotion 
understanding when they were 33 months old and their theory of mind understanding 
7 months later. It is possible that the relation seen between these two cognitive 
abilities is due to a third underlying variable (e.g., language). 
Children's emotion understanding has been related to the children's language 
abilities. Dunn and Cutting (1999) found a high correlation between children's 
language abilities and their emotion understanding. Similarly, Pons et al. (2003) found 
emotion understanding to be related to the children's language abilities even after the 
children's age had been controlled for. 
Another factor found to influence children's emotion understanding is 
maternal talk about emotions. Dunn et al. (1991a) found that children in families 
which frequently talk about emotions when the children were 3- years-old had better 
emotion understanding at the age of 6. In a similar study Kuebli et al. (1995) found 
that mothers who discussed emotions more with their children at 40- months had 
children who also discussed emotions more frequently 18 months later. 
Along with emotion understanding, autobiographical memory has also been 
related to theory of mind understanding. Pemer (2000b) and Welch-Ross (1995) have 
both proposed that for the development of autobiographical memory children must 
possess a representational understanding of mind. Pemer and Ruffrnan (1995) found a 
relation between the children's knowledge that experience leads to knowing and their 
free recall abilities. Welch- Ross (1997) found a relation between the children's 
memory response during conversations with their mothers about past events and the 
children's theory of mind understanding. Conversely, Reese and Cleveland (2006) 
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found that the mothers' use of elaborations during conversations was the strongest 
predictor of the children's autobiographical memory not the children's theory of mind 
understanding. 
Mothers' use of elaborations during conversations with their children has 
consistently been related to their children's autobiographical memory development. 
Reese and Fivush (1993) found a relation between the children's participation in 
conversations and their mothers' use of elaboration. Mothers who were highly 
elaborate had children who participated more in the conversations. Reese et al. (1993) 
also found this relation in a longitudinal study. In their study highly elaborate mothers 
had children who recalled more up to 12 months later. Leichtman et al. (2000) also 
found that mothers who were more elaborate during an interview with their children 
about an event the children had experienced at preschool, had children who recalled 
more about the same event 3 weeks later. 
In the current study we investigated the relationship between the children's 
theory of mind understanding, emotion understanding, language abilities and the 
children's and parents' use of pretence. We also investigated the relation between 
these factors and parent-child talk about the past. Another factor that we were 
interested in was whether there was a relationship between the mothers' theory of 
mind understanding and that of the children. The fathers' systemising and 
empathising were also measured to investigate whether the fathers' empathising was 
related to the children's theory of mind understanding. 
This study aimed to answer five main research questions: 1) Are theory of 
mind and emotion understanding related abilities? 2) Is there a relationship between 
theory of mind and autobiographical memory? 3) What factors are associated with the 
development of theory of mind and emotion understanding? 4) Do mothers with better 
r 
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theory of mind understanding have children with a more sophisticated theory of 
mind? 5) Do mothers with better emotion understanding have children with better 
emotion understanding? 
It was hypothesised that the children's language abilities would be related to 
their theory of mind and emotion understanding. It was also hypothesised that 
children who either demonstrated or experienced more pretence would have a higher 
theory of mind understanding. Another prediction was that the children's theory of 
mind performance would be related to their mothers' use of mental state words during 
talk about the past. It was also hypothesised that the children's theory of mind and 
emotion understanding would be related. Moreover, it was expected that the mothers' 
theory of mind understanding and their empathising scores would be related to the 




There were 59 parent/child dyads in this study. None of these dyads had 
participated in the longitudinal study. The children were aged between 48.03 months 
and 54.47 months, with an average age of 51.45 months. There were 30 female 
children and 29 male children. The children were recruited through a database of 
parents who at the birth of the child had been willing to be contacted at a later stage to 
take part in various child development projects. 
The mothers' ages ranged from 22 to 46 years, with an average age of 35.75 
years. The fathers' ranged in age from 23 to 50 years, with an average age of 37.89 
years. The parent's median income was $40,000 or more. Both mother and fathers had 
similar profiles for their level of education as shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2. Their 
education levels covered a wide range from no formal high school qualification to a 
postgraduate level. Just over a third of mothers had no tertiary experience. A quarter 
of the mothers had a post secondary qualification like a trade certificate or diploma, 
and the remaining mothers (just over a third) had a tertiary qualification or higher. 
Just over a fifth of the fathers had no tertiary experience. A third of the fathers had 
post secondary qualifications such as a diploma or trade certificate and the remaining 
fathers (over a third) had a tertiary qualification or higher. Fifty-five of the children 
were of New Zealand European or Pakeha descent, two of the children were New 
Zealand Maori descent, one child was of New Zealand European and Pacific Island 
descent and for one child the ethnicity was not specified. 
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Figure 4.1. Mother education levels. 
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Figure 4.2. Father education levels 
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D University Bursacy 
D University Bursacy 
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Settings 
The same research room used in Study 1 was used for the current study. It was 
organised to resemble a family room, and had a discrete roof mounted camera. There 
were two microphones discretely positioned from the roof, and these were linked to 
an audiocassette recorder. Audiocassette recordings were taken only for the event 
narration between the mothers and their children. 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (III). The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test 
(version three) was given to all the children to establish their receptive vocabulary 
(Dunn & Dunn, 1997). The researcher administered the PPVT (Form Ilia). It was 
designed for the use on participants aged between 2 Yz years to 90 years of age. The 
children were first given two training items to familiarise them with the procedure. 
They were instructed to point to the picture that was the same as the word that was 
said. The children were started on a set of words appropriate for their age. Once a set 
of words was started all 12 words in the set were administered. Testing continued 
until the children were incorrect on 8 or more of the items in a set. The target words 
were spoken aloud and the children had to point to a picture from four possible 
options. The pictures were simple black and white illustrations presented on a picture 
plate. If no response was given after a period of approximately 15 seconds, the 
children were encouraged to point to the target picture. If the children still failed to 
respond, the next set of pictures was shown. The pictures were displayed on an easel 
so that the children could only see the pictures of that set and were unable to see the 
scoring card behind the easel. The scoring was done during the testing. The children's 
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raw scores, which were calculated by subtracting the highest number achieved in the 
final set and subtracting the total number of errors made were transformed into an age 
referenced normative score. 
Emotion Recognition Task. The emotion recognition tasked used the "JJ" faces 
from Ekman and Friesen (1976). The procedure for this task was the same as that 
described in Study 1. Unlike Study 1, there was only one researcher present so the 
scoring was done by the primary researcher. The children were given a score of 1 for 
each of the trials they got correct for a total out of 12. 
Emotion Situation Task. This task was adapted from one used by Denham 
(1986) and Ruffman, Slade & Crowe (2002). The procedure was the same as the one 
used in Study 1. The children were given a score of one for each correct response 
(some situations had two possible correct responses) for a total score out of eight. 
Unexpected Contents Task. This task was based on Pemer, Leekam and 
Wimmer (1987) with the justification question based on Ruffman, Slade and Crowe 
(2002). The procedure for this task was the same as described for the 48 -month time 
point in Study 1. The props used for this task included a 'Snax' cracker box. The 
children were presented with the box and asked, "What do you think is inside the 
box?" The children were prompted with "What does the box look like?" if they did 
not spontaneously respond. The children were then shown the contents of the box. 
The unexpected contents were purple silk flowers. After the children had identified 
the box's actual contents they were asked the representative change question, "Before, 
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when it was all closed up like this, before we opened it, what did you think was 
inside?" The children were then introduced to a finger puppet of a leopard. The name 
of the leopard was altered depending on the gender of the child; it was "Lily" if the 
child was a girl and "Leo" if the child was a boy. The children were told that the 
leopard had not seen inside the box. The children were then asked the false belief 
question, "What does Lily/Leo think is inside the box?" If they children responded 
correctly to the false belief questions they were asked a justification question, "Why 
will Lily/Leo think there are flowers inside?" The children were given a score of one 
for each correct response to the representative change, the false belief question and 
the justification question, which summed to a possible total score out of 3. 
Unexpected Location Task. The unexpected location task is based on Wimmer 
and Pemer (1983) and was adapted from Welch- Ross (1997). The story followed the 
basic Sally- Aw1e paradigm. Two Mattei "Barbie little brother and sister dolls" were 
used, along with a small plastic present, a box and a bag. One of the dolls was a 
female doll and the other was a male doll. The children were told a short story that 
was simultaneously acted out using the props. Tommy and Jenny brought a present to 
take to a friend's party. Tommy puts the present away in the box then he goes away. 
While he is away Jenny takes the present out of the box to have a look at it then puts it 
away in the bag. Then she leaves. Tommy returns. He wants the present. The children 
were asked, "Where will Tommy look first for his present?" If the children responded 
correctly that Tommy would look in the box, they were then asked the justification 
question, "Why will Tommy look in there?" A correct response would refer to 
Tommy's false belief that he thinks the present is in the box. The children were given 
a score of 1 for each correct response for a possible total out of 2. 
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Appearance/ Reality Task. This task was based on the mistaken identity task 
used by Welch- Ross (1997). The children were presented with a sponge, which had 
been painted to look like a rock. The children were asked, "What does this look like to 
you?" The correct response was a rock or a stone. Only one child failed to respond 
correctly and identified it as being a sponge. The children were then asked to touch 
the "rock/ sponge" and then asked, "What is it really?" The correct response being the 
actual reality that it is a sponge. The sponge is then removed from the children's grasp 
and they were asked, "Before you touched it, before when you just saw it, what did 
you think it was?" If the children failed to respond they were given two forced choice 
alternatives, "Did you think it was a rock or a sponge?" The order of the forced choice 
alternatives was counterbalanced across the children. The children were then 
introduced to a finger puppet of a turtle called either "Tania" if the child was female 
or "Tony" if the child was male. The children were then told, "Tania/ Tony has not 
touched it, what will he/she think it is?" If the children did not respond they were 
again presented with the forced choice alternatives of rock or a sponge. The children 
were given a score of 1 for each correct response for a possible total out of 2. 
CAST. Scott, Baron- Cohen, Bolton, and Brayne (2002) designed the 
Childhood Asperger Syndrome Test. It was developed to help identify children who 
are at risk of developing Asperger's Syndrome (AS). Parents filled out the 
questionnaire, which had 37 items in total. 31 of these items were scored (for a 
possible total out of 31) and there were 6 control items. Scott et al. (2002) established 
a cut off point of 15 for picking up children who are at risk for AS. So the higher 
score indicates a higher risk. We did not use the CAST for this purpose in the current 
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study; it was to rule out AS as a possible reason for poor theory of mind performance. 
The CAST is shown in Appendix A. 
Systemising Quotient and Empathising Quotient. The children's parents were 
given the systemising quotient questionnaire and empathising quotient questionnaire 
to fill out. Copies of the questionnaire along with a postage paid return envelope were 
taken home for the other parent to complete. Thirty-seven of the fifty-nine 
questionnaires were returned. Baron-Cohen, Richler, Bisarya, Gurunathan and 
Wheelwright (2003) devised the questionnaires. Each questionnaire contained 60 
statements (e.g., SQ: I am fascinated by how machines work; EQ: Friends usually talk 
to me about their problems as they say that I am very understanding) Parents ticked a 
box corresponding with how strongly they either agreed or disagreed with the 
statement. There were four possible answers to the statement: strongly agree, slightly 
agree, slightly disagree and strongly disagree. Forty of the statements in each 
questionnaire were scored, half of which were reversed scored. The remaining twenty 
statements acted as filler items. A score of 2 was given for a strongly agree or 
disagree response and a score of 1 was given for a slightly agree or disagree response 
for a total possible score of 80 for each questionnaire. A higher score on the 
questionnaires indicated a greater tendency towards empathising (EQ) or systemising 
(SQ). The EQ is shown in Appendix B and the SQ is shown in Appendix C. 
Faux Pas. The Faux-Pas task was designed by Baron-Cohen, O'Riordan, 
Stone, Jones and Plaisted (1999). The original task involved ten test stories and ten 
control stories. In the current study 8 test stories were used, although different studies 
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have used different numbers of stories (Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998; Stone, 
Baron-Cohen, Calder, Keane, & Young, 2003). The stories were presented on 
laminated A4 cards. The stories were printed in size 14 font and in a landscape layout. 
Each story was a few sentences long and contained two or three characters. 
Table 4.1 
Example of Faux Pas story 
All of the class took part in a story competition. Emma really wanted to win. Whilst 
she was away from school, the results of the competition were announced: Alice was 
the winner. The next day, Alice saw Emma and said, "I'm sorry about your story." 
"What do you mean?'' said Emma. "Oh nothing" said Alice. 
The faux pas occurred at different places in each of the stories to prevent the 
participants from simply repeating the last sentence in the story to get the correct 
answer. Also there was no reference to any of the emotional reactions of the 
characters in the story to the faux pas. This was done in order to prevent the reaction 
of the character being used to detect the faux pas. The parents were asked to read the 
story either aloud or to themselves and were instructed that at the end of each story 
they would be asked some questions about it. The parents were told they could keep 
the story in front of them and could refer back to it during the questions to minimise 
the memory requirements of the task. The parents were asked three or four questions 
for each story depending on the answer to the first question. The parents were asked 
the faux pas detection question, "In the story did someone say something they should 
not have said?" If the parents responded affirmatively they were then asked the 
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justification question, "What did they say that they should not have said?" The parents 
were then asked a comprehension question about some detail available in the story. 
The comprehension question differed for each story. The parents were then asked the 
false belief question, "Did they know/remember that?" regarding the knowledge of 
the person who had committed the faux pas as to whether the faux pas was 
unintentional or whether the person had malicious intent. If the participants responded 
negatively to the first question they were asked the final two questions. The 
experimenter recorded pmticipants' answers. The participants were given a score of 1 
for the correct answers for the first two questions, which summed to a total out of 8. 
The participants could respond incorrectly to the later comprehension and belief 
questions. This was due to the ambiguous nature of some of the stories or questions. 
For example above the final question was, "Did Alice know that Emma hadn't heard 
the results of the competition?" This caused some confusion because Alice's 
knowledge of Emma's belief changed during the story. The answer to the belief 
question was not easily accessible and the adults were inclined to over think their 
responses. 
Eyes Task- Adults Revised Version. The eyes task was devised by Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste and Plumb (2001). It used 36 black and white 
pictures of the eye region from midway along the nose to above the eyebrow using an 
equal number of male and female faces. Each eye region was associated with four 
complex mental state words of equal emotional valence. One was the target word and 
the other three were foil words. The four words were situated at the four comers of the 
picture. The parents were instructed to pick which word best described what the 
person in the picture was thinking or feeling. The parents used the mouse to click on 
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one of the four options. In order to perform significantly above chance the parents had 
to score above 13 out of a possible 36. The parents were given a score of 1 for each 
correct response. The pictures were presented on a computer using Visual Basic 
program, which recorded the parent's responses. There was no time limit for the 
parents to respond, the task took most parents no more than ten minutes to complete. 
Emotion Vignettes. The task was initially designed by Ruffman and described 
in Sullivan and Ruffman (2004a). The participants are shown 26 short video clips 
taken from television programs. The clips lasted from 2 to 5 seconds in length and 
were presented using a specially written computer programme. At the bottom comer 
of each video clip were two words (e.g., happy and excited). The two words were 
present for the duration of each video clip. The parents were asked to pick the word 
the best represented what the person in the video clip was feeling. If there was more 
than one person in the video clip there was either an arrow pointing to the character 
they were to focus on, or the clip would focus in on that character in the end or else 
that character's face would be the only one visible. At the end of each clip two buttons 
came up and the parents used the mouse to click on the option they thought was the 
correct option. The parents were given a score of one for each correct response for a 
possible total out of 26. 
Pretence Questionnaire. The parents also filled out a questionnaire on the 
amount of pretence that the child engaged in either alone or with their parents. The 
parents were asked whether their child had a pretend or imaginary friend. Also did the 
child pretend to be another person or animal and the frequency of this behaviour 
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(either daily, once a week, occasionally?). The children were given a score of 1 if the 
parent said they had a pretend friend. They were also given a score of 1 if they had 
pretended to be either someone else or an animal and another score of 1 if they used 
this kind of pretence more than once a week. This was summed for a possible animal/ 
other pretence score out of 2. The parents were then asked to rate the frequency of 
certain pretend behaviour on a 4-point likert scale. These ratings were averaged to get 
a mean child pretence score, a mean parent pretence score and a joint pretence score. 
An example of the pretence questionnaire is shown in Appendix D. 
Personal Details Questionnaire. The personal details questionnaire was used 
to get a general description of the participant background and demographics. The 
parents were asked their age, the age of their partners. Information on the ethnicity of 
the child and the parent's level of education and the level of education of their 
partners was also collected. They were also asked the income of the household, the 
number of siblings the child had and the ages of the other siblings. The parents were 
also asked if anyone else resided in the household and whether the child attended 
preschool, kindergarten or day care. 
Event Narration. The participants were asked to talk about two past events 
that had occurred in the last six months; one event that was happy and positive and 
one that was a negative event involving sad, angry or fearful emotions. The parents 
were told to continue the conversation as long as the child was interested. Most 
conversations only lasted a few minutes in length before the children lost interest. The 
mother was not given any topic constraints. As described in Study 1, the 
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conversations were audio-taped and transcribed verbatim. The same coding scheme 
was used as that described in Study 1. 
A second researcher independently coded 25% of the transcripts for the 
mother-child event narration. The intra-class correlations ranged from .756 to 1.00, 
with an overall Cronbach's alpha of .900. 
Procedure 
Firstly the participants read and signed the informed consent form. While the 
parents read the consent form a rapport was developed with the child. Once the 
informed consent form was signed the parents were given the demographics 
questionnaire, the pretence questionnaire, the SQ, EQ and CAST to fill out. The child 
was sat a small table in the middle of the experimental room. Firstly they were given 
the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, then the children were given the Emotion 
Recognition task, the Unexpected Contents task, the Emotion Situation task, the 
Unexpected Location task and the Appearance I Reality task. Once both the parents 
and children had finished their respective tasks they were asked to talk about two past 
events that had occurred in the last six months, one event that was positive and one 
negative event. The order of the event talk was counterbalanced. The parents were 
asked to talk as if they would at home when discussing a past event and to talk as long 
as the child is interested in taking part. Then the parents did the two computer tasks, 
the Eyes task and the Emotion Vignette task. There were two orders of the Emotion 
Vignette task, the presentation of the two orders was counterbalanced across 
participants. The parents were then given the Faux Pas task. The Faux Pas task had 
two orders, forward and backwards and these were alternated between the 
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participants. While the parents were doing the computer task and the Faux Pas task 





Table 4.2 shows the number and percentage of data missing. Some tasks were 
not completed due to the child's task refusal, computer problems on the parent's 
computer- based task, or inadequate time to complete the parent's task. Missing 
values for the CAST or the mothers' SQ and EQ occurred when mothers missed a 
page of the questionnaire. Also, not all the fathers returned to SQ and EQ 
questionnaires. For the children's theory of mind and emotion tasks, the group means 
were substituted for the missing values. Substituting missing values did not alter the 
pattern of results. This was not done for the missing values from the questionnaires. 
To analyze the data from the event narration some of the coding categories were 
combined. The frequency of mothers' elaborative talk was obtained by summing the 
amount of mother elaborative questions, the yes/ no questions and the mothers' 
elaborative statements across the positive and negative event talk. The children's 
memory responses and memory questions were also summed across the positive and 
negative events to provide the frequency of children's elaborative talk. To get a 
measure of the amount of mental talk by the mothers' and their children the frequency 
of think/ know statements, think/ know prompts, other mental state statements and 
other mental state prompts were summed across both the positive and negative events. 
To get a measure of the frequency of mother and child desire talk the amount of desire 
talk statements and desire talk prompts were summed across the positive and negative 
events. Also to obtain a measure of the frequency of the mothers and child emotion 
talk the amount of emotion statements and emotion prompts were summed across the 
positive and negative events. 
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Table 4.2 
Number and Percent of Missing Values for Child and Adult Tasks 
Tasks Nmissing %missing 
Child Tasks 
Emotion Recognition 1 1.6 
Unexpected Contents 1 1.6 
Appearance Reality 1 1.6 
CAST 2 3.4 
Event narration 7 12 
Parent Tasks 
Emotion Attribution 3 5.1 
Eyes Task 3 5.1 
Faux Pas 2 3.4 
SQ Mother 1 1.6 
EQMother 1 1.6 
SQ Father 23 39 
EQ Father 23 39 
Descriptive Statistics 
The scores on the three theory of mind tasks (unexpected contents, unexpected 
location and appearance/ reality tasks) were summed to make a composite score for 
theory of mind understanding. The theory of mind composite was out of a possible 
total of 7. Higher values indicate a greater theory of mind understanding. The scores 
on the two emotion tasks (emotion situation and emotion recognition) were also 
summed to yield a composite score of emotion understanding. Emotion composite 
scores were out of a possible 20. Again higher values indicated a greater level of 
emotion understanding. 
The mean values, range, and standard deviation for each measure are shown in 
the tables below. 
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Table 4.3 
The Mean, Minimum, Maximum Scores and Standard Deviation for Each of the Child 
Tasks 
Tasks N Minimum 
Language 59 69 
(norm) 
Emotion 58 3 
Recognition 
Emotion 59 3 
Situation 
Emotion 58 7 
Composite 
Unexpected 58 0 
Contents 
Unexpected 59 0 
Location 
Appearance 58 0 
Reality 
False Belief 57 0 
Composite 






















The mean, minimum, maximum and standard deviation for the adult tasks are 
shown in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4 
The Mean, Maximum, Minimum and Standard Deviations of the Adult Tasks 
Task N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Faux Pas 57 0 8 5.68 2.27 
Emotion 56 14 25 20.73 2.36 
Attribution 
Eyes Task 56 16 35 26.61 4.46 
EQ mother 58 24 69 47.78 9.93 
SQ mother 58 4 52 26.05 10.21 
SQ father 36 12 65 33.33 11.88 
EQ father 36 17 57 37.19 10.16 
An independent samples t-test was done on the theory of mind and emotion 
tasks to investigate whether there was a gender difference in performance on the 
tasks. The mean scores with respect to gender are shown in Table 4.5. 
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Table 4.5 
Mean Scores for Language, Theory of Mind, Emotion Understanding and the CAST 
with Respect to Gender 
Tasks Gender N Mean Standard t-values 
Deviation 
Language* Female 30 109.73 1.97 2.659 
Male 29 100.72 2.78 
Emotion Female 30 9.73 .33 2.422 
Recognition * Male 28 8.57 .35 
Emotion Female 30 6.30 .24 .919 
Situation Male 29 5.97 .28 
Emotion Female 30 16.03 .45 2.171 
Composite* Male 28 14.57 .50 
Unexpected Female 30 .87 .20 1.905 
Contents Male 28 .39 .15 
Unexpected Female 30 1.10 .15 1.958 
Location Male 29 .69 .14 
Appearance Female 29 1.03 .16 1.869 
Reality Male 29 .62 .15 
TOM Female 29 2.97 .41 2.379 
composite* Male 28 1.71 .33 
CAST Female 29 6.24 .53 -1.034 
Male 28 7.18 .74 
p<.05 
Females were found to have significantly higher language levels than males (t 
(57) = 2.659, p < .05). There was also a significant difference in the scores between 
males and females in the emotion recognition task and the emotion composite scores. 
Females had higher scores on the emotion recognition task (t (56) = 2.422, p < .05) 
and the emotion composite scores (t (56) = 2.171, p < .05). Also, there was a 
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significant difference in the theory of mind composite scores, with females 
performing better than males (t (55)= 2.379, p < .05). There was also a strong trend 
towards better performance by females on the unexpected contents task (t (57) = 
1.905, p = .062), the unexpected location task (t (57) = 1.958, p= .055) and the 
appearance/ reality task (t (57)= 1.869,p = .067). Independent t- tests were also done 
to compare the mothers' and fathers' scores on the systemizing quotient. Fathers' had 
significantly higher SQ scores than the mothers' (t (92) = 3.155,p < .01). Conversely, 
mothers' empathizing quotient scores were significantly higher than those of fathers (t 
(92) = 4.977, p < .01). A significant difference remained for the SQ and EQ scores 
once Stepwise Bonferroni corrections were carried out to reduce the family- wise 
error rate. However, no other significant gender differences remained. 
Correlation Analyses 
The three theory of mind tasks were all correlated with each other, the 
unexpected contents task was significantly correlated with the appearance reality task 
(r = .462,p < .01) and the unexpected location (r = .353,p < .01). Also the appearance 
reality task and the unexpected location were tasks were significantly correlated (r = 
.371, p < .01). Scores for the three theory of mind tasks were combined to form a 
theory of mind composite, which is used in further analyses. 
The two emotion tasks were also related. Performance on the emotion 
situation task was significantly correlated with that of the emotion recognition task (r 
= .265, p < .05). Consequently, an emotion composite score was used in further 
analyses. 
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Pearson product correlations were performed to investigate the relations 
between the children's theory of mind abilities, emotion understanding, language 
performance and age. The correlations are shown in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6 
Correlations between Theory of Mind performance, Emotion Understanding, 
Language Abilities, CAST Scores and the Children 'sAges 
TOM Emotion Language CAST 
Age .102 .049 .146 -.272* 
TOM .291* .417** -.319* 
Emotion .408** -.270* 
Language -.306* 
* p <.05, ** p < .01 
The age of the participants was not related to their performance on theory of 
mind tasks, emotion tasks, or their language abilities. The language abilities of the 
children were significantly correlated with their theory of mind performance and their 
emotion understanding. 
There was a small but significant correlation between the emotion composite 
scores and the theory of mind composite scores (r = .291, p < .05). Because both 
emotion and theory of mind understanding are related to the children's language 
abilities a partial correlation was completed to investigate language as a possible 
mediator between the children's theory of mind and emotion understanding. When the 
children's language was controlled for there was no longer a significant correlation 
between the theory of mind composite score and emotion composite score (r = .1462, 
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p = .274). A mediation model was done to investigate whether the relation between 
emotion understanding and theory of mind understanding was being mediated by the 
children's language abilities. The children's language abilities fully mediated the 
relation between theory of mind understanding and emotion understanding (Sobel's z 
= 2.178,p < .05). 
The CAST questionnaire was negatively correlated with age, with the younger 
participants having higher CAST scores. The CAST questionnaire was also negatively 
correlated with theory of mind abilities and emotion understanding; the lower the 
children's CAST score the higher the children's theory of mind and emotion 
understanding. There was also a negative correlation between language abilities and 
the children's CAST score; children with higher language scores had lower scores on 
the CAST. 
Pearson product correlations were also done to investigate the relation 
between parental performance on the theory of mind, emotion tasks, systemizing and 
empathizing. The results are shown in Table 4. 7. 
Table 4.7 
Correlations between the Parents Theory of Mind and Emotion Tasks 
Emotion Eyes SQ EQ SQ EQ 
Attribution Task mother mother father father 
Faux Pas .028 .137 .116 .207 .001 .035 
Emotion .210 -.038 -.009 -.018 .001 
Attribution 
Eyes Task -.108 .222 -.330* -.149 
SQ mother .078 .018 .126 
EQ mother .029 -.062 
SQ father .120 
*p < .05 
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There were no significant correlations between any of the parent's tasks. 
Because there was no relation found between the parent's performances on the two 
emotion tasks, a composite measure was not formed. There was a negative relation 
between the fathers' SQ score and the mothers' performance on the eyes task. 
Pearson product correlations were then done to investigate the relation 
between the children's performance on the theory of mind and emotion tasks and the 
parent's understanding of theory of mind and emotion. Correlations were also 
performed to investigate the relations between the children's performance on theory 
of mind and emotion tasks and the parent's SQ and EQ scores. The results are shown 
in Table 4.8. 
Table 4.8 
Correlations between Children 's Performance and Parent's Performance 
Parent Tasks 
Child Faux Emotion Eyes SQ EQ SQ EQ 
Tasks Pas Attribution Task mother mother father Father 
Child -.142 .058 .329* -.046 .173 -.347* -.108 
emotion 
Child .091 -.067 .237 -.032 .197 -.334* .237 
TOM 
CAST -.087 .096 -.103 .030 -.248 .240 -.209 
* p <.05, **p < .01 
Table 4.8 shows a significant correlation between the children's performance 
on the emotion tasks and the mothers' emotion understanding using the eyes task. 
There were no significant correlations between the children's theory of mind and 
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emotion understanding and the mothers' performance on the faux pas, emotion 
attribution and eyes tasks. 
There was a significant negative correlation between the fathers' score on the 
SQ questionnaire and the children's emotion understanding. There was also a 
significant negative correlation between the fathers' SQ score and the children's 
theory of mind understanding. The mothers' SQ and EQ scores and the fathers' EQ 
scores were not related to the children's theory of mind and emotion understanding. 
There was also no relation between the children's CAST scores and the parent's SQ 
and EQ scores. The mothers' eyes task and father's systemizing were related to the 
children's mental and emotion understanding. 
Pretence Correlations. Independent t- tests were performed to test whether the 
use of pretence varied as a function of the gender of the child. Although means were 
regularly larger for girls, t-tests revealed no significant gender differences in the 
reported level of pretence the child engaged in or the amount of pretence that the 




The Mean Pretence Scores with Respect to Gender 
Task Gender N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Pretend Friend Female 30 .33 .48 
Male 29 .24 .44 
Pretend Female 30 1.63 .56 
Animal/Person Male 29 1.45 .78 
Child Pretence Female 30 2.74 .70 
Male 29 2.55 .55 
Parent Pretence Female 30 2.77 .51 
Male 29 2.64 .52 
Joint Pretence Female 30 2.87 .86 
Male 29 2.59 .87 
Pearson product correlations were done to look at the relation between the 
children's theory of mind performance, emotion understanding, language abilities, 




Correlations between the Pretence Measures and Children's Performance on the 
Theory of Mind and Emotion Tasks, Language Abilities, Age and CAST Scores 
J Pretend Pretend Child Parent Joint 
Friend Animal/Person Pretence Pretence Pretence 
TOM .094 .152 .005 .075 .097 
Emotion .035 .008 068 .011 .105 
CAST .089 .045 -.133 -.160 -.067 
Language .292* .166 .347** .301* .158 
Age .023 -.109 -.050 -.037 -.035 
* p< .05, ** p< .01 
Table 4.10 shows that the children's theory of mind understanding was not 
related to their use of pretence. Similarly, the children's emotion understanding was 
not correlated with any of the pretence measures. The pretence measures were also 
not correlated with the CAST scores of the children or the children's ages. The only 
reliable relation was between the children's language abilities and some of the 
pretence measures. There was a significant correlation between whether or not the 
children had a pretend friend or not and their language abilities. There was also a 
significant correlation between the level of pretence the children engaged in and their 
language abilities and there was a relation between the parent's use of pretence and 
the language abilities of the children. 
Pearson product correlations were also done to investigate the relations 
between the parent's performance on theory of mind tasks, emotion tasks and their SQ 
and EQ scores. The results are shown in Table 4.11. 
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Table 4.11 
Correlations between Pretence Scores and the Parent's Theory of Mind, Emotion, SQ 
and EQ Scores 
Pretend Pretend Child Parent Joint 
Friend Animal/Person Pretence Pretence Pretence 
Faux Pas -.011 .040 .115 .178 .205 
Emotion .087 -.046 .047 -.031 -.212 
Attribution 
Eyes Task .020 .193 .218 .249 .219 
SQ mother -.041 -.019 .212 .178 .146 
EQ mother -.041 .202 .379** .354** .200 
SQ father -.169 -.218 -.092 -.319 -.128 
EQ father .115 .021 -.069 -.133 -.160 
** p < .01 
Table 4.11 shows that the children's amount of pretence or the amount of 
pretence that the parents engaged in with their children was not related to the mothers' 
faux pas, eyes task and emotion attribution scores. There was a correlation between 
the mothers' EQ scores and the children's level of pretence. There was also a 
correlation between the parent's use of pretence and the mothers' EQ scores. There 
was no relation between any of the pretence measures and the fathers' SQ and EQ 
scores and the mothers' SQ scores. 
Siblings. Descriptive statistics of sibling numbers, number of older siblings and 
younger siblings are shown in Table 4.12. 
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Table 4.12 
Frequencies of Siblings, Number of Older Siblings, and Number of Younger Siblings 
Number Frequency of Total Frequency of Frequency of Older 
Siblings (%) Younger Siblings Siblings(%) 
(%) 
0 7(12.1) 27 (46.6) 28 (48.3) 
1 32 (55.5) 30 (51.7) 20 (34.5) 
2 14(24.1) 1 (1.7) 7 (12.1) 
3 5 (8.6) 0 3 (5.2) 
Independent t-tests were conducted to see whether there are differences in 
performance on the theory of mind tasks, emotion tasks and the CAST in relation to 
whether the children have older siblings, younger siblings or no siblings. Firstly t-
tests were done with two groups, the children who had siblings and children with no 
siblings. There were no significant group differences on any of the child tasks (all ps 
> .257). Secondly, the children were put into groups depending on whether they had 
older siblings or not. Again there were no significant differences in the performance 
on the theory of mind, emotion and CAST tasks for children with and without older 
siblings (all ps > .138). Finally independent t-tests were done with two groups, one 
group of children who had younger siblings and another group who did not have 
younger siblings. There was also no significant difference in performance on theory of 
mind and emotion tasks or the CAST scores for the two groups (allps >.174). 
Pearson product correlations were also done to investigate whether there was 
any relation between the number of siblings the children had and their theory of mind 
understanding, emotion understanding, language abilities, the amount of pretence and 
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CAST scores. There were no significant correlations between any of the children's 
tasks and the number of siblings the child had. 
There was a significant negative correlation between the number older siblings 
the child had and the amount of pretence the parents engaged in with the child (r = -
.265, p< .05). There was also a significant correlation between the number of younger 
siblings the children had and the amount of pretence that the child engaged in (r = 
.263, p < .05). 
Analyses were also done combining the children into three sibling categories: 
children with no siblings, children with one sibling, and children with two or more 
siblings. There was no change in the pattern of results when the three sibling 
categories were used. 
Event Narration. I was also interested in whether the frequency of mothers' 
mental, emotion, and desire state talk during discussions about past events was 
associated with children's theory of mind and emotion understanding. Table 4.13 
shows the means and standard deviations for maternal talk. Pearson product 
correlations were done to investigate the relation between the mothers' and children's 
elaborative, mental, emotion and desire talk and the performance on any of the theory 
of mind and emotion tasks or questionnaires. 
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Table 4.13 
Descriptive Statistics for Maternal Narration 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mother total 52 12 119 47.79 26.11 
talk 
Mother 52 10 214 41.79 22.21 
elaborative talk 
Mother mental 52 0 27 5.90 6.15 
state talk 
Mother 52 0 28 5.54 5.23 
emotion state 
talk 
Mother desire 52 0 20 2.02 3.34 
talk 
No relation was found between the mothers' elaborative, mental, desire and 
emotion talk and the children's theory of mind performance. There was also no 
relation between the children's elaborative, mental, emotion and desire talk and their 
theory of mind performance. There was no relation between the children's theory of 
mind understanding and their autobiographical memory. A relation was found 
between the mothers' elaborative talk and the children's elaborative talk. Mothers 
who were more elaborative during past event talk had children who were also more 
elaborative during past event talk (r = .674, p < .01). Furthermore, no relation was 
found between the mothers' elaborative, mental, emotion and desire talk and the 
children's emotion understanding. Similarly, no relation was found between the 
frequency of the children's elaborative, mental, emotion and desire talk and their 
emotion understanding. 
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Correlations were performed to investigate the relation between the mother's 
elaborative, mental, emotion and desire talk and the mother's performance on the 
adult theory of mind and emotion tasks. Again no relation was found. 
There was a significant relation found between the language abilities of the 
children and the frequency of the mothers' mental talk (r = .289, p < .05). There was 
also a significant relation between the frequency of the mothers' mental talk and the 
mothers' EQ scores (r = .373, p < .01). Another significant relation was found 
between the mothers' EQ scores and the frequency of the mothers' elaborative talk (r 
= .307, p < .05). Finally a negative relation was found between the children's 
frequency of elaborative talk and their scores on the CAST (r = -.285,p < .05). 
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Discussion 
Many researchers have found a relation between the language abilities of the 
children and theory of mind understanding (Ruffman et al., 2003; Astington & 
Jenkins, 1999). The current study also found a strong concurrent relation between the 
children's language abilities and their theory of mind understanding. In the current 
study the children's language abilities were also related to their emotion 
understanding, which supports the findings of Pons, Lawson, Harris and de Rosnay 
(2003), who found a relation between language and emotion understanding in 4- to 
11- year- olds even after the children's age had been controlled for. Whether language 
is a major factor in the development of these two abilities, or whether the relation 
between theory of mind and language and emotion understanding and language 
abilities are simply seen due to the language demands of the tasks is not certain. The 
emotion tasks used in the current study, however, were low on linguistic demands, so 
could be ruled out as an explanation for the relation between emotion understanding 
and the children's language abilities. For theory of mind understanding, when 
researchers have made the questions more conversationally appropriate for the child 
(i.e., where will he look first?) they have found an increase in the number of younger 
children passing the false belief task (Siegal & Beattie, 1991). 
Another aspect of language that has been related to the children's developing 
theory of mind and emotion understanding is maternal use of mental and emotional 
state terms. In the current study no relation was found between mothers' elaborative, 
mental, emotional, or desire talk and the children's theory of mind and emotion 
understanding. This does not support the findings of Ruffrnan et al. (2002) and Brown 
et al. (1996) who found that mental state talk by mothers, friends and siblings 
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contributes to children's theory of mind understanding. One possible explanation for 
not finding a relation in the current study was that the mother-child talk occurred at 
the same time point that their theory of mind and emotion understanding was 
measured; it may be that the relation is seen at different time points (as seen in 
Ruffman et al. 's (2002) experiment). There was, however, a relation found between 
the amount of mental talk the mother used during conversation about a previous 
positive and negative event and the mothers' EQ scores. This suggests that mothers 
who have better theory of mind understanding may place more emphasis on the 
mental aspects of the situations during past event talk with their children than mothers 
with poorer theory of mind understanding. 
Interestingly, the CAST, designed by Baron-Cohen to help identify children 
with autism spectrum disorders, was negatively correlated with the children's theory 
of mind and emotion understanding and also negatively correlated with their language 
abilities. Children who have autism have consistently been found to perform poorly 
on theory of mind tasks when compared to normal children. The CAST result is 
consistent with these previous findings (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; 1997; 1999; 2001; 
Brent et al., 2004; Rutherford et al., 2002; Happe, 1994) and shows similar relations at 
sub-clinical levels as found in clinical (Autism Spectrum Disorder) populations. 
A relation has been found in previous research between the mothers' mind-
mindedness and the children's later theory of mind understanding (Meins et al., 2002; 
2003). In the current study, however, no relation was found between mothers' theory 
of mind and their children's theory of mind abilities. This result does not support the 
hypothesis that the mothers' theory of mind understanding and empathising scores 
would be related to the children's theory of mind understanding. My findings do 
extend the results of Taumoepeau and Ruffman (2006) who found that the mother's 
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theory of mind understanding was not related to their 24 -month -old children's theory 
of mind. Instead they found that it was mothers' talk about mental states or more 
specifically emotions and desires that was related to the children's theory of mind 
understanding. Thus, it does not appear that the link between maternal talk and 
children's theory of mind is driven by mothers' theory of mind. 
One unexpected finding was the relation between the fathers' scores on the SQ 
and their children's emotion and theory of mind understanding. There was a negative 
relation between the children's theory of mind and emotion understanding and the 
father's SQ scores. Fathers with lower SQ scores had children who displayed a better 
theory of mind and emotion understanding. 
Unlike the studies by Pemer and Ruffrnan (Pemer et al., 1994; Ruffman et al., 
1998), there was no relation found between theory of mind understanding and the 
number of siblings (both older and younger) the children had. There was also no 
relation between the number of siblings and the children's emotion understanding. 
One interesting result that, to my knowledge, has not been previously examined was 
the relation between the use of pretence and the number of siblings. The current study 
found that the greater number of older siblings, the less likely the parents were to 
engage in pretence with the child. There was also a relation between the number of 
younger siblings the child had and their level of pretence, such that children with a 
greater number of younger siblings were more likely to engage in pretence. 
A theoretical link has been proposed between theory of mind understanding 
and the children's experience with pretence (Astington & Jenkins, 1995). There was 
no relation in the current study between the parents and children's use of pretence and 
the children's theory of mind understanding, however. This result is similar to the 
findings of Jenkins and Astington (1996) who found no relation between the amount 
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of pretend play the child engaged in and their theory of mind abilities. In the current 
study there were no gender differences in the amount of pretence the children and 
their parents engaged in. There was also no relation between the amount of pretence 
the children and parents engaged in and the children's emotion understanding. Three 
of the five pretence measures were related to the children's language abilities and two 
of the five pretence measures were related to the mothers' EQ scores. 
As predicted, the children's theory of mind understanding and emotion 
understanding were related. The relation between these two abilities may be a product 
of some third factor which influences both theory of mind and emotion understanding. 
When the children's language abilities are controlled for, the relation between the 
children's theory of mind and emotion understanding was no longer significant. Also, 
when a mediating model was completed it was found that language was fully 
mediating the relation found between theory of mind and emotion understanding. 
The mothers also completed emotion and theory of mind tasks during the 
study. There was no relation between the mother's theory of mind performance and 
their emotion understanding. Based on the relation found between these tasks for the 
children, I had expected to find a similar relation between emotion and theory of mind 
understanding for the mothers but this was not so. This is also inconsistent with recent 
speculation by Baron-Cohen (1995). 
Children's emotion understanding was related to their mothers' emotion 
understanding. It is not certain what the causal factor is behind this relationship. It 
may be that mothers with better emotion understanding are more likely to correctly 
identify and respond to emotional displays in their children, and therefore the children 
learn about emotion through this experience with their mothers. Alternatively, it may 
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be that mothers, who have better emotion understanding, mention and describe 
emotions more during everyday situations. 
The development of autobiographical memory has theoretically been linked to 
the children's developing theory of mind understanding. Both Pemer (2000b) and 
Welch-Ross (1995) proposed that children could not develop autobiographical 
memories without a representational understanding of others' minds. Welch-Ross 
(1997) found that children who provided more memory responses during past event 
talk also had a more developed theory of mind understanding. Similarly, Pemer and 
Ruffman (1995) found a relation between the children's understanding of experiential 
knowledge and their free recall. In the current study, there was no relation found 
between the children's theory of mind understanding and the amount of memory 
elaborations they provided during past event talk. The current results are consistent 
with those of Reese and Cleveland (2006) who found that mothers' elaborative talk 
was a stronger predictor of the children's autobiographical memory than the 
children's implicit and explicit understanding of others' minds. 
There are many studies that have found a relation between the children's 
autobiographical memory and their mothers' use of elaborations during shared event 
talk. Reese and Fivush (1993) found that children of highly elaborate mothers 
provided more memory elaborations during past event talk. In a longitudinal study, 
Reese et al. (1993) found that mothers who were highly elaborative during 
conversations about past events when the children were 40- and 46- months had 
children who recalled more information at 58- and 70- months. The results of the 
current study are consistent with those of Reese and her colleagues. The children's 
use of elaborations during past event conversations were highly correlated with the 
mothers' use of elaborations. 
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In the current study the results showed gender differences in the children's 
theory of mind performance. These results support the finding of girls' superiority for 
theory of mind understanding in a number of studies (e.g., Charman et al., 2002; 
Bosacki & Astington, 1999; Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; 1999; 2001b). Girls were also 
found to outperform boys in emotion understanding, which extends the previous 
findings of gender differences in talk about emotion, where girls talk more about 
emotions than boys (Cervantes & Callanan, 1998; Dunn et al., 1987). The current 
results also extend the findings of Dunn et al. (1991b). They found that girls were 
more successful at labelling and explaining emotions than were boys. Another 
significant gender difference found in the present study was in the language abilities 
of the children; girls had significantly higher language scores on the PPVT than boys. 
There were a number of limitations associated with the current research. One 
was that directionality or causality could not be directly established due to the 
correlational nature. In addition, the cross-sectional nature of the research meant that 
developmental trajectories could not be adequately assessed. In the future research 
could investigate the relation between mothers' theory of mind and emotion 
understanding and their children's theory of mind understanding longitudinally, 
starting from around the age of 2 years until 5 years. One other aspect which should 
be explored more thoroughly is the change from desire to belief understanding. By 
giving the children various desire and belief tasks, the trajectory of the development 
of these two aspects of theory of mind understanding could be more clearly 
investigated. 
Not all fathers in the study returned the SQ and EQ forms. If the return rate 
had been higher it may have been possible to see the full extent that the fathers' 
systemising and empathising related to their children's understanding of theory of 
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mind and emotion. Future research could also bring fathers into the lab and measure 
their theory of mind performance and emotion understanding as well. 
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Chapter 5 
Theory of Mind and Autobiographical Memory in Adults 
The first question the current study aimed to answer was whether there are 
gender differences in adult's autobiographical memory. Previous research has yielded 
mixed results in terms of gender differences in the age of earliest memory, number of 
early memories and details reported in the earliest memories. When differences have 
been found, they show earlier, more detailed, numerous early memories for females. 
A range of studies completed by Davis (1999), for example, concluded that females 
were better able to recall more memories from their early childhood than were males. 
Davis also found that females could access their early memories at a faster rate. The 
faster recall of females over males was found in both adult and child samples. 
There are also gender differences in the detail provided in early 
autobiographical memories. MacDonald et al. (2000) found that females provided 
more narrative description for their earliest memories than did males. Women 
reported more details in earlier memories in a study by Wang (2001). However, Wang 
(2001) only found a gender difference in the content of the early memories in his 
Chinese sample of university undergraduates. There was no gender difference found 
for the American undergraduates in the content of their earliest memories. Wang 
(200 1) did find other gender differences in autobiographical recall across both 
Chinese and American cultures. The females were more likely to mention one-time 
specific events in their early recollections and were found to have thought about and 
discussed their earliest memories more frequently than males. 
There have also been mixed findings with regards to gender differences in the 
age of onset of the early autobiographical memories. In a series of three studies by 
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Mullen (1994), no gender differences in the age of the early memories were found on 
one of her studies; a second study found that the gender difference was approaching 
significance; and a third study found that women reported earlier memories than did 
men. When the results from all three studies were combined, Mullen (1994) found a 
significant gender difference in favour of the females, who recalled memories from an 
earlier age than the males. Mullen also found that females were more likely to 
mention others in their early memory narratives (especially siblings) and that females 
were more likely than males to mention negative emotions in their early memory 
narratives. MacDonald et al. (2000) also found a significant difference in the age of 
the earliest memories; however, this finding is in direct conflict with other findings. 
MacDonald and colleagues found that Asian females had significantly later early 
memories than Asian males. If gender differences are found in autobiographical 
memory studies, they have generally been found in favour of females over males. 
Why may we expect gender differences in autobiographical memory recall? 
Several studies have found gender differences in the ways that past and current events 
are discussed with children. Reese and Fivush (1993) found that both mothers and 
fathers were more elaborate when talking with their daughters than with their sons, 
and in tum their daughters talked more during these conversations than boys. 
Although this finding itself does not directly show that females will develop superior 
autobiographical memories for childhood (either in the age of earliest memory 
recalled or the amount of detail recalled) this finding coupled with the finding by 
Reese et al. (1993) indicates that parents may be influencing the gender differences 
for autobiographical recall in children from a young age. Reese et al. (1993) found 
that parents who elaborated more during a conversation were more likely to have 
children who recalled more up to 12 months later. Thus, if parents are elaborating 
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more with girls than boys at a young age, and the amount of elaboration the child 
experiences influences the amount they recall 12 months later, we would expect 
females to have superior recall of early memories than males at a later stage (i.e., in 
adulthood). There us evidence that even at a young age, girls provide more details in 
their memory than do boys. Haden et al. (1997) found that girls provided longer 
narratives that contained more contextual information than did boys when they were 
as young as 40- months- old. 
The second question the current study aimed to answer was whether there are 
gender differences in adult's theory of mind understanding. Many studies have found 
gender differences in children's theory of mind abilities, and when these are found 
they are always in the direction of females having a more sophisticated theory of mind 
understanding. Charman et al. (2002) found a gender difference in data sets from two 
separate laboratories. The children had been given either an unexpected location or 
unexpected contents task. Although girls significantly outperformed the boys on these 
two tasks, the gender difference was weak and was not as strong a predictor of their 
theory of mind understanding as the children's age. Many studies, however have 
found no gender difference in false belief performance for boys and girls (e.g., Dunn 
et al., 1991b). 
Theory of mind in adults has not been systematically measured across a 
variety of tasks. Some research on theory of mind in adults has been done by Baron-
Cohen and his colleagues, and this has been extended to the elderly by Ruffman and 
his colleagues. Baron-Cohen et al. (1999) found that females outperformed males in 
the faux pas task. In other studies Baron-Cohen et al. (1997; 2001b) found that 
females had superior performance on the reading the mind in the eyes task. Sullivan 
and Ruffman (2004a), however, did not find a difference in performance on the 
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strange stories task between males and females. Although these studies were not 
specifically investigating gender differences, any difference was in the direction of 
females having superior theory of mind understanding to males. Why might gender 
differences in theory of mind be expected? Like autobiographical memory, these 
gender differences may be due to differing socialisation by parents. It may be that, 
like talk about past events, parents are more elaborative and talk more about mental 
states such as thoughts and beliefs with their daughters than their sons. Maternal talk 
about mental states has been found to influence later theory of mind understanding 
(Ruffm.an et al., 2002), although Ruffman et al. did not report whether the amount of 
maternal mental state talk differed for sons and daughters. Hughes and Dunn (1998) 
found that during dyadic talk between friends, girls referred to mental states more 
often than boys. No research to date has systematically investigated possible 
explanations for the weak gender differences found in theory of mind understanding 
in favour of females. 
Another question that the current study addressed was whether there is a 
gender difference in emotion understanding. Gender differences have been found for 
36- month- olds on emotion labelling andjustification (Dunn et al., 1991b). There is 
also some evidence of a marginal difference (p< . 06) in adulthood in favour of 
females for emotion labelling (Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004a). Like autobiographical 
memory, these gender differences may also be due to differences in socialisation as 
children. Dunn and her colleagues found that mothers were more likely to discuss 
emotions with their daughters than sons (Dunn et al., 1987). In a similar study, 
Kuebli, Butler and Fivush (1995) found that mothers talked about emotions more and 
used a greater variety of emotion words in conversations with girls than with boys. 
Interestingly, 18 months later the girls in the study talked more about emotions than 
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the boys. Dunn et al. (1991a) also found that children who were exposed to more 
emotion talk at the age of 3 demonstrated a better emotion understanding at the age of 
six years. This supports the theory that emotion understanding is related to parental 
socialisation. 
The current study also addressed the question of whether there is a relation 
between theory of mind understanding and emotion understanding. Baron-Cohen 
(2003) considers emotion understanding to be an important facet of theory of mind 
understanding. Ruffman and his colleagues also use emotion recognition tasks in their 
studies on theory of mind understanding in the elderly (e.g., Sullivan & Ruffman, 
2004a). Several studies have found a relation between theory of mind and emotion 
understanding in children. Hughes and Dunn (1998) found a strong relation between 
the children's emotion understanding at 47- months and their theory of mind 
understanding at 60- months. Similarly, Cutting and Dunn (1999) found a relation 
between theory of mind and emotion understanding in 4- year- olds, even after the 
children's language abilities had been partialed out. Conversely, Dunn et al. (1991b) 
found no relation between the children's emotion understanding using an affective 
perspective taking task at 33- months and the children's theory of mind understanding 
at 40- months. To my knowledge, the relation between theory of mind and emotion 
understanding has not been investigated in adults. 
The final question that the current study addressed was whether there is an 
association between autobiographical memory and theory of mind understanding in 
adults. Theoretically these two abilities have been linked by Welch- Ross (1995) and 
Pemer (2000b ). Both have proposed that children cannot develop autobiographical 
memories until they have a theory of mind. The level of theory of mind understanding 
required for autobiographical memory development has been subject to debate. Pemer 
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(2000b) proposed that the child must have an explicit theory of mind, understanding, 
whereas Welch-Ross ( 1995) has proposed that only an implicit understanding of mind 
is required for autobiographical memory development, and that an explicit 
understanding of mind is used to refine autobiographical memories. Welch-Ross 
(1997) found a relation between children's talk about the past with their mothers and 
the children's theory of mind understanding. She found a positive relation between the 
frequency of the children's memory responses and their theory of mind 
understanding, which still existed after the children's age and linguistic ability was 
controlled for. Conversely, Reese and Cleveland (2006) did not find a relation 
between either the children's implicit or explicit understanding of mind and their past 
narratives with their mothers. Reese and Cleveland found that mother's use of 
elaborations during talk about the past was a stronger predictor of the children's 
autobiographical memory. The mother's use of elaborations also related to the 
children's theory of mind understanding. These conflicting results still leave the link 
between theory of mind and autobiographical memory open to investigation, and the 
link has not been systematically investigated in adult populations. 
In the current study there were 73 participants ranging in age from 18 years, 5 
months to 34 years and 3 months. Each participant was given theory of mind and 
emotion understanding assessments and was asked to provide and describe three of 
their earliest memories. This study aimed to answer three main research questions: 1) 
Are theory of mind and autobiographical memory related in an adult population? 2) 
Are theory of mind and emotion understanding related in an adult population? 3) Are 
there gender differences in theory of mind, emotion understanding and 
autobiographical memory in an adult population? It was hypothesized that there were 
would be a gender difference in autobiographical memory, shown by more detailed 
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descriptions of early memories by females. It was also hypothesized that if a gender 
difference was found for theory of mind understanding in adults it would favour a 
female superiority. A third hypothesis was that there would be a gender difference in 
emotion understanding in an adult population. It was also hypothesised that there 
would be a relation between the participants' emotion understanding and theory of 
mind understanding. The final hypothesis was that there would be a relation between 




Seventy-three participants (38 females and 35 males) took part in this study. 
The participants ranged in age from 18 years, 5 months to 34 years, 3 months. The 
average age of participants was 20.62 years. Most of the participants were recruited 
through a student hall of residence at the University of Otago. Sixteen of the male 
participants were recruited through Student Job Search. All the participants had 
normal hearing ability; one participant had a previous diagnosis of ADHD. All the 
participants were students at a tertiary institution in Dunedin, New Zealand. Fifty-six 
of the participants were of New Zealand Pakeha or European descent, seven 
participants identified as being New Zealand Maori descent, three were of Pacific 
Island descent, five were of Asian descent, and two were not specified. Fifty-seven of 
the participants spoke English only and sixteen of the participants were bilingual. The 
participants had a median family income of more than $40, 000 per annum and the 
participants had a median education level of University Bursary or scholarship. 
Materials 
An audio-cassette recorder was used to record the participants' description of 
their earliest memories and a recent personal memory. A PC computer was used to 
run three of the tasks. The emotion-context task was presented using Power Point, the 
emotion- vignette task and the eyes tasks were presented using Visual Basic 
programs. 
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Emotion-Context Task. The task was designed by Ruffman and is described in 
Ruffman, Sullivan and Hutton (in preparation). The emotion-context task included 24 
pictures taken from various movies that were presented as a power-point slide show. 
The participant was given a sheet of paper on which were the six emotion words: 
happy, sad, afraid, disgust, angry and surprise. The participant was asked to pick 
which one of these six emotions best described what the character in the picture was 
feeling. Each picture was presented twice. In the first presentation block the faces of 
all the characters in the photos were covered by a flesh coloured patch. In this first 
block the participant only had the use of contextual cues to judge the character's 
emotion. In the second block the characters' faces were revealed so that the 
participant was able to use the facial expressions as well as context to judge what 
emotion the character was feeling. The researcher recorded the answers as the 
participant announced them. The researcher then clicked the mouse button to move 
onto the next picture. If there was more than one character in the picture, an arrow 
pointed to the target person. The participants were given a score out of a possible 24 
for the emotion context- only and emotion context- face presentations. 
Emotion Vignette Task. This task was also devised by Ruffman, and is 
described in Sullivan and Ruffman (2004a). The procedure is described fully in Study 
2. In this task, participants viewed brief video-clips and selected the target emotion 
from a possible two presented. The participants were given a score for each correct 
response out of a possible 26. 
Eyes Task- Child Version. The third computer task, the eyes task, was 
developed by Baron- Cohen (see Baron- Cohen, Wheelwright, Spong, Scahill & 
183 
Lawson, 2001 ). The participant was shown the eye-region of a face taken from a 
photograph. Each set of eyes was presented with 4 words or phrases arranged over 
each comer of the picture. Participants picked which of the four options best 
represented the feelings or thoughts shown by the set of eyes in the picture. A 
specially designed computer program presented the pictures and recorded responses. 
Participants used the mouse to click on one of the four mental state options that were 
displayed on the screen. The participants were shown 28 pictures in total. In the child 
version of this task, the language used is at a child's level (e.g., in the child version 
rather than an option of "preoccupied", the participant is presented with "thinking 
about something"), but the discriminations between the options are similar in 
difficulty to that of the adult version. The child version of the task was used in the 
present study to minimise the impact of the participants' language level on the results. 
Each participant was given a score of one for each correct response, which was 
summed to a possible total out of 28. 
Personal Details Questionnaire. The personal details questionnaire was used 
to provide a general description of participant backgrounds and demographics. The 
participants were asked about their age, gender, ethnicity, primary language, other 
languages spoken fluently, age when they first began to speak using two or more word 
sentences, number of siblings and current age of the siblings, who lived with them in 
their home prior to age 8, whether they attended kindergarten, day-care, or preschool 
and at what ages, parental employment prior to their age of 8 (whether they were 
fulltime or part-time), who was their main caregiver, their current education level, 
their occupation and their household income when they were growing up. The 
questions were chosen based on prior use by other researchers (MacDonald, 
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Uesiliana, & Hayne, 2000; Williams & Bonvillian, 1989; Weigle & Bauer, 2000; 
Bruce, Dolan, & Phillips-Grant, 2000; Mullen, 1994). A sample questionnaire is 
presented in Appendix E. 
Systemising Quotient and Empathising Quotient. A set of questions designed 
by Baron-Cohen, Richler, Bisarya, Gurunathan and Wheelwright (2003) yielded a 
systemising quotient (SQ) and an empathising quotient (EQ). The procedure was 
similar to that described in Study 2. Participants could score a maximum possible of 
80 on each questionnaire. Higher numbers indicated a great tendency towards 
systemising (SQ) or empathising (EQ). 
Faux Pas Task. The Faux- Pas task was designed by Baron-Cohen, O'Riordan, 
Stone, Jones and Plaisted (1999). In the original task, there were ten test stories and 
ten control stories; for the current study there were 8 stories comprising 6 test stories 
and two control stories. The procedure and coding is described fully in Study 2. A 
score of 1 was given for identifying the faux pas in each story for a possible total out 
of6. 
Second-Order False Belief Task. There were two second-order false belief 
stories. The first story was based on one used by Pemer, Kain and Barchfeld (2002). 
The second story was based on one used by Buitelaar, van der W ees, Swaab-
Bameveld and van der Gaag (1999). Each task involved a story with three drawings. 
The drawings were shown one at a time while the experimenter told the story. For the 
first story, participants were shown a picture of a boy and his mother. They were told, 
"This is a story about a boy called Peter. Peter's mum wants to surprise him with a 
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real puppy for his birthday. She wants it to be a surprise, so she tells him that he will 
get a toy for his birthday". The participants were then shown a picture of Peter with a 
puppy and told, "By accident, Peter finds the puppy hidden down in the basement 
without his mum finding out". The participants are then shown the final picture of 
Peter's mother and his grandmother talking on the phone. The participants are then 
told, "Peter's grandmother then called his mum to ask her whether Peter knows what 
he is getting for his birthday". The participants are then asked the first false belief 
question, "What will Peter's mum say? That he knows or he doesn't know?" The 
participants are then told, "Grandma then asks Peter's mum, 'What does Peter think 
he is getting for his birthday?" The participants were then asked the second false 
belief question, "What will Peter's mum say? Will she say that Peter thinks he is 
getting a toy or a dog?" The participants were then asked two further questions: a 
reality question, "Does Peter know that he will get a real puppy for his birthday?" and 
a belief question, "Does his mum know that Peter found the puppy in the basement?" 
For the second story the participants were shown a picture of three children 
and told, "After school Alice, Rachel, and Tom decide to go to the movies. Alice has 
to go home first to get her money. She tells Rachel and Tom that she will meet them 
at the theatre." The participants were then shown a picture of Rachel and Tom and 
were told, "Rachel and Tom go on to the theatre. When they get there, they have an 
argument about which movie to watch. Tom says he's leaving and is going to go to 
Time Out instead. Rachel stays and watches the movie." The participants were then 
shown a picture of Tom and Alice and were told, "When Tom is on his way to Time 
Out, he bumps into Alice. He says, 'Come on Alice, lets go to Time Out' 'Sure' said 
Alice." The participants were then asked four questions. First they were asked the 
false belief question along with a justification question, "What does Rachel think 
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Alice is going to after school? Movies or Time Out? Why?" The participants were 
then asked the reality question, "What is Alice going to do?" and the belief question, 
"Does Rachel know that Tom talked to Alice in town?" Finally the participants were 
asked a memory question, "At the start, where were the children going to go? To the 
movies or Time Out?" For the first story participants were given a score of one for 
each correctly answered false belief question, and for the second story the participants 
were given a score of one for correctly answering the false belief question and a score 
of one for correctly answering the justification question yielding a maximum total 
score of four. 
Early Memory Recall. Participants were asked to describe their earliest 
memory in as much detail as possible. Once they had finished free recall, they were 
prompted for details that had not previously been given. The participant was asked 
about their age at the time of the memory, how they determined what their age was, 
who was present at the time, where the memory took place and what they think made 
that particular memory distinctive or memorable. Participants were also asked 
whether they had discussed the memory with others before, and if so, how often they 
had discussed the memory. They were asked how they felt at the time and finally were 
asked to give the memory an emotional rating (i.e., how much emotion was involved 
at the time) using a rating scale where 1 meant there was not much emotion involved 
and 5 indicated that the memory was full of emotion. This questioning process was 
followed for another two of the participants' early memories. Once participants had 
described three of their earliest memories, they were asked to describe a recent 
personal memory - something that had happened to them in the last three or four 
years. If the participants asked for clarification, they were given examples of a high 
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school ball, graduation, or wedding. The memory interview was audio-taped and later 
transcribed verbatim for coding. 
The coding of the memories was based on that used by Fivush, Gray, and 
Fromhoff (1987) and Weigle and Bauer (2000). Initially, the transcripts were parsed 
into clauses. A clause consisted of one verb. If the participant listed a set of objects, 
credit was given for each object mentioned. Current evaluations about the event were 
not coded; only information that was remembered from that time was coded. Any 
information that was repeated was only counted once. Statements such as "I don't 
remember" or "I don't know" were not coded. When the sentence contained 
"because" or "to" it was parsed into two separate clauses. 
Once the memory narratives had been parsed into clauses, they were coded for 
their content. One clause could contain more than one category of information (e.g., 
location and person). Most of the content categories were based on Fivush, Gray, and 
Fromhoff (1987). The information was coded as Location when the participant 
specified when or where an event occurred (e.g., Christmas, at the beach, on a 
Saturday) or details about the participant's age at the time. Any mention of a person 
other than the participant themselves (e.g., mum, dad, or friends) was coded as 
Person. The use of pronouns (e.g., them) was not coded. When an object involved in 
the event was mentioned it was coded as an Object this category included any 
mention of animate objects such as animals and cartoon characters. An activity or 
action that occurred was coded as Activity. This included the mention of any verb 
except the verbs "to be", "was" and "have". These verbs were counted as Attributes. 
Also included in the category of attributes were any adjectives, adverbs and modifiers 
(e.g., big dog, or three cats). This category also included any information that added 
detail to the memory (e.g., it was a rainy day). 
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The following two categories (Words and Thoughts) were based on the coding 
scheme used by Weigle and Bauer (2000). The participants' recall of thoughts at the 
time of the event was coded as Thoughts (e.g., decided, thinking/ thought, worries, 
wishing, realised). Also the verbatim recall of words spoken at the time of the event 
either by the participant or someone else present was coded as Words. Recall of the 
gist of a conversation was not included in this category. The final content category 
was Emotions, which includes the mention of any emotion that was felt at the time 
(e.g. happy, sad, and also included laughing and crying). This category was added to 
be consistent with previous coding done by the researcher. The three earliest 
memories and the recent memory were all coded using these categories. 
More detail was coded for the earliest memory. The age in months at the time 
of the memory was recorded. If the participant simply said the year then it was 
counted as half way through that year (e.g., 3 years was coded as 42- months). The 
participants were also asked how they determined how old they were at the time. 
Their responses were separated into 8 categories based on Mullen (1994). The 8 
categories were: 1) That it was a datable event (e.g., birthday or Christmas) or there 
was a datable photograph, 2) That it took place at a house or location that the 
participant had moved from later (e.g., kindergarten or moved house), 3) That it 
involved a person that was only known at that particular time or the absence of 
someone (e.g., before a sibling was born), 4) The participants just remember how old 
they were, 5) Others had told them their age, 6) The participant had an image of how 
old they were at the time, 7) It was a guess, and 8) Another explanation. 
The participants were also asked whether they had discussed the memory with 
others, this information was separated into three categories: 1) No, they had never 
discussed the memory before, 2) Yes, they had discussed if before but only once or 
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twice, and 3) Yes, they had discussed it a few times or more. The early memories 
were also coded for whether the valence of the memory was positive or negative 
overall and what was the main emotion the participant felt at the time. 
A quarter of the transcripts were independently coded by a second researcher. 
The overall Cronbach's alpha for categories coded and used in the analyses was .866. 
The intra-class correlations ranged from .759 to .979. 
Procedure 
After participants had read and signed the informed consent form, they were 
given the Faux Pas task. Participants then completed Emotion-Context, Emotion 
Vignette and the Eyes Task presented on a computer. Participants were given the two 
second-order false belief tasks, followed by the personal details questionnaire. The 
participants were then asked to give as much detail as possible about their earliest 
memory, two other early memories and a recent memory. Following the memory 
interview participants were given the SQ and EQ to complete. Throughout the entire 
sessions the experimenter remained in the room and was available to answer any 




The mean, minimum and, maximum scores, and standard deviations for each 
of the tasks are presented in Table 5.1. Composite scores for emotion understanding 
and theory of mind were used in some of the analyses. The emotion composite was 
obtained by summing across the emotion attribution task, the emotion context task 
and the eyes task. A higher score indicates a greater level of emotion understanding. 
Theory of mind composite scores were obtained by summing across the theory of 
mind tasks; the second order false belief task, and the faux pas task. A higher score 
indicates a greater theory of mind understanding. 
Table 5.1 
Range, Means and Standard Deviations for Theory of Mind Tasks 
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Emotion Context - only 13 24 19.84 2.38 
Emotion Context - face 16 24 21.21 1.92 
77 
Emotion Attribution 16 26 21.30 2.06 
Second Order False Belief 2 4 3.92 .34 
Eyes Task 13 26 20.66 2.74 
Faux Pas 2 6 5.34 .88 
Baron- Cohen SQ 3 54 26.49 11.31 
Baron- Cohen EQ 21 71 43.74 11.41 
Age in years 18.42 34.25 20.62 5.14 
191 
Gender differences in task performance were assessed using independent t-
tests. A t-test was also performed on participant age. Means and standard errors for 
each gender are presented in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2 
Mean Task Performance and Standard Errors for Women and Men 
Tasks Gender N Mean Standard Error 
* Emotion Context- only Male 35 19.23 .43 
Female 38 20.39 .35 
* Emotion Context + face Male 35 20.74 .35 
Female 38 21.63 .28 
Emotion Attribution Male 35 20.89 .38 
Female 38 21.68 .28 
Second Order False Belief Male 35 3.86 .07 
Female 38 3.97 .03 
Eyes Task Male 35 20.66 .46 
Female 38 20.66 .43 
Faux Pas- test Male 35 5.26 .17 
Female 38 5.42 .12 
**Systemising Quotient Male 35 30.91 1.86 
Female 38 22.42 1.63 
* Empathising Quotient Male 35 40.37 1.67 
Female 38 46.84 1.83 
Age Male 35 21.15 .53 
Female 38 20.15 .37 
*p < .05, **p <.01 
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Women had significantly higher scores than did men on the emotion context-
only and the emotion context+ face tasks (t (71) = 2.12, p < .05 and t (71) = 2.01, p < 
.05 respectively). Whereas men had significantly higher scores on the systemising 
quotient (SQ) questionnaire than did women (t (71) = 3.45, p < .01), women scored 
significantly higher on the empathising quotient (EQ) questionnaire than did men (t 
(71) = 2.60 p < .05). There were no other significant gender differences. 
Correlation Analyses 
This next section reports associations between the various tasks used in this 
study. First Pearson product correlations were computed between the different 
emotion tasks and between the different theory of mind tasks. They were then done 
between the theory of mind and emotion tasks and finally were computed with various 
tasks and the SQ and EQ. 
Correlations Between Emotion Based Tasks. Performance on the emotion 
context- only and emotion context + face sections of the emotion context task were 
significantly correlated. In addition, performance on the emotion context- face task 
was significantly correlated with performance on the emotion attribution task. Scores 
on the eyes task were significantly correlated with both the emotion context only and 
emotion context + face task. There were no significant correlation between emotion 
attribution and eyes task performance. These correlations are shown in Table 5.3. 
There was also a significant correlation between the participant's age and their eyes 
task performance (r = .372,p < .01). 
Table 5.3 




































* p < .05, ** p < .01 
Correlations between Theory of Mind Tasks. Performance on the faux pas 
task and the second order false belief task were significantly correlated as shown in 
Table 5.3. 
Correlations between Theory of Mind Tasks and Emotion Tasks. There was a 
significant correlation between the faux pas task and the emotion context- only task. 
Similarly, there was also a significant correlation between the emotion context- only 
task and the theory of mind composite (r = .237, p < .05). No other correlations were 
significant. These correlations are shown in Table 5.3. There was also no significant 
correlation between a composite of theory of mind tasks and an emotion composite (r 
= .159, ns). 
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Correlations with the Empathising Quotient. The empathising quotient was 
significantly correlated with the emotion context-only task, but not the other three 
emotion tasks. The empathising quotient was also significantly correlated with the 
emotion composite scores. The empathising quotient was significantly correlated with 
the two theory of mind tasks. Performance on the second order false belief task was 
correlated with the empathising quotient and performance on the faux pas task was 
correlated with the empathising quotient. The theory of mind composite was also 
correlated with the empathising quotient. The correlations are shown in Table 5.4. 
Correlations with the Systemising Quotient. The systemising quotient was not 
significantly correlated with any of the theory of mind tasks or the emotion tasks. The 
correlations are shown in Table 5.4. There was also no correlation between 
systemising and empathising scores. 
Table 5.4 
Correlations with Empathising and Systemising Quotients 
Empathising Quotient Systemising Quotient 
Emotion Context- Only .255* .090 
Emotion Context +Face .198 -.032 
Emotion Attribution .160 -.088 
Eyes task .140 .046 
Emotion composite .274* -.005 
Second Order False Belief .282* -.096 
Faux Pas .272* .043 
Theory of Mind composite .322** .007 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Siblings. Due to the low number of participants who had no siblings, 
comparisons could not be made between the theory of mind abilities, emotion 
understanding and autobiographical memory of participants with and without siblings. 
Autobiographical Memory. I was interested in the relation between early 
autobiographical memories and the participants' theory of mind, emotion 
understanding, and recall of a recent memory. Gender effects on the amount recalled, 
content recalled and age at recall were investigated for the three early memories and 
recent memory using independent t-tests. There was a significant gender difference in 
the amount of activities recalled for the earliest memory, with women recalling more 
than men (4.97 vs. 3.46) (t (71) = 1.992, p < .05). The women also recalled more 
words in their earliest memory than did men (.32 vs .. 03) (t (71) = 2.245, p < .05). 
There were no further significant gender differences in the three early memories for 
any of the content recalled, total pieces of information recalled, or age at recall. For 
recent memories there was one significant gender difference. The women's narratives 
more frequently mentioned other people than did the men's narratives (1.43 vs .. 57) (t 
(70) = 2.793,p < .01). 
Pearson product correlations were completed between the amount recalled and 
performance on the theory of mind tasks and emotion tasks, and the empathising and 
systemising quotients. The results are shown in Table 5.5. There was a significant 
negative correlation between the emotion context- only task and the amount recalled 
for the earliest memory. There were no other significant correlations between theory 
of mind, emotion understanding, and early or recent memory recall. 
r 
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Correlations were also completed to investigate the relation between 
the amount of emotions and thoughts recalled in early memories and theory of mind 
and emotion understanding. None of these were significant. In addition, correlations 
between theory of mind and emotion understanding and the amount of thoughts and 
emotions recalled for recent memories were conducted. There was a significant 
negative correlation between theory of mind understanding and the amount of 
emotions recalled for the recent memory (r = -.297, p < .05). There was also a 
significant negative correlation between theory of mind understanding and the amount 
of thoughts recalled for the recent memory (r = -.367, p < .01). There were no 
significant correlations between emotion understanding and the amount of thoughts 
and emotions mentioned in the participant's recent memories. 
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Table 5.5 
Correlations with Amount Recalled for Early and Recent Memories 
Earliest Childhood Recent 
Memory Memories Memory 
Emotion -.241 * -.006 .089 
Context- Only 
Emotion -.189 -.011 .123 
Context +Face 
Emotion -.041 -.100 .198 
Attribution 
Eyes Task -.112 .097 -.011 
Emotion -.208 -.049 .129 
Composite 
Second Order .048 .013 .062 
False Belief 
Faux Pas -.073 -.037 -.069 
Theory of Mind -.048 -.029 -.042 
composite 
Empathising .035 -.034 .222 
Quotient 
Systemising -.070 -.043 -.157 
Quotient 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
A Univariate analysis of variance was done to investigate whether there was a 
difference in the amount recalled as an effect of the emotion felt at the time. The 
emotions were coded as 7 categories, happy, sad, scared, excited/fun, angry, 
pain/sore, and other. There was no significant effect of emotion felt and amount 
recalled for any of the early memories. The early memories were also separated into 
two categories depending on the valence of the memory (positive or negative). 
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Independent t- tests were conducted to investigate the effect of valence on the amount 
recalled. There was a significant difference in the amount recalled for positive (11.44) 
and negative events (15. 69) for the earliest memory (t (65) = 2.170, p < .05) with 
more being recalled for negative events. There were no significant differences in the 
amount recalled as an effect of the valence of the memory for later childhood 
memories. There was also no effect ofvalence of the memory and age at the time for 
any of the early memories. 
I was interested in whether previously talking about the memory with others 
affected the amount recalled and whether the participants who had previously 
discussed the events had earlier memories. Univariate analyses of variance were 
conducted to investigate the effect. There were no differences in the amount recalled 
or the age of the participant at the time for those who had not previously discussed the 
memory, those who had discussed it once or twice and those who had discussed a few 
times or more. 
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Discussion 
The first question my study aimed to answer was whether there are gender 
differences in adults' autobiographical memory. Previous studies have yielded mixed 
results for gender differences in autobiographical memory. Unlike Macdonald et al. 
(2000), who found that women provided lengthier and more detailed memories than 
males, the current study did not find gender differences in the length of the early 
memory narratives. Women, however, did mention conversations and activities more 
frequently than did the men. There have also been mixed results for the gender 
differences in the age of onset of early memories. Whereas Mullen (1994) found small 
or marginal effects of gender in two of her studies, MacDonald et al. (2000) found 
that Asian women had significantly later early memories than did Asian men. In the 
current study there were no gender differences in the onset of autobiographical 
memory. 
The second question the current study aimed to answer was whether there are 
gender differences in adult's theory of mind understanding. Baron-Cohen and his 
colleagues have found superior performance by females over males on the reading the 
mind in the eyes task and the faux pas task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; 1999; 2001). In 
another study on theory of mind understanding in adults, Sullivan and Ruffman 
(2004a) did not find a gender difference using the strange stories task. In the current 
study our results were concurrent with Sullivan and Ruffman. There were no gender 
differences on any of the theory of mind tasks completed by the adults. 
The third hypothesis of the current study was that there would be a gender 
difference in the adult's emotion understanding, and that the females would have a 
superior emotion understanding. Gender differences in emotion understanding have 
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been found in favour of girls for labelling and explaining emotions when the children 
were 36- months- old (Dunn et al., 1991b). Sullivan and Ruffman (2004a) found a 
marginal superiority for adult females on an emotion labelling task. In the current 
study there was a gender difference found on the emotion context task; the women 
scored higher than the men on this task. However, there were no gender differences in 
emotion understanding on the eyes task or the emotion vignette task. When the tasks 
were combined for an overall emotion composite, there was no difference in the 
emotion understanding between men and women. The third hypothesis of this study 
was not fully supported. I have concluded that any gender differences in adults for 
emotion understanding are weak at best. 
The fourth hypothesis of this study was whether there is a relation between 
adult's theory of mind and emotion understanding. Hughes and Dunn (1998) found a 
relation between the children's affective perspective taking at 47 months of age and 
their theory of mind understanding at 60- months. Conversely Dunn (1995) did not 
find a relation between children's theory of mind at 40 months of age and their 
emotion understanding at 33 months of age. No studies to date have investigated the 
relation between theory of mind and emotion understanding in adults. Lawrence, 
Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen and David (2004) found a relation between a 
questionnaire measuring empathy (the EQ) and the participants' scores on the reading 
the mind in the eyes task (which they considered to be a theory of mind task). It was 
hypothesised that there are links between the adult's theory of mind and emotion 
understanding. The current results did not support this hypothesis; there was no 
relation between the adults' theory of mind and their emotion understanding. Also, 
unlike Lawrence et al. (2004) there was no relation between the EQ scores and the 
participants' scores on the reading the mind in the eyes task. 
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The final question that I aimed to answer was that there would be a relation 
between the adult's theory of mind understanding and their autobiographical memory. 
Theory of mind understanding and autobiographical memory have been associated in 
children. Welch- Ross (1997) found a relation between children's talk about the past 
with their mothers and the children's theory of mind understanding. In another study 
(Reese & Cleveland, 2006), no such relation was found between the children's 
implicit or explicit theory of mind understanding and their past narratives with their 
mothers. The results of this study, in line with Reese and Cleveland's findings, show 
that there was no relation between the adult's theory of mind understanding and the 
recall of their early memories. It may be that the relation is only found when theory of 
mind and autobiographical memories are being developed, and that once a certain 
level of attainment has been reached there is no longer a link between the two 
abilities. In other words the representational abilities required for theory of mind 
might facilitate the development of autobiographical memories, but once these are 
established, differences in theory of mind might have little bearing on the likelihood 
of accessing those early memories. 
There were substantial differences m the theory of mind understanding 
between adult individuals. Even after first and second order false belief understanding 
have been attained, individual's theory of mind understanding continues to develop, 
and individual differences in understanding can be found. This study shows that 
theory of mind and emotion understanding should not be considered as an all- or-
none ability, they are changing throughout the lifespan. Little research has been done 
on theory of mind and emotion understanding in normal developing adults, but this 
current study has shown that further assessment of theory of mind abilities into 
adolescence and adulthood should be undertaken. Considering the consistent relations 
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that have been found between theory of mind understanding and individual's 
acceptance by peers (e.g., Slaughter et al., 2002) theory of mind research should be 
continued into adulthood. Future research could investigate the relation between 
theory of mind understanding and an adult's ability to maintain relationships with 
others and success in the workplace. 
In the current study there was considerable variation in the understanding of 
emotions and theory of mind abilities, despite the very homogenous sample used. All 
the participants in the current study were undertaking some form of tertiary study. 
There was also very little variation in the ages of the participants. In the future, studies 
could investigate theory of mind and emotion understanding in individuals from a 
wider range of educational backgrounds and ages. Sullivan and Ruffman (2004a, 
2004b) have researched theory of mind and emotion understanding in elderly 
populations, and Baron-Cohen and his colleagues have researched theory of mind in 
adult populations as a comparison to their adult participants with autism, but overall 
little investigation has been done on these abilities in adults (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 




Theory of Mind and Autobiographical Memory 
Both Pemer and Welch-Ross have proposed links between children's theory of 
mind and autobiographical memory. Pemer (2000b) proposed that it was not until 
children understand representations (or theory of mind) that they can form 
autobiographical memories. Welch-Ross (1995) had a similar proposal. However, she 
proposed an implicit understanding of representation was required rather than an 
explicit representational understanding as Pemer posited. Some studies have found a 
relation between theory of mind and autobiographical memory. Pemer and Ruffman 
(1995) found a relation between children's knowledge of experiential awareness and 
their free recall. Similarly, Welch-Ross (1997) investigated the link between theory of 
mind and the children's past event talk between 3 Yz and 4 Y2 years. She found a 
positive relation between the children's theory of mind understanding and their 
memory responses even after the children's linguistic abilities and age had been 
controlled for. In addition, a study by Naito (2003) investigated the relation between 
memory and theory of mind in a Japanese sample of children between 4 and 7 years 
of age. Naito found a relation between theory of mind and memory performance, 
however, once the children's age had been controlled for, the relation was only found 
in the 6- year- olds between the representational change task and their source 
memories. Naito's results cast doubt on the claim made by Pemer that "one cognitive 
ability (i.e., theory of mind in general) precedes and underlies (i.e., episodic memory); 
instead, they [Naito's results] suggest that in late preschool years, children's episodic 
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memory and a component of theory of mind are grounded on a common subjective 
aspect ofrecollective experience" (p. 333). 
The current studies found no relation between theory of mind understanding 
and autobiographical memory in children and adults. In the first study, the children's 
theory of mind understanding at all three time points was not related to their recall of 
a laboratory event experienced six months previously or the amount of elaboration the 
children provided during past discussions with their mothers. In the second study, the 
children's amount of elaborative talk was not associated with their theory of mind 
understanding. And in the final, adult study, there was no relation found between the 
amount recalled for any of the three early childhood memories or the recent memory 
and theory of mind understanding. The results do not support the relation between 
theory of mind and autobiographical memory proposed by Pemer and Welch-Ross. 
It is possible that I did not find a relation because of limitations in the tasks 
that were currently used, although I used a variety of theory of mind tasks in the three 
studies. It may that the coding and measurement of autobiographical memory was not 
adequate. In the first and second study, the children's autobiographical recall was 
measured during conversations with their mothers, during which the children did not 
provide a lot of information. Reese has found that the more elaborative a mother is 
during conversations with their children the more the children recall about the event at 
a later date (Reese et al., 1993). A relation may have been detected between theory of 
mind and autobiographical recall if the child had been questioned at a later date on an 
event that they had previously discussed with their mothers. Also, it may be that 
mother's elaboration is a mediator between the children's theory of mind and 
autobiographical memory, for how elaborative a mother is during conversations has 
been shown to influence both of these abilities (Nelson & Fivush, 2004; Reese & 
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Cleveland, 2006). The children's language abilities may also be a strong mediator 
between theory of mind understanding and autobiographical memory. 
Theory of Mind and Emotion Understanding 
Some researchers have used theory of mind and emotion understanding as 
interchangeable cognitive abilities, often inclosing both abilities under the term 'social 
understanding'. Ruffman, Baron-Cohen and their colleagues often use emotion 
recognition tasks in studies on theory of mind understanding (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al, 
1997b, 2001b; Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006). In a longitudinal study by Dunn et al. 
( 1991 b), no relation was found between the children's performance on an affective 
perspective taking task at 33 months and their false belief understanding at 40 months. 
Conversely to this result, Hughes and Dunn (1998) found a relation between emotion 
understanding and theory of mind understanding in an older sample of children. They 
found that the children's performance on an affective perspective task at 47- months 
predicted their theory of mind understanding at 60 months of age. A relation between 
theory of mind and emotion understanding has also been found concurrently in four-
year- olds. Cutting and Dunn (1999) found a relation between theory of mind and 
affective perspective taking even after the children's language abilities were 
controlled for. 
The results of the current studies are consistent with the previous research that 
found a relationship between theory of mind and emotion understanding. In the first 
study, the children's theory of mind and emotion understanding was related in five of 
the possible six correlations. The only non-significant correlation was between the 
children's theory of mind understanding at 42- months and their emotion 
understanding a year later at 54- months. The relation between theory of mind and 
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emotion understanding existed once the children's language abilities were controlled 
for in only two of the six correlations. In the second study, the children's theory of 
mind and emotion understanding were also correlated with each other, but the 
correlation was no longer significant once the children's language abilities had been 
partialed out. It appears that language may be a strong contributor to the relations seen 
between theory of mind and emotion understanding. The third study was the only 
study not to find a reliable relation between theory of mind and emotion 
understanding. Only one of the six possible correlations between the theory of mind 
tasks and emotion tasks was significant. It could be concluded from the current 
studies that theory of mind and emotion understanding may be related but distinct 
abilities. It is possible that language may act as a mediator for this relationship. 
The Effects of Language 
Theory of Mind and Language. The current studies attempted to address the 
relation between theory of mind and language. In Study 1, there were strong 
correlations between the children's theory of mind abilities at 42-, 48-, and 54-
months of age and their language abilities at 42- and 48- months of age. It appears that 
language abilities are influencing theory of mind understanding. The children's 
language at 42 months was related to their later theory of mind understanding, 
however, their theory of mind understanding at 42- months was not related to their 
later language abilities at 48- months. The relation between language and theory of 
mind was also found in the second study; the two abilities were highly correlated. Due 
to the cross-sectional nature of the second study, directionality was not established. 
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Many studies have found a relationship between language and theory of mind. 
Jenkins and Astington (1996) found a relation between the children's general 
language abilities and their false belief understanding. Interestingly, they found that it 
was not until the children reached a linguistic ability equivalent to a 49- month- old 
that they began to pass false belief tasks. This age is consistent with the age that most 
children begin to show theory of mind understanding. Astington and Jenkins (1999) 
found that children's early language abilities were related to their later theory of mind 
understanding, but the reverse relation did not exist; children's early theory of mind 
understanding was not related to their later language abilities. Ruffman et al. (2003) 
also found a longitudinal relation between the child's early language abilities and their 
theory of mind understanding two and a half years later. The results from the current 
studies are consistent with the results of Jenkins and Astington (1996, 1999) and 
Ruffman et al. (2003), in that there was a longitudinal relation between the children's 
language abilities at 42- months and their theory of mind understanding a year later at 
54 months of age. Relations between language abilities and theory of mind 
understanding were also concurrent. 
Emotion Understanding and Language. A link has been established between 
emotion understanding and language. In the current studies a relation was found 
between the children's language abilities and their emotion understanding. In the first 
study, all four of the possible correlations were significant. In the second study, 
children's emotion composite scores were significantly correlated with the children's 
language abilities. The current results extend previous findings that emotion 
understanding and language were related (Dunn & Cutting, 1999) even after the 
children's age had been controlled for (Pons et al., 2003). 
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Autobiographical Memory and Language. To my knowledge there has been 
little research on the relation between the amount of talk children provide about 
previously experienced events and their language abilities, although logically one 
would expect that the children's ability to talk about the past would be reliant on their 
language abilities. A study by Simcock and Hayne (2002) found that when recalling a 
past event, the children only used the words that had been part of their productive 
vocabulary at the time of the event, even though at the time of recall their language 
abilities had improved. Harley and Reese ( 1999) found a relation between the 
children's language abilities at 19- months and their shared memory elaborations at 
19-, 25- and 32- months. In the cunent studies there were mixed results for a relation 
between autobiographical memory and language abilities. In the first study, the 
amount of elaboration the children used (which has been used in previous studies -
e.g., Harley & Reese, 1999 - as a measure of their autobiographical recall) during 
conversation about past events with their mothers was related to the children's 
language abilities at 42- months, but there was no relation once the children were 48 
months of age. The strongest evidence of a relation between the children's language 
abilities and their autobiographical memory comes from the significant relation found 
between the children's language abilities at 42- months and the amount they recalled 6 
months later about a laboratory event experienced at 48- months. In the second study 
there was no relation between the children's use of elaboration during past event 
conversations with their mothers and their language abilities. The result of the second 
study is consistent with the results of the first study. There was no relation between 
the children's autobiographical memory and language abilities once the children were 
older than 48- months. One possibility for the lack of relation between the children's 
209 
use of elaboration and their language abilities may be that the children's use of 
elaboration would be influenced by the mother's use of elaboration. It may be that 
mothers, who are highly elaborate during past conversations with their children, 
provide most of the information about the event and therefore there is little 
information for the children left to provide. It maybe that if the conversations took 
place with a conversational partner who was not familiar with the events that took 
place, the children would be able to provide more elaborative information that would 
be highly related to their language abilities. This is an avenue for future research. 
The Effects of Maternal Talk 
Theory of Mind and Maternal Talk. The current studies also addressed 
whether a relationship existed between the children's theory of mind understanding 
and the mothers' use of mental state talk. In the first study, three of the possible six 
correlations between the mothers' use of mental state language (e.g., think, know, 
remember) and the children's theory of mind understanding were significant. The 
mothers' use of mental state language when the children were 42 months old was 
related to the children's later theory of mind understanding at 54- months. Also the 
mothers' use of mental state language at 48- months was significantly related to their 
children's theory of mind understanding at 48- and 54- months of age. A relation was 
also found between the mothers' elaborative talk during past event conversations 
when the children were 42 months of age and the children's theory of mind at 54-
months. Concurrent relations were also found between the amount of maternal desire 
talk at 42- months and children's theory of mind at 42- months. The results show that 
the mother's use of mental state language was more likely to relate to the children's 
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theory of mind than the mothers' use of desire and emotion state terms. In the second 
study there were no significant relations between the mother's use of mental, 
emotional or desire state terms, or their use of elaboration during past event 
conversations and the children's theory of mind understanding. The results from the 
first study are consistent with previous research. Taumoepeau and Ruffman (2006) 
found that mothers' mental state talk that was mainly desire talk, when the child was 
15- months- old, was related to children's emotion understanding 9 months later. A 
relation between mental state use and theory of mind has also been established in 
older children. Ruffman et al. (2002) found that mothers' mental state talk, when 
children were three years of age, contributed to the children's theory of mind 
understanding up to a year later. Peterson and Slaughter (2003) found that mothers, 
who preferred to use elaborative mental state explanations when explaining a situation 
to their children, had children with more sophisticated theory of mind understanding. 
One possible explanation for the inconsistent results between the two current 
studies may be that only 5 to 10 minutes of conversation between the mother and 
child were recorded, and were not recorded in a natural setting (although every 
possible measure was taken to try and make the children and their parents feel 'at 
home'). The small samples of conversation taken were also restricted to talk about 
past events. It may be that the influence of maternal talk is greater during 
conversations where the mother is explaining the current situational determinants to 
the child, allowing the child a clearer picture of the relation between their own 
thoughts and another's. However, talk about past events has been proposed to be a 
prime opportunity for the child to learn that others have different views of the same 
situation. It is through talk about past events that the child may learn that another's 
recall or beliefs about the event differed to their own, through past event talk there is 
211 
opportunity to compare 'stories' about the event (Fivush, 1998). The fact that we did 
find correlations with such small samples of conversations shows that the effect of 
maternal mental state language on theory of mind performance may be a real effect. 
Emotion Understanding and Maternal Talk. Researchers have proposed that 
children's emotion understanding is 'scaffolded' during conversations with their 
parents (Cervantes & Callanan, 1998; Lagattuta & Wellman, 2002). Several studies 
have found a relation between the amount of emotion talk mothers' used during 
conversations and the children's emotion understanding. Dunn et al. ( 1991 b) found 
mother-child talk about emotions was related to the children's affective perspective 
taking abilities 7 months later. Similarly, Dunn et al. (1991a) found better emotion 
understanding in 6 year old children whose families had discussed emotions more 
frequently when the children were 3 years old. Denham et al. (1997) found that both 
the parent's and children's talk of emotions was related to the children's emotion 
understanding. Mothers who made emotions salient (by talking about them) during 
conflicts when the child was 30- months, had children with better emotion 
understanding 6 months later. 
In the first study, there was no relation between the mothers' emotion talk at 
42- and 48- months and the children's emotion understanding at 48- and 54- months. 
There was also no relation between the mothers' elaborative talk and the children's 
emotion understanding. Only one aspect of maternal talk was related to the children's 
emotion understanding. There was a concurrent relation between the mother's mental 
state use during past conversations at 48- months and the children's emotion 
understanding at 48- months. In the second study, no aspect of the mothers' talk 
(elaborative, mental state talk, emotion talk, and talk about desires) during past event 
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conversations was related to children's emotion understanding. I concluded that there 
was no reliable relation between the maternal talk and the children's emotion 
understanding, which conflicts with the previous research. One possible explanation 
for the lack of relation found between maternal talk and the children's emotion 
understanding is again the small sample of talk that was measured. The mothers were 
permitted to talk for as long as they or the child was willing to participate in the 
conversations, however, the conversations were only between five and ten minutes in 
length. If a larger sample of mother-child talk was taken, there may have been a 
relation found. It is also possible that past event talk about emotions does effectively 
scaffold emotion understanding as efficiently as cunent talk about emotions, where 
the emotion the child is experiencing is salient. During talk about cunent emotions 
there will be a direct link between the emotion the child is experiencing and the 
emotion the mother is discussing. Whereas, during past event talk the emotion the 
mother is discussing may be incongruent with the cunent situation (i.e., the child may 
be happy, but talking about a previously sad event) therefore, there may not be a 
direct link between the emotion felt and the emotion being discussed by the mother-
child dyad. 
Maternal Elaboration and Autobiographical Memory. Previous studies have 
found a strong link between the amount of elaboration a mother provides during 
conversations with their children and the children's later recall. Reese et al. (1993) 
found that children of highly elaborate mothers recalled more up to 12 months later. A 
similar study by Leichtman et al. (2000) found that children with highly elaborate 
mothers had more accurate and detailed recall of an event three weeks later. In the 
first study there were strong correlations between the mother's use of elaboration and 
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children's use of elaboration concurrently, but not across time. The mother's use of 
elaboration at 42- months was not related to their children's use of elaboration at 48-
months. Also the mother's use of elaboration was not significantly correlated with 
their children's recall at 54- months of the laboratory event experienced 6 months 
previously. Similar to the first study, in the second study, there was a strong 
concurrent correlation between the children's and mothers' elaboration. 
Gender Differences 
Gender Differences in Theory of Mind Understanding. One factor that has 
been inconsistently related to theory of mind understanding is gender. In the first 
study there were no differences in performance on any of the theory of mind tasks for 
girls and boys at any of the three time points. Similar results were obtained in the 
adult study. There were no differences in performance on the faux pas or the second 
order false belief task for men and women. The only study to find a gender difference 
in theory of mind understanding was the second study. In this study the girls 
outperformed the boys on the theory of mind tasks. This was no longer significant 
once the children's language abilities were controlled for. Previous findings have been 
inconsistent with regards to gender differences in theory of mind understanding. If 
gender differences are found they show that females outperform males. Charman et al. 
(2002) found that girls outperformed boys on unexpected contents and unexpected 
location tasks using post-hoc analysis on data sets from over a thousand children 
between the ages of 2 and 6 years. In older populations Baron-Cohen has found 
gender differences using different tasks - the faux pas task (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1999), and the reading the mind in the eyes task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997a; 2001b). 
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The effect of gender on theory of mind is often weak if it is found and is not as strong 
a predictor as the children's age (Charman et al., 2002). Dunn et al. (199lb) did not 
find any differences between the genders on a false belief task with 40 month old 
children. Al-Hilawani et al. (2002) also did not find a difference between genders in 
third graders. One possible explanation for not finding a gender difference in the 
current studies may be due to the small numbers of participants used, so the weak 
gender effect did not show. Together, these findings suggest a very weak gender 
difference, at best, in theory of mind abilities. 
Gender Differences in Emotion Understanding. Some studies have found 
gender differences in the emotion understanding in children and adults. When gender 
differences have been found they have been in the direction of females having a better 
emotion understanding than males. In the current studies, there were gender 
differences found in emotion understanding between males and females. In the first 
study, girls showed higher scores on the emotion composite at 48- months than boys. 
The difference was no longer significant, however, once the children's language 
abilities were controlled for. In the second study, there was also a significant gender 
difference found. The girls significantly outperformed the boys on the emotion tasks. 
Again this difference was no longer significant once the children's language abilities 
had been controlled for. The results of the first two studies are consistent with those of 
Dunn et al. (199b), who found that girls were better than boys at labeling and 
explaining emotions. Cutting and Dunn (1999) also found a trend towards a gender 
difference in emotion understanding for girls and boys, but it did not reach 
significance. In the adult study, the gender difference between men and women 
approached significance, with the women showing higher emotion understanding than 
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the men. The result of the third study is consistent with those found by Sullivan and 
Ruffman (2004a), who found that women marginally outperformed men on an 
emotion labeling task. In contrast, Baron-Cohen (2003) presents emotion 
understanding as a clear domain for gender differences. 
Gender Differences in Autobiographical Memory. In the current studies there 
were no differences found between the autobiographical memories of the males and 
females. In the first study, there were no differences between girls and boys in the 
amount of elaboration they provided during past conversations with their mothers. 
There was also no difference between the girls and boys in the amount recalled for the 
laboratory event. There were similar findings in the second study. There were no 
differences in the children's elaboration during conversations about the past with their 
mothers for the boys and girls. These results are consistent with those found by Harley 
and Reese (1999), who did not find any difference in the amount of children's 
memory elaborations for girls and boys. Conversely, Reese et al. (1996) found a 
gender difference in the amount of memory information the children provided during 
conversations with their mothers, fathers and an experimenter. The girls provided 
more memory information than the boys. 
In the third study, with the adults, there was also no difference between the 
men and women in the detail of their earliest memories. There was also no difference 
in the age of their earliest memories for men and women. The results of the adult 
study are inconsistent with the findings of Davis (1999), who found that women were 
able to recall more early memories, at a faster rate, and they also provided more 
emotion detail in their early memories. Gender differences in autobiographical recall 
were also found for the amount of distinct one-time events recalled, with women 
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recalling more umque events than men (Wang, 2001). One possibility for the 
differences found between the current research and previOus research on 
autobiographical memory in adults may be the measures used. The studies that did 
find gender differences measured different aspects of autobiographical memory (e.g., 
number of early memories, and the time it took to recall the memories) than the 
current study, which asked the adult participants to provide only three early memories. 
A study that did ask the participants for the date and detail of their early memories 
(Wang, 2004) did not find gender differences in the amount recalled or the age of the 
earliest memories between men and women. Therefore, it may be that gender 
differences are only found on some aspects of autobiographical recall, which is an 
avenue for future research. 
The Effects of Siblings 
Sibling effects on Theory of Mind. Some previous studies have found a relation 
between children's theory of mind understanding and the number of siblings the child 
has. In the first study, there was no relation between the children's theory of mind and 
the number of siblings the children have. There was also no difference on theory of 
mind performance from having older or younger siblings. This result was also 
consistent with the findings of the second study. The children's theory of mind 
understanding was not related to the number of siblings the child had, and whether 
these siblings were older or younger. In the third study, there were not enough 
participants without siblings to do any comparisons between the number of siblings 
the adult had and their theory of mind understanding. However, I would not have 
expected siblings to have an effect on an adult's theory of mind understanding. It was 
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expected that having siblings would influence children's developing theory of mind 
understanding, and that the influence would no longer exist once theory of mind was 
firmly understood. It has been found that conflict between siblings may encourage 
theory of mind understanding. Foote and Holmes-Lonergan (2003) found that children, 
who used other-oriented arguments that took into consideration the other siblings 
interests during conflict, had better theory of mind understanding. The current results 
are inconsistent with previous findings. Pemer et al. (1994) found that children with 
more siblings showed better theory of mind understanding and whether the siblings 
were older or younger did not make a difference. Ruffman et al. (1998) found that 
having older but not younger siblings was related to theory of mind understanding. 
Sibling Effects on Autobiographical Memory. The effect of siblings on an 
individual's early recall has not been a major focus of study. Wang et al. (1998) 
investigated the effect of growing up as an only child in China and what effect this 
would have on autobiographical memory. They found that early memories for 
adolescents who did not have siblings, their early memories were on average 9 
months earlier than adolescents with siblings. The early memories of the only-
children were also more self-oriented, whereas, the early memories of the adolescents 
who had siblings were more likely to contain information about family members and 
social interactions. In the adult study, due to the low numbers of participants who did 
not have any siblings, no analyses were done to investigate the relation between 
autobiographical memory and the number of siblings an individual has. Therefore the 
results can not be compared to previous research by Wang et al. (1998). 
As far as I know, to date, the effect of siblings on the recall of children has not 
been investigated. In the first study, there were no correlations between the amount of 
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elaboration the child provided during talk about the past and the number of siblings 
the child had. There was an effect of siblings on the amount of prompted objects the 
child recalled for the laboratory event. The children who had siblings recalled more 
objects when prompted than only- children. In the second study there was no 
difference in the amount of elaboration for children with or without siblings and no 
correlation between children's elaboration used during past event talk with their 
mothers and the number of siblings. I did not find a reliable difference on the 
children's autobiographical memory between children with siblings and only-children. 
Theory of Mind and Pretence 
Another question the study addressed was the relation between theory of mind 
and pretence. Lillard (2002) proposed that taking part in pretend play may lead to a 
more advanced theory of mind understanding. Many studies have found a relation 
between theory of mind and various aspects of pretend play in children. Astington and 
Jenkins (1995) found that children with more advanced theory of mind used more 
joint proposals and role assignments during pretend play. Jenkins and Astington (2000) 
also found the relation between the children's theory of mind, role assignment, and 
joint planning longitudinally. The changes in the children's use of joint planning and 
role assignment were predicted by their theory of mind understanding. Nielson and 
Dissanayake (2002) found that children who showed better theory of mind 
understanding also used more role assignment and object substitution when they were 
between 36 and 53 months old. In the second study, I investigated the relation 
between theory of mind and the amount of pretence a child took part in. There was no 
significant correlation between the children's theory of mind at 4 years and any ofthe 
pretence measures: the amount of pretence the child engaged in, the amount the 
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parents engaged with the child, the child having a pretend friend or pretending to act 
as another person or animal, and joint pretence between the parents and child. The 
current results are not consistent with previous studies. One possible explanation is 
that we used a parental questionnaire to measure the child's use and experience with 
pretence. Other studies have used observational measures of the children engaging in 
pretend play. 
Problems and Strengths 
There are a few problems with the current research, some of which are 
problems with research in general. The samples used are generally white middle class 
participants, from homogenous backgrounds. Because of our relatively homogenous 
sample it is not possible to generalize the results to different cultures, and less 
privileged backgrounds. There may be a socio-economic bias to the sample. 
A problem that is inherent in autobiographical memory research 1s the 
accuracy of the memory report. Either the detail of the memory or the age that the 
reported memory occurred at can not be accurately assessed. Other studies that have 
asked for confirmation of the memories from parents or others involved and generally 
found that the memory reports are accurate. Another problem is whether the memory 
is actually recalled as being experienced or whether it has become part of a family 
story, or supported by family pictures, so it is either recalled from the family retelling 
or has been rehearsed and changed during talk with others. In the first and second 
studies the mothers would confirm or deny the child's report at the time of recall and 
would generally work to resolve the discrepancies of their recall. In Study 1 where the 
child was asked to recall a laboratory event from sixth months previously, it was 
possible to check the accuracy of their reports from the video recording taken at the 
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time of the event. Also the shared memory talk with parents in the first two studies 
may not become part of the children's later autobiographical memory. As yet, no 
research has established parameters of an event that ensure it will become part of the 
adult's autobiographical memory. 
Another problem inherent with research using children is incomplete date sets. 
Some children did not complete the sessions, either due to time constraints or task 
refusal I did not have complete data sets. For the analysis of the results mean values 
for that task were substituted for the missing values. This, however, did not change 
the overall pattern of results. 
The current studies had numerous strengths. In the first study data was 
collected longitudinally over a period of 12 months. The children were tested at 42-, 
48- and 54- months. This allowed me to investigate the directionality of the relations 
between theory of mind, language and emotion understanding. Another strength of all 
three studies were the multiple measures taken for each ability. Theory of mind has 
been measured in a multitude of studies using single measures, which has lead to the 
impression that theory of mind understanding is an all- or -none ability. By using 
multiple measures we can get a clearer picture of the child's theory of mind 
understanding. As well, there were also multiple measures used for emotion 
understanding. Evidence that theory of mind understanding is not an all- or -none 
ability was clearly shown in the third study in adults. There was considerable 
variation in the adults' performances on the theory of mind tasks, so simply passing 
first order false belief cannot be taken as a litmus test of theory of mind understanding. 
Two other positive notes are worth mentioning. There was little drop out from 
the longitudinal study, so it was possible to maintain a large sample size and we found 
consistent results across two separate samples of children. 
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Conclusions and Future Directions. 
The series of studies described here show some interesting relations between 
children's and adult's cognitive abilities. Emotion understanding and theory of mind 
understanding appear to be related but distinct abilities in children, with language 
acting as a mediating factor in the relationship. The current studies did not find a 
consistent relation between theory of mind understanding and autobiographical 
memory, as has been proposed by Perner and Welch-Ross. However, the development 
of these cognitive abilities is related to maternal talk. Language development is also a 
factor both in the development of theory of mind and autobiographical memory. 
Gender has also been found to relate to the development of emotion 
understanding, theory of mind and autobiographical memory. In the current studies, 
the participants' gender only related to the children's and adults' emotion 
understanding. There were no consistent gender differences found in theory of mind 
understanding or autobiographical memory. 
I have concluded that one of the factors that strongly influences the 
development of theory of mind, emotion understanding and autobiographical memory 
is language. It is less clear why language has this important role, whether it be the 
language abilities itself (i.e., vocabulary and syntax), or the communication 
opportunities having language provides (i.e., talk about mental states, maternal 
elaborateness), or it may be the symbolic function of language, which provides 
children practice at representational flexibility. 
Future research could explicitly investigate the function that language serves 
in the development of theory of mind, emotion understanding, and autobiographical 
memory. It may be that representational understanding is the underlying cognitive 
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ability to theory of mind, emotion understanding and autobiographical memory. The 
understanding of language as symbolic and representational, measured by children's 
ability to possess multiple labels for an object (e.g., rabbit, bunny and animal), may 
relate to children's theory of mind, emotion understanding, and autobiographical 
memory. 
The relation between the children's symbolic understanding, their theory of 
mind, emotion understanding and autobiographical memory could be measured over a 
period of years extending from 36 months of age to 54- months. Another future 
direction could be a discussion about a past event between a child and an adult who is 
nai've about the event. This would allow a direct measure of the amount of elaboration 
the child provides during past event talk without being influenced by the amount of 
elaboration the mother provides. 
In summary, I believe the main finding of these studies is that parents are 
important. How parents talk to their children is related to their children's theory of 
mind understanding, emotion understanding and autobiographical memory. Also, 
mothers who have better emotion understanding have children with better 
understanding of others' emotions. The overall pattern of results from these studies 
shows some support for the importance of socialization in the development of theory 
of mind, emotion understanding and autobiographical memory. 
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Child's Participant Identification Number: 
Please read the following questions carefully, and circle the appropriate answer. 
All responses are confidential. 
1. Does s/he join in playing games with other children easily? Yes 
2. Does s/he come up to you spontaneously for a chat? Yes 
3. Was s/he speaking by 2 years old? Yes 
4. Does s/he enjoy sports? Yes 
5. Is it important to him/her to fit in with the peer group? Yes 
6. Does s/he appear to notice unusual details that 
others miss? Yes 
7. Does s/he tend to take things literally? Yes 
8. When s/he was 3 years old, did s/he spend a lot of time 
pretending (e.g., play-acting being a superhero, or 
holding teddy's tea parties)? 
9. Does s/he like to do things over and over again, 
in the same way all the time? 
10. Does s/he find it easy to interact with other 
children? 
11. Can s/he keep a two-way conversation going? 
12. Cans/he read appropriately for his/her age? 
13. Does s/he mostly have the same interests as 
his/her peers? 
14. Does s/he have an interest which takes up so much 
time that s/he does little else? 
15. Does s/he have friends, rather than just acquaintances? 
16. Does s/he often bring you things s/he is interested 
in to show you? 





























18. Does s/he have difficulty understanding the rules 
for polite behaviour? Yes No 
19. Does s/he appear to have an unusual memory for 
details? Yes No 
? 20. Is his/her voice unusual (e.g., overly adult, flat, or 
" very monotonous)? Yes No 
21. Are people important to him/her? Yes No 
22. Cans/he dress him/herself? Yes No 
23. Is s/he good at turn-taking in conversation? Yes No 
24. Does s/he play imaginatively with other 
children, and engage in role-play? Yes No 
25. Does s/he often do or say things that are tactless 
or socially inappropriate? Yes No 
26. Can s/he count to 50 without leaving out any 
numbers? Yes No 
27. Does s/he make normal eye-contact? Yes No 
28. Does s/he have any unusual and repetitive 
movements? Yes No 
29. Is his/her social behaviour very one-sided and 
always on his/her own terms? Yes No 
30. Does s/he sometimes say "you" or "s/he" when 
s/he means "I"? Yes No 
31. Does s/he prefer imaginative activities such as 
play-acting or story-telling, rather than numbers 
or lists of facts? Yes No 
32. Does s/he sometimes lose the listener because of 
not explaining what s/he is talking about? Yes No 
33. Cans/he ride a bicycle (even if with stabilisers)? Yes No 
34. Does s/he try to impose routines on him/herself, 
or on others, in such a way that it causes problems? Yes No 
35. Does s/he care how s/he is perceived by the rest of 
the group? Yes No 
36. Does s/he often turn conversations to his/her 
favourite subject rather than following what the other 
person wants to talk about? Yes No 
37. Does s/he have odd or unusual phrases? Yes No 
SPECIAL NEEDS SECTION 
Please complete as appropriate 
38. Have teachers/health visitors ever expressed any 
concerns about his/her development? Yes No 
If Yes, please specify ................................................................................................. . 
39. Has s/he ever been diagnosed with any of the following?: 
Language delay Yes No 
Hyperactivity/Attention Deficit Disorder (ADHD) Yes No 
Hearing or visual difficulties Yes No 
Autism Spectrum Condition, incl. Asperger's Syndrome Yes No 
A physical disability Yes No 





ALL INFORMATION REMAINS STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL 
Participant Identification Number: .......................................... . 
How to fill out the questionnaire 
Below are a list of statements. Please read each statement very carefully and rate how 
strongly you agree or disagree with it by ticking the appropriate column. 
strongly slightly slightly strongly 
agree agree disagree d" Isagree 
.~ 
I can easily tell if someone else wants to enter a . 1. . 
. conversation . • ... .. .... .. .... .. .. .. .... .. 
2. I prefer animals to humans. ! 
: 
~~~ 
.... . ...... ...... ... .. ......... 





.. .. .. ... ......... ... ... .... .. · ..... ...... .i 
'14:· I find it difficult to explain to others things that i . 





. understand it the first time. : i .. .... .. ...... ..... " .... 
~~H~ost nights -~-~~; L ........ ; ...... ... . Ci .I .. , . . . .... ... .. ....... '. ....... . .............................. 




7. I try to solve my own problems rather than . ! 
i 
discussing them with others. . 
• ................. i ::.:.: ..... 
; 
......... : .. : ........ .. .......... . .. .. " 
---··-»••··~ 
......... 
8. I find it hard to know what to do in a social i 
: situation. : 
..... 
J9. I am at my best first thing in the morning. ....... .I • ........ "" ........... ' .. . .... ....... . ........ .......... ...... ' ............ " " ...... ·' ............ . ........ 
'!'"''"'•• mm~"""""""""""" """" 
·!10. People often tell me that I went too far in i . driving my point home in a discussion. ; 
j ................. \ •............ : ............. '... ...... ..... . . .... ... ..... .. ......... ' . ..... ...... ... ......... .. ... .. J . ....... 
:11 L! It doesn't bother me too much ifl am late : ···-··, : 
' . 
I I meeting a friend. 
.. i .. . ... . ... · 
• f1i j F?~~d~hip~-~~d relation;hips are j.ust to~-· ' 
. I difficult, so I tend not to bother with them. 
L ..... .. .. .. . ... ..... . . ... 
! ............ .. ......................... 






C:ii.:c .. :.:.·. 
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14. I often find it difficult to judge if something is 
rude or polite. 
: 
·~·····~··· 
15. In a conversation, I tend to focus on my own 
• 
thoughts rather than on what my listener might : 
be thinking. 
; 
......... ··•·· .... ... •.•... .. . .............. ... .......... ·.:.: .. , ...... . ..•. .. ··: ... . ~.- I prefer practical jokes to verbal humour. 
"-~~· ...... ... .... .. . .. ......... 'L ..... . .. 117. I live life for today rather than the future. 
,:.~ ... . ..... ... .. ..... ...... . .............................. .. ..... . ... .......... .. 
• 18.1 When I as a child, I enjoyed cutting up worms 
. to see what would happen. • 
i j .... .. . . .. 
~ 
I can pick up quickly if someone says one thing 
i 
. 
but means another. i 
i i . ............. 
20. I tend to have very strong opinions about i 
morality. i 
........ :. . ......... ' 
i ····:····· 
...... ...... .... . .. ... .......... ... ........................... ..! .... . ....... 
. 21. It is hard for me to see why some things upset ! 
people so much. i . . 
. ;:;:.;:;_;-' ... .. . ...... .. . ... ···:.·· . · .. ·cc· ..•.. ........ L .. , ...... 
. 22. I find it easy to put myself in somebody else's i 
shoes. i i i 
................... .·, ................................ 
23. I think that good manners are the most i i 
i ' 
i 
important thing a parent can teach their child. 
:::.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.: .. . ... . . ... .. .. .. ................................. ,:. . ..... • ....... . ... 
24. I like to do things on the spur of the moment. ; i i 
.. 
I am good at predicting how someone will feel. I 
i 
.;.26~ I am quick to spot when someone in a group is i : 
. feeling awkward or uncomfortable. i i 
""' ,., ......... ....... . ... . . ..... .• .. .. . .............. . ··: .... ..... .. .. .... . .......... : .. ··: ........ ; .............. : .. · ... :.·· ... 
. 
27. If I say something that someone else is • 
offended by, I think that that's their problem, i i '. 
i 
' not mine. : 
i•· .. :.cc.·· .. . ... .. .... ... ...... .. ...... .... .• ...... •.. .. . ....................... : ............. : .............. . ........ ..... ..... .. ... 
~8 If anyone asked me if I liked their haircut, I 
. would reply truthfully, even ifl didn't like it. : ! 
.. ... '. . ....... 
. 9 . I can't always see why someone should have 
: felt offended by a remark. 
: 
•,·-··-· •... . ··~-. ... 
30. People often tell me that I am very : i i 
' : 
unpredictable. : . 




social gathering. I . : 
.. .: .... 
·--·~·~·~~-~=~~~-~·-~-~~~~·~-
f32. Seeing people cry doesn't really upset me. 
... .... . .... 
[~3. I enjoy having discussions about politics. :: Jl ... ·.· ... . :.: .... · . .: ; 
251 
: , ............ 
34. I am very blunt, which some people take to be 
rudeness, even though this is unintentional. 
• 
! .. .. .. ...... ! 
35. I don't tend to find social situations confusing. : 
.... .! 
"36: Other people tell me I am good at 
understanding how they are feeling and what ! . 
• . ! 
they are thinking. I ', I .. .. .. ............... 
37. When I talk to people, I tend to talk about their 
experiences rather than my own. 
• ·I It upsets me to see an animal in pain. .. 
3~ I am able to make decisions without being ! 
influenced by people's feelings. . 
' 40. I can't relax until I have done everything I had I i 
. 
planned to do that day. 
•, ............... .. .• .. 
41. I can easily tell if someone else is interested or 
' 
bored with what I am saying. 
. 
,-42 . ... ... ...· .. ..... ·.·.: . I get upset if I see people suffering on news 
programmes. ; 
!''"":"::"• 
! 43. Friends usually talk to me about their problems i 
' 
as they say that I am very understanding. . 
• , ................... 
' 44. I can sense if I am intruding, even if the other . 
; 
person doesn't tell me. 
• 
-- "~-~~--~-~-.,..,._~ .. . ... :.-.... ~-·---~- .. .... 
45. I often start new hobbies but quickly become ' 





46. People sometimes tell me that I have gone too 
I 
far with teasing. 
i ................. 
47. I would be too nervous to go on a big roller-
i coaster. 
... . .. ... . .. ...... .. ... .... .. •. ... .. ................. 
48. Other people often say that I am insensitive, ; ' 
though I don't always see why . 
.................. 
49. If I see a stranger in a group, I think that it is up 
:I to them to make an effort to join in. . 
;::;;_.,;,;:;::.'•••••cc •• "!'(''""""''' ,.,, • •• •· '"'"'"'"' ••• .......... ......... .......... .:! ....... .. ,, ...... '".'".' .. : .. 
I usually stay emotionally detached when • 
watching a film. : : i 
~ 
... 
51. I like to be very organised in day to day life ; 





j .. ! 
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, ...................... 
. 52. I can tune into how someone else feels rapidly ; 
and intuitively. 
53. I don't like to take risks. 
. .. , .................... 
54. I can easily work out what another person 
might want to talk about. 
I 
... ... .. ........ .... ~ .. 
55. I can tell if someone is masking their true 
emotion. 
.. ...... ... . 
·56. Bdu1v making a decision I always weigh up 
I the pros and cons. 
;· .•. 1.1.1. ... . i .. . .... ....... 
57.1 I do~;tco~~c·i;~8iyw;~k;~iih:~~i~~c;[80c .. i~i ; ; 
I situations. : 
!. .• ... • .. . ......... •·••· .. ····· ........ ....... . .. .. ..... 
r~~:r~: good at predicting what someone will do. 
·~ . . . ~--~~-~-····-·~~-·-~··--~ ..... :::_.. .. .. . ..•• l. .... 
59. I tend to get emotionally involved with a : 
friend's problems. 
. ... 
60. I can usually appreciate the other person's 
viewpoint, even ifl don't agree with it. ! I 
Appendix C 
TheSQ 
ALL INFORMATION REMAINS STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL 
Participant Identification Number: .......................................... . 
How to fill out the questionnaire 
Below are a list of statements. Please read each statement very carefully and rate 
how strongly you agree or disagree with it by ticking the appropriate column. 
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strongly slightly slightly strongly 
a~ree a~ree tsa~ree 1sa~ree d' d' 
' 1 •I When I listen to a pie~~ of ~~~ic, I ~l;~y;·r{otic~--
• the way it's structured. 
i .. .. .. .. 
-~~-2""' I adhere to common superstitions. 




I prefer to read non-fiction than fiction . 
.. ... . .. . .. ·--·s-· If I were buying a car, I would want to obtain 
specific information about its engine capacity. 
, ...... ,.~~~-· ... .... "' .... .. ... ... .... ...... .... .............. "" .... ' . " ... '" """ 
6 When I look at a painting, I do not usually think 
• about the technique involved in making it. 
' 
C'"""'~~ 
7 If there was a problem with the electrical wiring 
in my home, I'd be able to fix it myself. 








When I watch a film, I prefer to be with a group 




1 .•.•.•. ·.· '' .. 
""'•••··~----_.-. .-............... ~----···-·· ............ ""''"'-'"'"""'""'" ... "w"""~'''""""_."""'' ................................... _ ....... , .... '•••••• .···· .: .. ... ... ... '' 
10 I am interested in learning about different ' . 
i 
religions. ; 
.. .... .. .. ..... 




~-- 12 I do not enjoy games that involve a high degree 
I of strategy. . 
I .... .. 
fascinated by how machines work. 
I 
14 I make it a point of listening to the news each . 
mornmg . 
... ~ .... ::.~ ... .... .. . ... 
15 In maths, I am intrigued by the rules and patterns . 
. governing numbers . . 
~-
I am bad about keeping in touch with old friends. 
'· .......... . ... ... ...... .. .... .... ........... ........ .. ..... ...... ... ... ..... .. .. 
..) 
7J When I am relating a story, I often leave out 
I details and just give the gist of what happened. 
l 
l 
. .. ..... . 
18 I find it difficult to understand instruction 
manuals for putting appliances together. 
I 
,. ................ ·················· 
19 When I look at an animal, I like to know the ! 
precise species it belongs to. . ; 
......................... ... ... .. .. ... .. .. ······ ... ... .... .. .. . ....... ... ... 
20 If I were buying a computer, I would want to 
know exact details about its hard drive capacity 
. 
and processor speed. 
• . ······ .. .. .. ...... . .. 
·i2i I enjoy participating in sport. 
.. . . 
. I 22 I try to avoid doing household chores if I can . 
............. _ 
23 When I cook, I do not think about exactly how 
different methods and ingredients contribute to • 
the final product. . 
...... ·r·-·--·, I find it difficult to read and understand maps. I ! 24 I ... .. .... ·r .,._, .. ,., ____ ,,,,. . .......................... 
I 
25. Ifl had a collection (e.g., CDs, coins, stamps), it 
would be highly organised. 
1.. . . ... ... . .. 
--2"'6' When I look at a piece of furniture, I do not 
notice the details of how it was constructed. 
.. ... .... ..... ... ... . ..... ... .. ...... .. ........... ... ..... 
-·~ ... - . ..... l ......... .... ··· .. ··.:· . . .... ·: 
~7 The idea of engaging in 'risk-taking' activities 
appeals to me. 
• 
I 
.... ··~~--~"-~~~-~ . 
8 When I learn about historical events, I do not 
focus on exact dates . 
.................. 
29 When I read the newspaper, I am drawn to tables 
• 
of information, such as football league scores or : : 
• 
stock market indices . 
.............. 30' 
When I learn a language, I become intrigued by 
. its grammatical rules . 
.... .. : .... ..... . :: .. ···:·:·::·:.· ..... ....... ·· .. ·: . ·.: .. ···: .. :.: ... :::'.cc::·" .... ·::·•-=-='- '·:. 
: 
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' """'"""'"m"•••• '""""''''"'"m"-'' ' • "" '""'"'""""""""""'""'"""""""""-'"'"""""'"'""''""""'" • • • •• • """"""' """""'"''~ 
1 31 I find it difficult to learn my way around a new 
I • city. 
r·-32' 
I . 
~~~~~··"·---~~··-····-····-~---~--········--·--·-·-·--·~····-··~·~····-···-·-~-····· ,~~""""'"""'""""'""" f""""---~· .. '- ,... ... ~ .... - ......... f""""""""""""'"'"""""'"""""""" 
I 
1 
I do not tend to watch science documentaries on 
television or read articles about science and 
nature. 
~-~:;;·r-------... - ... --~·-----~----··---.... __ "' ,.c .. .-:·:;_:_·::::., r-"-~""""""1~~~-- ,--·· ____ • __ 
33 If I were buying a stereo, I would want to know 
about its precise technical features. 
34 j I find it easy to grasp exactly how odds work in 
i betting. 
i 
35 I am not very meticulous when I carry out D.I.Y. 
:-""'"'"'"- . 
36 I find it easy to carry on a conversation with 





...... , .. ···············-·" ·····················································································- ................................................... , ................ , ..•••.....••••...•...•.••.... , ........... , ..........................................• 
3 7 When I look at a building, I am curious about the 
precise way it was constructed. I 
.. :.cc:: ······· ........... "'" ..... .... .. ......... ... " ............. II .. ,, .. 
.. 38 When an election is being held, I am not I 
, ............. """"""''"''""'".· .. ... .. .. 
I interested in the results for each constituency. .. 
.. .. .. .. . . ...... .. .. .. .. ... :~-"-···-·· ;--~ .. ·-·""" r~·-·-~·~ ..,I .. .. .. .... 




pay me back exactly what they owe me. 
1 
I find it difficult to understand information the 
bank send me on different investment and saving I 
systems. 




· · "4i, ..... W ............ h .... e ..... n ....... t ..r·--a ... v ....... e .... l ..li .....n_ .. g ......... b ...... y ......... t ... r ... a ...i ..n ..... , ..... I ...... o ...ft ........ e .....n ......... w ........ o ... n ...... d .... e ......r ....... e ..... x .... a ....c ....t .... l.y .............. , .......................... ,lr· .. ···•· .......................................... , .................................... .. 
: I how the rail networks are coordinated. 
.. . . .. •· ... 
42 When I buy a new appliance, I do not read the 
instruction manual very thoroughly. 
43 If I were buying a camera, I would not look 
carefully into the quality of the lens. 
,.. ....................... ·.•. ,.. ...................................................................................................................................... "....................... ...................... . ....................................................... ,.. ........................................................... , ............................ ·, ................................... . 
44 When I read something, I always notice whether • · 
it is grammatically correct. ' I 
. .... .... ..... ... ..... .... .. .. . ..... : ....... ':·:·: ·····, .............................. · .. ·..... , 
1 ··45 When I hear the weather forecast, I am not very 
interested in the meteorological patterns. 
I 46 I often wonder what it would be like to be 
I 
I someone else. : 
I find it difficult to do two things at once. 
' · 48, When I look at a mountain, I think about how 
• precisely it was formed. 






49 I can easily visualise how the motorways in my 
region link up. : 
'"''' .. . ..... '" .. ... ···: . .. . ............ .. ... .. .. . . .. 
"'"'""""~'" 
·r· so. When I'm in a restaurant, I often have a hard 
I time deciding what to order. I 
: I 
:-·~ 
When I'm in a plane, I do not think about the 51 
aerodynamics. 
·························• 
52 I often forget the precise details of conversations 
I've had. 
.... .: 
~-51 When I am walking in the country, I am curious I I 
. about how the various kinds of trees differ. I I 
·:···· .1 .. 'i .... ... ... ..• ...... . ..... ........ .. ::··· ·:· . ..... .. :: ..... . . ....... ··' . .......... 
54 After meeting someone just once or twice, I find 
. it difficult to remember precisely what they look 
t 
! like. L ... , .. : .. ... .·· ... ··:: ... ... ..... . -~·-~··· 
55 I am interested in knowing the path a river takes 
from its source to the sea . 
..................... 
56 I do not read legal documents very carefully. 
,. ................... ............................. 
57 I am not interested in understanding how 
wireless communication works. 
•.. : .. ... . ... ·:.· ... 
58 I am curious about life on other planets. ... l . ... .... .. . .... .. .... .. .. ..... ..• .. .. .... . . ........ 
.. ~5~1 When I travel, I like to learn specific details ~ .. ~~ 
1 about the culture of the place I am visiting. 
: ... 
: 
..... ... . .. .... 
~···6o I do not care to know the names of the plants I 
see. : 
• • . ... 
Appendix D 
Parent-Child Use of Pretence in the Home 
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These questions are about things your child may have been taking part in over the 
last six months. 
1. As well as having other children as friends, a lot of children also have pretend 
friends. Does your child have a pretend friend? D Yes D No D Unsure 
If Yes: 
a. What is the name of your child's pretend friend? 
b. Is your child's pretend friend a toy or completely pretend? 
2. Does your child ever pretend to be an animal or a person? 
DYes D No D Unsure 
If Yes: 
a. Who or what does your child pretend to be? 
b. How often does your child engage in impersonation? (e.g: every day for a 
month or more, once a week, occasionally?) 
Please indicate whether of the following behaviours occur in your home: 
Parent intentionally mislabels an object or person 
'cl1ild il1te11t16I1h~IY: iliisi~r>eis •ati () hjea 0ti>~i-86i1 ·· · · ··· · · 
'''"~"~~"' " ', ":~"'''·•A:C '' ,.:;,_,", < > '<•~ 
Parent pretends to use an object in an unconventional way 
(e.g., pretends that a banana is a telephone) 
tchiidpi~reP:aS'tb·u~·gah 9~JecUiilatitiri28~\rciili16Iiai•W~Y 
Parent uses child's toys as if they were real 
(e.g., pretending to eat plastic food) 
Parent teasingly makes up an outrageous lie that is 

















:cJ:riidteasihglymakes up an outrageous liethatis 
'~bvi()usly. unti11e • 
;;;, :.~:-< '<. 'm,~:~ ~: _;> c, -,-, <::,;-;~,~C;;;~:{';~~,<, 
Parent and child engage in pretend role-playing 
(e.g., "Peter Pan") 
Child teases and/or exaggerates in a playful way 
with parent 
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So that we can provide a general description of backgrounds that the participants in 
our study come from, we need to ask about your education and work and family. 
Information you contribute will not be linked with your individual responses, but 
rather used to present a big picture of the range of participants that have taken part in 
this study. 
1. Age D years + D months 
2. Gender: Male I Female (Circle) 
3. Ethnicity: 
4. Primary language: 
5. Other languages: 
6. At what age (approximately) did you start to talk (say small sentences)?:-
7. Any others living in the household prior to age 8 (and who)?: 
8. Parent's employment prior to age 8 (full time/ part time)? 
9. Main caregiver: 
10. Did you attend preschool, kindergarten or daycare? What ages? -----
11. The current ages of any siblings that you have: 
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Please tick the box which best describes your total household income before tax 
0 less than $20 000 
0 $20 000 - $40 000 
0 more than $40 000 
Please tick your highest educational qualification on the list below 
0 No School Certificate 
0 School certificate in one or more subjects 
0 Sixth Form Ce1iificate or University Entrance in one or more subjects 
0 University Bursary or Scholarship 
0 Overseas Qualification ( eg., UK GCE; please specify ) 
0 Post-secondary (e.g., diploma, trade certificate) 
0 Tertiary Degree 
0 Other Qualification (please specify ) --------
Your occupation __________________ _ 
